Thursday, February 26, 2026
Page 3
Court of Appeal:
Trial Judge Erred in Issuing DVRO Against Absent Inmate
Opinion Tries to Strike Balance Between Safeguarding Rights of Prisoner, Who Was Allegedly Incarcerated for Assaulting Petitioning Party, While Protecting Victim by Not Immediately Dissolving Order
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal held yesterday that a trial judge erred in issuing a domestic violence protective order against an inmate who was not present in court for the hearing, allegedly due to his incarceration on charges that he assaulted the petitioner, saying the jurist abused her discretion by failing to ensure that he be given meaningful access to court after he requested help in making an appearance.
However, seeking to strike a balance between the inmate’s due process rights and the safety of the victim, the court expressed a desire to “place the parties as close as possible to the status quo ante” and declared:
“[W]e do not immediately dissolve the current protective order. [The petitioner] successfully obtained a [temporary restraining order] and was entitled to its protection pending the hearing on [the permanent order]. We therefore leave the protective order in force until at least 30 days after issuance of this court’s remittitur.”
Yesterday’s opinion, by Justice Truc T. Do and joined in by Acting Presiding Justice Terry B. O’Rourke smd Justice David M. Rubin, highlights the importance of ensuring all litigants have meaningful access to the judicial system and notes that “this is the second time we reverse” a restraining order involving the same parties due to a judge’s failure to act on his request for help ensuring his presence in court. Do wrote:
“Indigent inmates in bona fide civil actions that threaten their interests have a right to meaningful access to the courts to be heard in their defense. The deprivation of that right is a violation of both the due process and equal protection clauses of both the state and federal constitutions.”
She added:
“And because the remedy for the denial of that fundamental right is a new hearing, it is critically important for both the petitioner and respondent…that courts promptly identify and address these requests by indigent inmates for access. Duplicative proceedings necessitated by such preventable errors are burdensome for victims of domestic violence and may discourage them from pursuing protective relief.”
Restraining Order Petition
Appealing the order was Daniel Acedo, referred to in the opinion as “D.A.,” who was serving time in a San Diego-area prison at the time his ex-fiancée, Jael Sanchez, petitioned the court for a domestic violence restraining order (“DVRO”) against him last February.
San Diego Superior Court Commissioner James T. Atkins had earlier issued a restraining order protecting Sanchez, who is identified in yesterday’s decision only as “J.S.,” in November 2023, but the decree was reversed in April 2024 after it was revealed that Acedo had not been present at the hearing despite having requested transport from jail to make an appearance. In her second petition, Sanchez alleged that Acedo had been abusive since the beginning of their relationship, had broken her nose in 2022, and had given her “many black eyes over the years.” She said that he “is currently in prison for the prior domestic violence against [her]” and had contacted her from the correctional facility early last year, saying “I hope you get raped” and “[i]f I cannot be with you, then you cannot be with anyone else.”
On Feb. 26, 2025, San Diego Superior Court Judge Brigid Campo issued a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) requiring Acedo to stay away from Sanchez upon his release and to refrain from contacting her. An evidentiary hearing was set for March 17 to determine whether to extend the relief.
Five days before the hearing date, Acedo filed a response objecting to the issuance of the TRO in his absence and requesting to “have the litigations coordinator at [the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation] prepare for me to appear by telephone by order of this court.”
After he failed to appear on March 17, 2025, the hearing was continued until April, at which time the court granted Sanchez a five-year DVRO against Acedo. Do makes note of the fact that “[t]he minutes do not show the court conducted a custody check for appellant at the time of the hearing” and “do not reflect that the court considered appellant’s…request for an order to appear by telephone.”
Meaningful Access
Saying “[w]e begin with what we consider to be the…dispositive issue in this appeal: whether appellant was improperly denied his right to meaningful access to the courts,” Do said that “[c]ourts have wide discretion and a variety of measures at their disposal to ensure an indigent inmate is provided with [such] access,” including deferral until his release, appointment of counsel, holding hearings in prison, and the use of electronic media.
Noting that “it is undisputed that appellant was in prison when J.S. filed her DVRO request” and had “asked the court to order” prison officials to make preparations for him to appear telephonically, she opined:
“Upon receipt of this request, and in light of the information in its record, the trial court was required to (1) determine whether appellant was indigent, (2) determine whether J.S.’s application for a DVRO was a bona fide threat to appellant’s personal or property interests, and (3) if the first two conditions were satisfied, consider what measures were available to protect appellant’s right of meaningful access to the courts….The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider and rule on appellant’s request before holding the evidentiary hearing without him.”
She continued: “The remedy for the trial court’s error is a new hearing that comports with the principles of due process and equal protection….On remand, the trial court must determine whether appellant is presently indigent and whether he is still incarcerated or otherwise subject to restrictions on his liberty that necessitate assistance with meaningful access to the courts….If so, the court shall exercise its discretion to select or fashion an appropriate means of affording him meaningful access….If not, appellant will have the opportunity to hire an attorney or appear on his own behalf at any further proceedings.”
The jurist commented that “we expect the trial court to conduct a new hearing” within the 30 days following remittitur should Sanchez still seek a permanent order and declared:
“The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our opinion. The TRO issued on February 26, 2025 is reinstated and shall remain in force until at least 30 days after issuance of this court’s remittitur. Neither party shall recover costs on appeal.”
The case is J.S. v. D.A., 2026 S.O.S. 504.
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