Tuesday, October 28, 2025
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Liability for DUI Murder Does Not Cease at Moment Defendant Stops Driving—C.A.
Opinion Declines to Adopt Bright Line Rule Based on Language in Prior Case
By a MetNews Staff Writer
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ROBERT COLE SUTTON decedent |
Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal held yesterday that a defendant who crashed into a minivan while driving intoxicated, causing a subsequent deadly collision by a motorcyclist with the wreckage of his inoperable car, was not entitled to have his murder charges set aside based on the fact that he was not driving at the time of the decedent’s accident.
At issue is whether the defendant can be held liable for murder under the California Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in People v. Watson which involved a defendant accused of speeding through an intersection while intoxicated, killing a mother and her six-year-old child. In that case, the high court held that the facts were sufficient to establish the requisite implied malice for second-degree murder charges.
Presiding Justice Judith McConnell, writing for the court, acknowledged that Div. One’s 2024 decision in People v. Superior Court (Chagolla) contains language arguably supporting the view that there is a bright-line rule that a defendant must be driving at the time of the deadly crash. However, McConnell declared:
“We…accept the parties’ invitation to clarify our decision in Chagolla and hold that liability for murder under the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Watson…does not automatically end the moment an intoxicated driver ceases driving.”
Justices Joan K. Irion and Julia C. Kelety joined in the opinion.
Chagolla Case
In Chagolla, a defendant under the influence of prescription painkillers led police on a high-speed chase before crashing into a guardrail and refusing to exit the car for 45 minutes. Police shut down a portion of the freeway, which caused rush hour traffic to stop and an ensuing multicar collision that claimed one person’s life.
Then-Acting Presiding Justice Richard D. Huffman (now retired) wrote the majority opinion, joined in by Kelety, in which the court found that the evidence fell short of establishing implied malice, reasoning that although the defendant “created a potential deadly situation that could have supported…[murder charges]…if a[n]…accident occurred while [she] was driving, the environment shortly after her vehicle crashed…was somewhat different.”
Justice Truc T. Do penned a concurring opinion, critiquing the majority’s focus on the question of driving, saying that causation was the critical issue because the victim’s death was too remote from the defendant’s actions to support murder liability.
Interstate Collision
The question of liability following a deadly collision again came before the court after Jose Nevarez crashed his Honda Pilot into a minivan traveling in front of him on Interstate 15 on Dec. 1, 2023, around 10 p.m. After hitting another car, Nevarez’s vehicle came to a stop against a concrete barrier wall.
A few minutes later, Robert Cole Sutton was driving his Harley Davidson motorcycle at a legal speed when he crashed into Nevarez’s Pilot, which was disabled and had no working lights on at the time. Sutton was pronounced dead at the scene.
Nevarez admitted to California Highway Patrol Officer Justin Wooten that he was drunk. Testing confirmed that his blood alcohol level was .15%, well above the legal limit.
He had a prior conviction for driving under the influence in October 2021 and, in that case, had been given a so-called “Watson admonishment,” in which he was warned that driving under the influence can lead to murder charges.
In December 2023, he was charged with murder and other charges relating to the December crash. After a preliminary hearing, Nevarez filed a motion to set aside the murder charges, citing Chagolla.
On April 4, San Diego Superior Court Judge Laura Parsky denied the request. Approximately two weeks later, Nevarez filed a petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the denial.
No Bright-Line Rule
Rejecting Nevarez’s assertion that the majority opinion in Chagolla created a bright-line rule, McConnell wrote:
“[T]here is sufficient evidence to support a probable cause finding with respect to both implied malice and proximate cause, and…Chagolla should not, as Nevarez argues, be expanded to preclude all liability for murder if a death occurs after the defendant ceases actively driving.”
She explained:
“[S]everal factors are relevant for assessing implied malice based on drunk driving: ‘(1) a blood-alcohol level above the .08 percent legal limit; (2) a predrinking intent to drive; (3) knowledge of the hazards of driving while intoxicated; and (4) highly dangerous driving.’…Not all of these factors need to be present to sustain a second-degree murder conviction under Watson and ‘there is no particular formula for analysis of vehicular homicide cases.’ ”
Applying those factors, she opined:
“With respect to the actus reus of implied malice murder, Nevarez drove while under the influence, with a high blood alcohol concentration level, and was speeding on a seven-lane freeway at night. Under existing law, this conduct created a high degree of probability of death under the circumstances.”
Endangers Human Life
The jurist added that “there was also direct evidence showing Nevarez knew that intoxicated driving endangers human life, but that he chose to drive drunk anyway,” citing his previous drunk driving conviction and his statement at the scene indicating that he was “drunk” and that there would be a “Watson charge.”
As to Chagolla, McConnell remarked:
“[W]e agree with the People that Nevarez’s expansive reading of the majority opinion in Chagolla to preclude murder liability unless the defendant is actively driving is inappropriate and leads to absurd results. Faced with a highly unusual set of facts, the majority concluded there was no evidence the defendant intended to cause the second accident, and thus implied malice was lacking. However, we do not read the majority opinion as eliminating implied malice murder anytime an intoxicated driver is no longer actively driving. Rather, as the majority noted, every unique case requires an examination of each element of the crime at issue, including consideration of both the existence of implied malice and proximate cause.”
She commented:
“The fact that Nevarez was no longer driving at the time his car was struck by Sutton’s motorcycle did not negate the existence of implied malice, and Chagolla does not require us to hold otherwise. As the People assert, ‘[t]he law requires a fact-specific causation analysis—not a rigid, bright-line rule that allows those who engaged in egregious, life-threatening conduct to escape accountability.’ ”
The case is Nevarez v. Superior Court (People), D085897.
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