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Ninth Circuit Declines Relief in Kidnap-for-Ransom Case
Majority Says Failure of Charging Documents to Allege Facts Necessary to Support Defendant’s Sentence of Life Without Possibility of Parole Does Not Mandate Granting of Habeas Petition
By a MetNews Staff Writer
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KYLE HANDLEY |
A divided Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held yesterday that a habeas corpus petition—asserting that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the nature of the charges against him was violated by a failure to allege in the charging documents facts necessary to the imposition of a heightened sentence—was properly denied in a kidnapping-for-ransom case that left a victim permanently mutilated.
Petitioning for habeas relief was Kyle Handley who was convicted of participating in a 2012 kidnapping of a marijuana-dispensary owner, identified in court records as “Michael S.,” and his roommate, Mary Barnes, from their Newport Beach home. According to prosecutors with the Orange County District Attorney’s Office, Handley drove the van that transported the victims to the Mojave Desert, allegedly in search of $1 million in buried cash.
Some of the kidnappers tortured Michael S. during his detention, burning him with a blowtorch, splashing him with bleach, and permanently cutting off a sexual organ. Both victims were left abandoned and tied up in a remote area after the perpetrators failed to find any buried treasure.
Among other crimes, prosecutors charged Handley with kidnapping for ransom, in violation of Penal Code §209, which provides:
“A person who…kidnaps…another person…with intent to…detain…that person for ransom…is guilty of a felony. When a person subjected to that act suffers death or bodily harm, or is intentionally confined in a manner that exposes that person to a substantial likelihood of death, the person…shall be punished by imprisonment…for life without possibility of parole. When no person subjected to that act suffers death or bodily harm, the person…shall be punished by imprisonment…for life with the possibility of parole.”
Failed to Allege
A complaint, and subsequent information, charging Handley with multiple offenses failed to allege that the victims suffered bodily harm or an exposure to a substantial likelihood of death, as required for the imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.
However, during a conference held before closing argument, Handley’s attorney, Robert Weinberg, did not object to a special jury instruction asking the panel to decide if the sentence-enhancing factors had been established.
After the jury found that Michael S. had suffered bodily harm and that Barnes had been exposed to a substantial likelihood of death, then-Orange Superior Court Judge Gregg L. Prickett (now retired) sentenced Handley to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”).
On direct appeal, Div. Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal held in 2021—in an unpublished opinion authored by then-Acting Presiding Justice William W. Bedsworth (now retired)—that the Constitution does not require charging documents to specifically allege punishment-enhancing factors.
Bedsworth acknowledged that Handley “was never expressly informed he could be sentenced to LWOP if the jury found the special allegations true,” but found that the charging documents were informally amended during the jury instruction conference. The California Supreme Court denied review.
Habeas Corpus Petition
Handley then filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254, which specifies that an application for a writ of habeas corpus “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court” unless the “decision…was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the [U.S.] Supreme Court” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.”
District Court Judge Mark C. Scarsi of the Central District of California denied the petition.
Yesterday’s opinion, written by Circuit Judge Holly A. Thomas and joined in by Circuit Judge Gabriel P. Sanchez, affirms the denial. District Court Judge James Donato of the Northern District of California, sitting by designation, dissented.
Contrary to Federal Law
Handley contends that Div. Three’s decision was “contrary to federal law” within the meaning of §2254, citing a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases that he says “clearly established” the principle that the Sixth Amendment requires state charging documents to allege any facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a defendant is exposed.
Thomas acknowledged that “the decisions Handley cites, along with others from the same era, require the essential elements of an offense to be charged in a federal indictment” and that “the notice requirement of the Sixth Amendment applies to the states,” but opined:
“We are not persuaded, however, by Handley’s contention that these nineteenth-century decisions clearly established that punishment-enhancing facts—facts serving solely to increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a defendant is exposed—must be alleged in a charging document. In [the cited cases], the indictment omitted—or failed to allege with sufficient certainty—a basic element required for the commission of the offense. None of these cases involved the omission of a fact going solely to punishment. These decisions, therefore, cannot have clearly established the principle that punishment-enhancing facts must be charged in an indictment or information.”
She continued:
“We next address Handley’s contention that the California Court of Appeal’s decision was ‘contrary to’ more recent Supreme Court decisions stating that any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed must be charged in an indictment.”
Footnote Cited
Handley pointed to a footnote in the 1999 U.S. Supreme Court case of Jones v. U.S. in which then-Justice David Souter (now deceased) wrote:
“[U]nder…the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Thomas pointed out that the high court declined to address whether a petitioner can assert a constitutional claim based on the omission of “any reference to sentence enhancement” in the indictment, in the 2000 decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, ultimately confining its holding to the principle that any sentence-enhancing facts must be submitted to a jury. Based on this limitation, she remarked:
“[W]e reject Handley’s contention that the Apprendi line of decisions clearly established that the Sixth Amendment requires punishment-enhancing facts to be alleged in state charging documents. The California Court of Appeal’s decision was not ‘contrary to’ clearly established federal law on this theory.”
The jurist added:
“In so holding, we emphasize that we have no occasion here to address the question whether Handley’s understanding of the Sixth Amendment’s notice requirement is correct. The question presented—and the one we answer—is whether, at the time of the state court’s decision, Handley’s proposed rule constituted ‘clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’ ”
As to Div. Three’s determination that the indictment was informally amended, she declared:
“The Supreme Court has not held that the notice inquiry is limited to the information, and even if the inquiry were so limited, the Court has not held that notice may not be provided through consensual amendment of the information.”
Donato’s View
Donato wrote:
“[T]he record establishes that for several years, across multiple charging documents and a preliminary examination, Handley was never charged with the circumstances of bodily harm or substantial likelihood of death in connection with the kidnapping counts. All the charging documents alleged only simple kidnapping for ransom under Penal Code Section 209(a), with a sentence of life with the possibility of parole.”
He continued:
“How then did Handley’s prosecution end in a conviction of aggravated kidnapping for ransom and a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole? It happened on the fly as the trial court drafted jury instructions during the final days of trial.”
Reasoning that Apprendi and other decisions have “clearly established that a fact which aggravates the legally prescribed punishment is an ‘element’ of the offense for purposes of the Sixth Amendment,” he said that “[t]he Court of Appeal mentioned the right cases but unreasonably applied them to deny Handley relief.” He added:
“I would reverse the denial of habeas relief in this circumstance and remand with instructions to issue a conditional writ of habeas corpus directing the vacatur of Handley’s convictions and sentences on the kidnapping for ransom charges unless he is retried within 120 days. The Sixth Amendment demands no less than that.”
The case is Handley v. Moore, 24-499.
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