Tuesday, November 4, 2025
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Court of Appeal:
County Fire Worker Properly Restrained for Shooting Remark
Opinion Says No Error in Issuing Workplace Violence Restraining Order Against Employee Accused of Bringing up 2021 Fatal Incident at Another Station, Saying ‘They’re Going to Have Another Situation’ if Things Don’t Change
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
Div. One of the Court of Appeal for this district has held that a workplace violence restraining order was properly issued against a Los Angeles County Fire Department employee who is accused of telling a secretary that “[i]f they don’t change things in his department, they are going to have another situation like they had with Tatone,” referencing a 2021 incident at another station in which one firefighter fatally shot another.
“Tatone” was the shooter, Jonathan Tatone.
In the unpublished opinion, filed Friday and posted on the California Courts website yesterday, the court opined that the statement in issue was properly found to be an implied threat against an assistant chief with whom the speaker had allegedly argued a week prior.
Acting Presiding Justice Helen I. Bendix authored the opinion, joined in by Justices Gregory J. Weingart and Michelle C. Kim, rejecting the restrained party’s contentions that the statement did not amount to a credible threat of violence against the assistant chief for purposes of the workplace restraining order statute, found at Code of Civil Procedure §527.8. That section provides:
“Any employer…of an employee who has suffered…a credible threat of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee….”
A “credible threat of violence” is defined as “a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for their safety, or the safety of their immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.”
In Friday’s opinion, Bendix also highlighted that the restrained employee’s counsel, Sacramento attorney Robert Lucas, may have “misuse[d]” artificial intelligence tools to draft the opening brief, noting the citation to a fabricated case, among other flaws, and saying:
“[I]n a separate ruling issued concurrently with this opinion, we order [Lucas] to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for misusing artificial intelligence.”
Lucas was ordered to show case before the panel on Nov. 17 “why sanctions, including monetary sanctions payable to the court, should not be imposed against him.”
Angry Response
The question as to what qualifies as threatening behavior under §527.8 arose after allegedly made the offending statement to a fire department secretary, Cari Hughes, on Oct. 11, 2022. Assistant Chief Samuel Simpson reported that Niblett, then a senior mechanic, had responded angrily when asked to clean up items left on the floor of the Lancaster fire station six days earlier.
Niblett’s comment was apparently a reference to a June 1, 2021 incident in which Tatone, opened fire at an Agua Dulce station, killing a fellow employee, Tory Carlon, and injuring Los Angeles County Fire Department Captain Arnie Sandoval. Later that day, he committed suicide.
On Nov. 18, 2022, the county filed a petition for a workplace violence restraining order (“WVRO”) against Niblett, naming Simpson as the employee in need of protection.
In January 2023, Los Angeles Superior Court Commissioner Valerie L. Skeba granted the request after holding an evidentiary hearing, barring Niblett from harassing Simpson or entering his workplace for a three-year period.
Immediate Threat
Niblett asserted in his opening brief that a statement does not qualify under §527.8 unless there is “evidence of an immediate threat” and “intent to harm.” Bendix pointed out the “absence of statutory text supporting his position” and rejected his reliance on jurisprudence, saying that one case did not stand for the proposition for which it was referenced and another opinion could not be located based on the provided citation.
Turning to whether the “trial court could have inferred, to a high degree of probability, that a reasonable person would have interpreted Niblett’s reference to Tatone as an expression of his intent” to commit violence against management employees, she opined:
“[T]he shooting at [the Agua Dulce station] occurred just over a year before Niblett had this conversation with Hughes in October 2022….[Simpson] indicated in his testimony that the union representing field mechanics had ‘constantly’ been asking for ‘body armor’ since the shooting….Given the heightened state of fear among fire department personnel, the trial court could rationally have inferred that a reasonable employee would have interpreted Niblett’s statement as a sincere expression of intent to commit violent acts.”
Target of Threat
She concluded that it is reasonable to view the threat as targeting Simpson, pointing out that the assistant chief had averred that Niblett had repeatedly raised his voice at him to complain about decisions and, on Oct. 5, 2022, screamed profanity at him. She remarked:
“Insofar as Niblett is claiming the trial court lacked authority to issue the WVRO because he did not direct his threat specifically at Samuel, Niblett is mistaken. ‘An employer may seek relief under section 527.8 on behalf of any employee who is credibly threatened with unlawful violence, whether or not that employee is identified by the defendant.’ ”
The jurist was also unpersuaded by Niblett’s attempt to characterize his comment as “a hypothetical warning about potential consequences of poor management” and as serving the legitimate purpose of “[e]xpressing dissatisfaction with workplace management,” saying:
“[T]he record contains substantial evidence from which the trial court reasonably could have found it highly probable that Niblett made a knowing and willful statement that a reasonable person would interpret as a threat to shoot fire department personnel if management continued to make decisions Niblett disliked. This conclusion is fatal to Niblett’s claim he was merely criticizing management’s decisions.”
The court affirmed the issuance of the WVRO.
Citations in Brief
As to Lucas’ appellate briefing, Bendix said that “the County points out that [he] cite[d] an alleged case” that is either fictitious or for which the given citation was inaccurate, and that the attorney misrepresented the facts or holdings of other authorities.
She acknowledged that Lucas filed a notice of errata, deleting the fictitious case from the opening brief and conceding that the opinion does not “appear to exist,” attributing the error to artificial intelligence editing tools. However, the justice commented:
“It…appears Attorney Lucas used artificial intelligence to prepare the opening brief, filed the brief without verifying the accuracy of the case authority it discusses, and failed to correct his miscitation of cases appearing in the opening brief despite the County’s appellate brief noting these errors. Attorney Lucas’s behavior is troubling and presents potential ethical issues we cannot ignore….Attorney Lucas apparently believes we do not read cases cited in briefs. More disturbing is his apparent disregard of his duties as an officer of the court. Our legal system depends on the integrity of counsel and the bench. Citing nonexistent authority or misciting holdings of cases tarnishes the integrity of the process.”
She continued:
“For these reasons, we will order Attorney Lucas to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed on him for his misuse of artificial intelligence in briefing this appeal. The order to show cause is issued concurrently with this opinion.”
The case is County of Los Angeles v. Niblett, B327744.
Representing the county were Jeffrey Mark Hausman and Larry Dean Stratton of Hausman & Sosa LLP, based in Woodland Hills.
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