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Monday, December 8, 2025

 

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Court of Appeal:

Mandatory-Relief Section May Apply to Terminating Sanction

Opinion Says Code of Civil Procedure §473(b), Requiring Court to Set Aside Judgment Based on Attorney’s Affidavit of Fault, Applies Only Where Penalty Was Unopposed

 

By a MetNews Staff Writer

 

Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal has held that a mandatory-relief provision of Code of Civil Procedure §473(b) that applies to a “default or dismissal” where the party’s lawyer submits an affidavit attesting that the result was caused by his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect may be invoked to set aside a judgment entered as a terminating sanction for discovery violations so long as the request for the penalty was unopposed.

At issue is whether a terminating sanction qualifies as a “default or dismissal” within the meaning of the section, which provides, in relevant part:

“[T]he court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any…resulting default…or…default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.”

Justice Martin N. Buchanan authored Thursday’s opinion. He noted a split in authority as to how courts are to interpret what qualifies as a “dismissal” under the code and sided with those that strictly limit the application of the section to decrees that are the “procedural equivalent” of defaults.

Citing the 2015 Fifth District Court of Appeal opinion in [Marta] Rodriguez v. Brill as the “only published decision” addressing the issue before the court, Buchanan criticized that case for failing to limit the holding that the mandatory-relief provision applies to dismissals resulting from terminating sanctions to situations where the penalty was not opposed.

Bed-Bug Suit Dismissed

The question arose after Roberto Solis Rodriguez appealed from a judgment entered against him after his November 2019 personal injury complaint against WNT Inc., doing business as the Plaza Hotel, and others, relating to an alleged 2017 bed bug infestation in his room, was dismissed.

In March 2023, the defendants filed motions to compel discovery responses and sought monetary sanctions due to repeated failures to provide requested medical records, responses to interrogatories, and other materials. Two months later, San Diego Superior Court Judge Joel R. Wohlfeil held a discovery hearing and granted the requests, ordering, among other things, that the plaintiff provide responses without objections to the defendants’ requests within 25 days and pay $1,116.25.

After Rodriguez failed to comply, the defendants moved for terminating sanctions and requested that the court dismiss the case with prejudice. The plaintiff’s attorney, Beverly Hills practitioner Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza, did not file an opposition and instead requested a continuance, submitting a declaration indicating that he was “unsure” of his client’s whereabouts and was “concerned” for his “well-being.”

Request Granted

Wohlfeil granted the request for terminating sanctions in August 2023 but stayed the ruling for 60 days. On Oct. 24, he ordered the case to be dismissed, noting that the only responses provided before the deadline included objections in violation of the court’s earlier decree.

Janfaza asked the court to set aside the dismissal under §473(b), including a declaration stating that he “mistakenly thought that finding [his] client would be enough” to have the August 2023 order “lifted” and that Rodriguez could provide discovery responses with objections.

In January of last year, Wohlfeil found that, while an attorney’s mistake must be “excusable” for a court to apply discretionary relief under the code, there was no such requirement in the mandatory provisions, but denied the request on other grounds. Yesterday’s opinion, joined in by Acting Presiding Justice Truc T. Do and Justice Jose S. Castillo, affirms the ensuing defense judgment.

Reasoning Differs

Saying “[o]ur reasoning differs” from the Fifth Circuit decision, Buchanan wrote:

Rodriguez held that the mandatory relief provision of section 473(b) applies to ‘dismissals entered as a terminating sanction for discovery abuse’ but did not limit its holding to situations in which the sanctioned party had failed to oppose the dismissal motion….The plaintiff in Rodriguez had in fact filed a document ‘which apparently was treated by all parties as an opposition to [the dismissal] motion.’…[T]he Rodriguez court concluded that mandatory relief was available because a terminating sanction of dismissal is [essentially the same as a default judgment.]”

Saying that “we conclude that such a terminating sanction qualifies as a dismissal under section 473(b)…only if the plaintiff failed to oppose the motion seeking dismissal,” he opined that such an order is only similar to a default if it is unopposed and “[w]e part company with Rodriguez to the extent it suggested otherwise.”

However, he concluded that the plaintiff “failed to meet his burden of establishing that his own fault did not cause the discovery violations” and pointed out that “[m]andatory relief is available only if the default or dismissal was ‘in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.’ ” 

Finding that Janfaza had deliberately failed to respond to the discovery requests, he said the mandatory provision of §473(b) does not apply.

The case is Rodriguez v. WNT Inc., D084642.

 

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