Page 1
Assailants Who Left Beaten Man in Path of Traffic Were Second-Degree Murderers—C.A.
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Two men who severely beat a victim in a public street, rendering him unconscious, and left him in the thoroughfare, resulting in his being run-over by a car, causing his death, were properly convicted of murder in the second degree, Div. Two of the Court of Appeal for this district has held.
The opinion rejects the contention that testimony was improperly admitted that one of the defendants had uttered “the ‘N’ word” because it was unduly prejudicial.
Justice Anne K. Richardson authored the unpublished opinion, filed Tuesday. It affirms a judgment, pursuant to a jury verdict, by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Andrew C. Kim.
2019 Encounter
According to testimony, on Sept. 18, 2019, defendant Kyle Michael Mangubat and two others who were engaged in a birthday celebration, had an altercation in Maggie’s Bar on Telegraph Road in Santa Fe Springs with Ricky Fernando Munoz and a friend. Security guards interceded.
Outside, defendant Anthony Edward Varela, one of the celebrators, made note of his group’s possession of guns.
Munoz and his friend, Bayron Manuel-Martinez, fled; Mangubat and Varela, chasing them in a vehicle, caught up with Munoz two blocks from Maggie’s; each administered blows to him; they got out of the way of an approaching car and ran off.
Kim commented at the time of sentencing on Aug. 22 of last year that leaving “an unconscious person in a lane of traffic…is most certainly going to lead to death.” He imposed on each a sentence of 15 years to life in prison.
Richardson’s Opinion
Richardson said in Tuesday’s opinion:
“[T]o convict a defendant of second degree murder, the evidence must show he acted with implied malice….
“Implied malice…has two components: an objective component describing the act the defendant must commit, and a subjective component describing the mental state with which he must act….
“There was abundant evidence supporting both the objective and subjective components of implied malice here.”
Addressing the objective element, she wrote:
“This was not just a fistfight….Rather, the jury could reasonably infer defendants beat Munoz senseless in a six-lane public roadway, at night, while other vehicles drove past—one of which defendants saw heading directly toward Munoz. Leaving a victim unconscious in a roadway, at night, directly in the path of an oncoming car, creates a virtual-inevitability he will be struck and killed—if not by that particular vehicle, then by another….That is more than adequate to demonstrate defendants committed an act whose natural consequences were dangerous to human life.”
With respect to the subjective factor, Richardson declared:
“[T]he evidence supports the inference defendants knew they had beaten Munoz unconscious and helpless in the street where he could be struck by a vehicle but took no steps to assist him— instead, they fled to avoid being hit by an oncoming car and bragged to friends about the beating….From that evidence, the jury could reasonably infer defendants knew their conduct endangered Munoz’s life and they acted with a conscious disregard for life.”
Kim had permitted testimony by Manuel-Martinez that one of the defendants, during the chase, had directed toward him a racial epithet with reference to the dark pigmentation of his skin. That, the appellants asserted, impermissibly spawned juror antagonism toward them.
Richardson wrote:
“[W]e recognize the extreme offensiveness of the slur that was used.”
However, she noted, the defendants/appellants acknowledge that on the night in question “they intended to fight and beat up both Munoz and Manuel-Martinez to avenge” the injury to the man whose 21st birthday was being celebrated. Noah Quintero, and who was, in the course of the fray in the bar, knocked unconscious. The jurist said:
“[D]efendants’ use of a repugnant racial slur during their pursuit of Manuel-Martinez and Munoz reasonably suggests their rage, desire for revenge, and intent to inflict harm may have been exacerbated by the fact a man they perceived to be African-American (Manuel-Martinez) had knocked Quintero unconscious with one strike of his hand and then successfully eluded them. It is therefore relevant to show the subjective component of implied malice: that defendants, stymied his retaliating against Manuel-Martinez, unloaded their rage upon Munoz and left him in the street in the path of oncoming traffic.”
The justice noted that “[w]hether Varela and Mangubat acted with implied malice was a critical issue in this case” and said that “[w]here, as here, the slur was a minimal portion of the evidence and was not mentioned by the prosecutor’s closing argument” there is “no reasonable possibility” that admission of the evidence so inflamed the jury as to create undue prejudice.
The case is People v. Mangubat, B340390.
Copyright 2025, Metropolitan News Company