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California Supreme Court:
MICRA’s Time Limit Does Not Apply to Ambulance Crash
Opinion Says One-Year Statute of Limitations for Medical Malpractice Actions Does Not Govern Lawsuit Filed by Driver of Other Vehicle Where Case Asserts Breach of General Duty Owed to Public
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
The California Supreme Court held yesterday that a one-year statute of limitation applicable under California law for medical professional negligence claims does not apply to an action brought by the injured driver of a vehicle that was rear-ended by an ambulance transporting a patient, saying that the time period for general negligence causes of action governs because the nature of the suit involves an asserted breach of the general duty owed to the public.
At issue is when the statutory time frame established by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (“MICRA”) applies. Specifically, Code of Civil Procedure §340.5 provides:
“In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.”
Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero wrote the opinion for a unanimous court, saying:
“Where, as here, a plaintiff sues a health care provider for breach of a duty owed to the public generally, as opposed to a violation of professional obligations owed to patients, the two-year statute of limitations for general negligence claims…applies. This conclusion is supported by MICRA’s text, purpose, and legislative history, as well as relevant public policy considerations.”
Yesterday’s decision disapproves of two cases holding, under similar facts, that §340.5 applies—the 2008 decision by Div. Eight of this district’s Court of Appeal in Canister v. Emergency Ambulance Service Inc. and the 2023 opinion by Div. Five of the First District in Lopez v. American Medical Response West.
Struck From Behind
The question arose after Francisco Gutierrez’s truck was struck from behind by an ambulance driven by Uriel Tostado, a licensed emergency medical technician, on Jan. 20, 2018. Tostado was driving to a regional medical center at the time of the collision, while another professional was caring for a patient in the back of the vehicle.
On Jan. 7, 2020, Gutierrez filed a complaint against Tostado and his employer, ProTransport-1 LLC, asserting that the collision caused him to suffer neck and back injuries. He styled his complaint as a general negligence action involving a motor vehicle.
Tostado and Pro-Transport moved for summary judgment, arguing that the action was barred under MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations. Santa Clara Superior Court Judge Christopher G. Rudy granted the request, saying that §340.5 applied because “Tostado was [a] health care provider employed by ProTransport…and was rendering professional medical services that were within the scope of services he was licensed to carry out.”
A divided Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that MICRA was “not limited to suits by patients or to recipients of medical services as long as the plaintiff is injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services and his injuries were foreseeable.”
Yesterday’s opinion reverses the judgment and remands for further proceedings.
Professional Negligence
Guerrero noted that subdivision (2) of §340.5 specifies:
“ ‘Professional negligence’ means a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.”
She turned for guidance to the 2016 decision by the state high court in Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, which dealt with the question of whether the MICRA filing period applied to a case brought by a patient who suffered injuries after falling out of her hospital bed due to a malfunctioning guardrail.
In an opinion by Justice Leondra Kruger, the court concluded that “the special statute of limitations for professional negligence actions against health care providers applies…to actions alleging injury suffered as a result of negligence in…the provision of medical care” and found that the plaintiff’s claim was covered by MICRA because a physician set the height of the guardrail, revealing that the barrier was “integrally related” to her treatment.
Acknowledging that “Flores did not have occasion to apply these principles in the context of a claim by…a third party having no professional relationship with the defendant,” Guerrero remarked that the statutory definition of “professional negligence” still “suggests the statute is only concerned with injuries resulting directly from the negligent rendering of medical care, as opposed to [those] that might occur during…the provision of medical care.”
Legislative History
Saying that the legislative history of MICRA supports the high court’s interpretation, she pointed out that the law was adopted to remedy the spiraling costs of medical malpractice insurance.
Based on this purpose, she opined:
“MICRA’s legislative materials reflect concerns regarding malpractice claims, not garden-variety negligence claims against health care providers.”
Guerrero added: “[T]he plaintiff’s status as a patient or nonpatient is not necessarily determinative. Rather, the fundamental question is whether the plaintiff’s claim for negligence involves a violation of professional obligations, as opposed to the breach of a duty owed to the public generally.”
Applying these principles, she wrote:
“Plaintiff does not allege that defendants were negligent in performing ‘medical diagnosis or treatment’ of the patient whom they were transporting….Rather, plaintiff alleges that defendants were negligent in their failure to obey traffic laws applicable to all drivers on the road….As such, plaintiff’s claim sounds in general negligence and falls outside of MICRA’s scope.”
Disapproved Cases
She noted that the Sixth District relied on Canister and Lopez in finding that MICRA’s statute of limitations applied, and commented:
“We conclude [that these cases] were incorrect to the extent they suggest that a plaintiff’s claim sounds in professional negligence merely because the plaintiff’s injuries ‘occur[ed] during the rendering of services’ to a patient….For MICRA’s statute of limitations to apply,….the breach of the professional obligation must be the ‘proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death.’ ”
The chief justice reasoned that a contrary rule would mean that “health care provider defendants would be afforded greater protection against an array of lawsuits than other types of defendants merely due to their identity as health care providers.”
The case is Gutierrez v. Tostado, 2025 S.O.S. 2193.
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