Justice Act Operates Differently When Juror Wrongly Seated

Thursday, October 23, 2025

Page 3

Court of Appeal:

Justice Act Operates Differently When Juror Wrongly Seated

Opinion Says Statute’s Mandate That Errors Relating to Objections to Peremptory Strikes Are to Be ‘Deemed Prejudicial’ Only Applies When Prospective Juror Is Excluded

By a MetNews Staff Writer

Div. Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal held yesterday, in a matter of first impression, that a provision of the Racial Justice Act, providing that an error relating to the ruling on an objection to the exercise of a peremptory challenge is to be “deemed prejudicial,” only applies when a prospective panelist is wrongly excluded from service and not when the juror is improperly seated.

Saying that the plain language and the legislative intent behind the statute mandate treating the two circumstances differently, the court declined to adopt a rule that would make reversal automatic every time a motion challenging a peremptory strike as racially motivated is erroneously granted.

At issue is Penal Code §231.7, adopted following the enactment of the Racial Justice Act in 2020, which specifies that “[a] party shall not use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s race” and renders certain reasons for dismissing a potential panelist to be presumptively invalid, including “[e]xpressing a distrust or having a negative experience with law enforcement.”

Subdivision (j) further provides:

“Should the appellate court determine that the objection was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.”

Justice Maurice Sanchez authored yesterday’s opinion, saying:

“[I]t is clear the scheme of section 231.7 is designed to target the improper removal of jurors, not the improper seating of them. It makes sense then that section 231.7(j) means exactly what it says: Only the erroneous denial of an objection to the exercise of a peremptory challenge, which would lead to a juror removal, is deemed to be prejudicial.”

Acting Presiding Justice Joanne Motoike and Justice Eileen C. Moore joined in the opinion.

Jury Selection

The question arose after Gustavo Guzman was tried for committing a domestic battery and assaulting a police officer in 2022. During jury selection, he challenged Juror 122 for cause, citing responses indicating exposure to similar crimes during childhood and employment in law enforcement; Orange Superior Court Judge Juliet O. Macauley denied the for-cause challenge.

Guzman then moved to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the panelist. Prosecutors objected under §231.7, pointing out that Juror 122 was the second white male that the defendant had sought to remove and arguing that a party’s opinions about police officers are presumptively invalid under the statutory scheme.

Macauley sustained the objection, noting that the juror had indicated several times that he could be fair and impartial.

In September 2022, the jury found Guzman guilty on lesser included charges relating to domestic violence and resisting a police officer, and Macauley sentenced him to three years of probation. On Feb. 2, Orange Superior Court Appellate Division reversed the judgment on one charge but otherwise affirmed the judgment.

Although prosecutors had conceded that the trial court erred in granting the objection to the peremptory challenge because a party’s reliance on a prospective juror’s positive associations with police officers is not a presumptively invalid reason to dismiss under §231.7, the Appellate Division concluded that Guzman had no demonstrated prejudice from the inclusion of Juror 122 on the panel.

A petition to transfer the matter was granted by Div. Three in order to address whether the “deemed prejudicial” standard applies when an objection to a peremptory challenge is found to have been erroneously granted.

Unambiguous Words

Saying that the court “presume[s] the Legislature meant what it said…and would have written section 231.7(j) to include erroneously granted objections if that were its intent,” Sanchez opined:

“The words denial and denied are clear and unambiguous. The plain and express language in section 231.7(j) makes the ‘deemed prejudicial’ standard applicable only to objections that were erroneously denied. The phrases ‘denial of an objection’ and ‘the objection was erroneously denied’ cannot reasonably be interpreted also to mean ‘granting an objection’ and ‘the objection was erroneously granted.’ ”

He acknowledged that “no opinion addresses the issue presented here,” but pointed to the May opinion by this district’s Div. One in People v. Hinojos, which addressed what standard of review applies to a trial court’s decision to sustain an objection made under the Racial Justice Act.

That court noted that the statute was silent as to what standard applies when an objection is sustained and looked to “traditional principles of appellate review” to conclude that such rulings will be reviewed de novo. Finding this logic to be persuasive, Sanchez wrote:

“Because the standard of review set forth in section 231.7(j) is expressly applicable only to erroneous denials of objections, the court in Hinojos turned to traditional principles of appellate review to determine [the] applicable standard when objections are granted. Here, likewise, because the deemed prejudicial standard of section 231.7(j) is expressly applicable only to erroneous denials of objections, we turn to traditional rules governing prejudicial error when objections are granted.”

Turning to those principles, he said that case law preexisting the enactment of the Racial Justice Act had established that a mistake in overruling a peremptory challenge—a ruling he likened to sustaining an objection under §231.7—is subject to a harmless error analysis and requires an affirmative showing of prejudice.

Legislative Intent

The jurist reasoned that the rule remained in effect following the adoption of §231.7, saying that the court’s interpretation is bolstered by the legislative purposes behind the statutory scheme. He remarked:

“Section 231.7 as a whole is structured to limit the use of peremptory challenges and make removal of jurors for discriminatory purposes more difficult.”

Under those circumstances, he commented:

“The jury verdict itself shows Guzman suffered no prejudice from the seating of Juror No. 122….Guzman’s reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge against Juror No. 122 were that he had had a traumatic childhood involving domestic violence, had been involved in law enforcement, and had had significant interactions with domestic violence victims….But the jury, with Juror No. 122 participating, acquitted Guzman of domestic battery with corporal injury…and of assault on a peace officer….”

Sanchez added:

“Establishing prejudice from the inclusion of a jury might be difficult, but it is not necessarily impossible. Juror declarations, obtained after the jury has been discharged, are common means of obtaining evidence that a particular juror ‘…acted in any manner…that is inconsistent with an unbiased factfinder’….Guzman did not produce any such juror declarations. Further, difficulty in establishing prejudice…is not a sufficient reason in itself for automatic reversal.”

The case is People v. Guzman, 2025 S.O.S. 2940.