Tuesday, November 18, 2025
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Court of Appeal:
Lease Proviso Doesn’t Govern Service of Court Documents
Segal Says Handing Summons, Complaint to Employee at Defendants’ Shop Didn’t Render Default Judgment Void
By a MetNews Staff Writer
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Above is a photo of an eyeglass store in Santa Monica. The Court of Appeal for this district held Friday that a default judgment based on substitute service at that location on an employee of the defendants was not defective based on a lease specifying delivery or mailing of papers to another address and a default judgment the plaintiff obtained is not void. |
A summons and complaint in an action seeking past-due rent from former commercial tenants, who had vacated the premises, were properly served by leaving them not at the address specified in the lease for delivery of notices, but at one of the defendants’ remaining places of business, Div. Seven of this district’s Court of Appeal has held.
Acting Presiding Justice John L. Segal authored the unpublished opinion, filed Friday. It affirms an order by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Mark H. Epstein denying a motion by Muhammad and Shaila Ali to vacate and set aside a default judgment for $353,571.17 based on unpaid rent, interest, attorney fees, and costs.
That judgment in favor of the former landlord, EJA Associates, L.P., was entered on Dec.17, 2021.
On July 19, 2022, an attorney for the Alis wrote to EJA’s lawyer indicating that the former tenants had just learned of the judgment and would seek to have it set aside. EJA’s lawyer responded that the Alis were “properly served” and, as reflected by a text message sent by Muhammad Ali on Sept. 6, 2021, “had actual notice of the lawsuit.”
Segal wrote:
“Nothing further happened in 2021.
“Nothing happened in 2022.
“Nothing happened in 2023.”
On April 4, 2024, the Alis filed a “Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and / or Default Judgment.” In light of the delay, relief under either a six-month statute or a two-year provision applicable to voidable judgments was unavailable.
Epstein’s Order
Epstein said in an Aug, 1, 2024 minute order denying relief: “The court’s view is that unless the judgment is void the motion will be denied.”
He remarked:
“[A] void judgment is just that: void. It can be attacked at any time and it can be attacked collaterally. That is powerful stuff, depriving a plaintiff of all practical rights many years later. While the case can be reinstated, years have passed and it may be much harder to garner evidence. That is very prejudicial, but it remains the law. However, while the remedy is powerful, the doctrine is narrow. A judgment is not void unless the infirmity is apparent from the face of the judgment roll alone. No extrinsic evidence will be admitted in that regard.”
Epstein went on to say:
“Here, defendants contend that the summons was not properly served. That may or may not be true, but it is not clear from the judgment roll. The proof of service on its face appears valid….Defendant also notes that the lease—which is attached to the complaint—has a particular address to which notices should be given, and that is not the address on the proof of service. That much is fine and at least arguably within the judgment roll. But the notice address for the lease is not dispositive here. Service of process is not governed by the lease; only service of notices required under the lease are so governed. Service of process is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, Here, those requirements were met—at least on the face of the judgment roll.”
The address set forth in the lease for service of notices “required by the Lease or applicable law” is that of the Alis’s residence in San Bernardino County.
Appellant’s Brief
The Alis said in their brief on appeal, prepared by Fullerton attorney Anju Multani:
“The lease provided for service of documents to be made at a particular address….
“Plaintiff landlord tried to serve the summons and complaint at an address where plaintiff knew the tenant/defendants were not to be found.
“Plaintiff/landlord was aware of the residence address for the defendants, yet took no steps to serve them at that address.
“The conduct of the plaintiff was to deprive the defendants of the ability to defend themselves in a lawsuit, to rush the matter to a judgment and then try to enforce a void judgment.”
Segal’s Opinion
Agreeing with Epstein that service at the Alis’s residence was not required, Segal said:
“Neither California law nor the lease, however, required EJA to serve the Alis with the summons and complaint at the address stated in the lease. As the trial court ruled, the Code of Civil Procedure, not the terms of a lease, governs service of process.”
He added that putting the “Code of Civil Procedure aside,” the lease “did not, contrary to the Alis’ primary argument on appeal, require EJA to serve the Alis at the address specified for notices in the lease.” Segal pointed out that the clause says that notices “may” be personally delivered or sent by mail there—“[n]ot that they must.”
The premises the couple leased from EJA, for use as a Sunsations Sunglass & Optical store, were at 1331 Third Street Promenade in Santa Monica. They vacated the premises in November 2020.
A process server had made two attempts to locate the Alis and serve them personally but was unsuccessful.
Substitute service was effected by handing papers to a clerk, identified by the process server as “Arlington Doe,” at a Sunsations store owned by the Alis at 1407 Third Street Promenade.
Contention Rejected
Segal found no merit in the proposition that service was made at a location where the Alis could not have been expected to be found, saying:
“The process server stated in his declarations of diligence ‘Arlington Doe,’ the store clerk, said that the Alis owned the store, that they owned ‘a few stores,’ but that they were ‘not in at the moment.’ A business address is a proper address for serving a defendant, even if the defendant has other business addresses or residences.”
The justice pointed to Code of Civil Procedure §415.20(b) which says that “a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s...usual place of business.”
He continued:
“That (according to the store clerk) the Alis were ‘not in at the moment’ the process server attempted to serve them and may have been at another of their stores does not show a lack of diligence. The Code of Civil Procedure did not require EJA to determine which of the Alis’ stores was the ‘home’ or ‘main’ store; one of their stores was enough.
“…[T]he the proofs of service showed service on a store employee named semi-fictitiously and described by physical characteristics. That was entirely proper.”
Defendant’s Declarations
The Alis each executed a declaration saying that they had never employed anyone named “Arlington” and that anyone at the location the process server went to would have been merely a clerk, not authorized to receive papers. Those declarations, however, were submitted in support of the motion to vacate the judgment and were not part of the judgment roll, so they could not be considered. Segal wrote.
The appellants’ brief contends:
“There was incomplete substitute service, as the statute requires at least 3 attempts before a substituted service is permitted. In this case, according to the Declaration of Due Diligence, only 2 attempts were made before the service was dropped on this unknown and non-existent employee.”
Code of Civil Procedure §415.20(b) authorizes substitute service where a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served.”
Citing precedent, Segal said:
“Reasonable diligence means two (as here) or three attempts.”
He remarked:
“You get the idea. None of the Alis’ assertions shows the judgment is void.”
The case is EJA Associates v. Ali, B342296.
EJA did not file a respondent’s brief.
On Sept. 3, 2024, the Alis sued EJA and its principal, John Alle, in Los Angeles Superior Court, claiming damages of $500,000. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants, on or about June 2, 2020, “and thereafter” breached the lease by “[b]oarding up the premises, locking out the plaintiffs from the leased premises, preventing them from operating their business, not permitting the plaintiffs from subleasing the premises, and not allowing Plaintiffs from changing the nature of the business operations to a restaurant.”
Multani represents the Alis. The case is before Epstein.
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