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C.A. Rejects Bid for Special Proof Standard for DUI Murders
Opinion Says Recent High Court Decision Finding That Implied Malice Requires High Probability of Death Does Not Mean That Cases Involving Intoxicated Drivers Must Involve Expert Opinion on Dangerousness
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
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RONALD PIERCE JR. slayer |
The Fifth District Court of Appeal has rejected a defendant’s assertion that prosecutors trying a defendant for murder based on a death caused by an intoxicated driver must, based on a recent California Supreme Court decision clarifying the standard for implied malice, present expert testimony as to whether the circumstances of the case presented a high probability of a fatality.
In an opinion authored by Acting Presiding Justice Jennifer R.S. Detjen and joined in by Justices Rosendo Peña Jr. and Thomas DeSantos, the court said that the evidence presented at his trial—showing that the defendant was driving while intoxicated at speeds nearing 100 miles per hour while participating in a spontaneous street race—was sufficient to meet the prosecution’s burden of proof without providing any expert opinion.
Wednesday’s decision also rejected the defendant’s assertion that the jury instruction given in his case, which defined implied malice without reference to a high probability of death standard announced a few months after his trial, rendered his conviction invalid.
At issue is the 2023 California Supreme Court decision in People v. Reyes which declared that “[t]o suffice for implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense” but must instead involve a high degree of probability that death will result from the actions of the accused.
Defendant Ronald Pierce Jr. maintained that the standard was not met in his case and also challenged his second-degree murder conviction by pointing to last year’s concurring opinion by Justice Kelli Evans appended to an order denying review over a vehicular homicide case involving a fatality in a high-speed crash. In People v. Doaifi, the jurist “urged the lower courts” to specifically analyze the probability of death in driving death cases and wrote:
“Speeding is unquestionably dangerous, reckless speeding even more so. But speeding itself, even at a high rate of speed, does not automatically equate to a [high probability of death]….Rather, an objective analysis of the risk of speeding must account for a myriad of factors….Expert testimony on traffic fatalities may be needed to objectively establish a ‘high degree of probability’ of causing death that adequately accounts for various risk factors.”
Fatal Collision
The question of proof arose after Pierce was found to have been driving a red Ford Mustang on Nov. 24, 2019, when the vehicle collided with a minivan on a road in Bakersfield and pushed that vehicle over a divider into oncoming traffic. Maria Navarro, who was driving the minivan, was killed in the ensuing accident, and her two grandchildren were seriously injured.
Pierce’s blood alcohol level was found to be 0.24% approximately two hours after the deadly collision.
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, among other crimes. In 2023, Kern Superior Court Judge Kenneth C. Twisselman II sentenced Pierce to upwards of 18 years to life in prison.”
Detjen wrote:
“[W]e hold substantial evidence supports a finding that defendant’s act satisfied the objective element of implied malice because it involved a high degree of probability that the act would result in death….We also hold substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding on the subjective element of implied malice, i.e., that defendant consciously disregarded the danger his actions posed to human life. Finally, we hold the instructions given on implied malice were legally correct.”
Murky Definition
Detjen said that the Reyes decision came after years of lament from lower courts that the statutory definition of malice is murky. However, she said that the case did not mandate a higher standard of proof for vehicular homicide cases, noting:
“[R]elying on Justice Evans’s statement concurring in the high court’s denial of review in Doaifi, defendant contends substantial evidence does not support a finding of implied malice because the prosecution failed to present expert testimony that ‘[defendant’s] act of driving while intoxicated at more than twice the speed limit on Old River Road…constitutes an act involving a high probability that it would result in death.’ He points out that ‘[t]he prosecution did not present any statistics with regard to traffic fatalities resulting from collisions involving excessive speed and/or drunk driving or street racing in Bakersfield, in California, or anywhere else.’ ”
Rejecting that line of reasoning, she remarked:
“As defendant recognizes, Justice Evans’s statement concurring in the high court’s denial of review in Doaifi is not binding on us. Defendant does not cite, and we do not find, controlling precedent suggesting that expert testimony is required to establish a high probability that a defendant’s act will result in death. In any event, Justice Evans does not suggest that expert testimony is required in all cases.”
The jurist opined that “substantial evidence supports a finding that defendant’s act satisfied the objective element of implied malice as clarified in Reyes because it was dangerous to life in more than a vague or speculative sense and instead involved a high degree of probability that the act would result in death,” saying:
“Defendant drove with a highly elevated blood-alcohol concentration of 0.24 percent and at speeds of up to 129 miles per hour while on city streets having a 55-miles per-hour speed limit and with many other drivers on the road. A rational juror could conclude that these factors combined raised the risk of death from the merely remote or possible to the highly probable.”
Appreciation of Harm
She also was unpersuaded that the prosecution failed to show that he appreciated the risk of fatal harm resulting from his actions, pointing out that “he exhibited highly dangerous driving, including traveling at speeds…nearly 75 miles per hour over the speed limit” and “he continued driving at high rates of speed, even after making a rapid lane change to avoid colliding with” another vehicle.
At the time of his trial, the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions defined implied malice without reference to a “high degree of probability of death” relating to the conduct in question. Those instructions were revised in 2023, following Reyes, to incorporate the standard.
Addressing Pierce’s claim of instructional error, Detjen wrote: “We disagree with defendant’s contention that [the given instruction] was incorrect under Reyes. Reyes did not involve jury instructions or hold that trial courts must instruct that the act required to support a finding of implied malice must involve a high probability that death will result….Because Reyes did not decide an instructional issue and did not overrule or disapprove of the high court’s prior cases, we….find no error in the implied malice instruction given at defendant’s trial.”
The case is People v. Pierce, 2025 S.O.S. 2499.
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