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Court of Appeal:
Deputy Due Summary Judgment in Fatal Shooting of Mother
Opinion Says Judge Erred in Wrongful Death Case by Denying Motion of Backup Officer Who Deployed Taser on Knife-Wielding Woman Before Other Responder Shot Her in Front of Her Children
By a MetNews Staff Writer
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Above is a screenshot from a GoFundMe page showing decedent Ariella Sage Crawford. |
The Third District Court of Appeal held yesterday that a trial judge erred in denying summary judgment to a Nevada County sheriff’s deputy—who deployed his taser against a knife-wielding mother in the presence of her children—in an action filed by the minors after the woman was fatally shot by another officer at the scene, finding the defendant acted reasonably as a matter of law.
In an opinion authored by Justice Louis Mauro, and joined in by Acting Presiding Justice Ronald B. Robie and Justice Aimee A. Feinberg, the court acknowledged that “[w]hat makes this case counter-intuitive is that the trial court concluded the deputy who used lethal force acted reasonably, but the deputy who used less-lethal force arguably acted unreasonably.”
At issue are the actions taken by Nevada County Sheriff’s Deputies Caleb Toderean and Matthew Harrison, who responded to a busy road in Alta Sierra on Feb. 4, 2021, after a concerned citizen called 911 to report that a woman was walking in the area, acting erratically, with her two small children in tow. The woman was Ariella Sage Crawford.
Mauro described the “heartbreaking incident,” saying:
“[A] mother was shot and killed by a deputy sheriff while her young children looked on. The case is all the more emotional because at one point, one of the children stood between the mother and the deputy with outstretched hands and yelled, ‘Stop!’…A lead deputy explained she was not in trouble and implored her to talk with him, but the mother rejected repeated requests to drop the knife and ultimately advanced quickly toward a backup deputy while raising the knife. The backup deputy discharged a taser in an effort to use less-lethal force, but when that did not stop the mother from advancing with the knife, the lead deputy fired his service pistol, killing the mother.”
Toderean was the “lead deputy” who shot Crawford, and Harrison acted as the “backup” officer.
Complaint Filed
Following her death, Crawford’s children, through a guardian ad litem, filed a complaint against the county and the deputies, asserting causes of action for negligence, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress as well as a civil rights claim under the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. Each cause of action was based on allegations that the deputies’ use of force was unreasonable.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims failed as a matter of law because the deputies used objectively reasonable force under the circumstances and there was no evidence, as to the Bane claim, that either officer had the specific intent to violate Crawford’s rights.
Nevada Superior Court Judge Robert Tice-Raskin granted summary judgment for Toderean, concluding that he acted reasonably as a matter of law, but denied the motion with respect to Harrison, explaining that a reasonable juror could find that his decisions to follow Crawford and deploy his taser were not justified and that he acted with reckless disregard for her constitutional rights.
Tice-Raskin’s order also denied the county’s motion to the extent that it could be held vicariously liable for Harrison’s conduct.
Harrison and the county filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the court’s order, arguing that Harrison acted reasonably as a matter of law.
Yesterday’s opinion declares that “[w]e will issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to set aside its partial denial of defendants’ summary judgment motion and to enter a new order granting the motion in its entirety,” noting that Code of Civil Procedure section 437c expressly provides that “any order entered pursuant to the summary judgment statute may be challenged by a petition for peremptory writ.”
Split-Second Decisions
Mauro opined:
“With 20/20 hindsight, it might be possible for us to identify alternative actions available to the deputies that would have been more effective in de-escalating or avoiding the confrontation….[H]owever, that is not the legal standard we are required to apply in this context. Rather, we need to assess reasonableness from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene. Such a standard recognizes the split-second decisions officers must make in dangerous environments.”
He continued:
“Regardless of the alternatives that were available to the deputies, it is beyond dispute that the mother advanced toward the deputies with a deadly weapon. Plaintiffs do not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that the lead officer acted reasonably in responding to that threat with deadly force. Applying the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, we conclude no reasonable juror could find unreasonable the actions of the deputy who did not lead the interaction with the mother but instead served as backup and used less-lethal force as the mother charged him with a raised knife.”
The jurist pointed out that the plaintiffs argue that triable issues of material fact exist as to whether Harrison’s pre-shooting actions were unreasonable, escalated the encounter, and created the circumstances that led to Toderean’s use of deadly force. Rejecting that argument, he said:
“We have sympathy for the loss and anguish suffered by the children. We also know that when material facts are in dispute, a case should proceed to trial. And we share the concerns engendered by prior tragic cases around the country in which law enforcement officers have acted unreasonably in their use of force. But this is not one of those cases.”
Saying that “[b]ecause each cause of action asserted against Deputy Harrison was based on the underlying assertion that unreasonable force was used against Crawford,” he declared:
“[T[he trial court should have granted summary judgment in his favor. And because the County’s alleged liability is purely vicarious, the trial court should have granted summary judgment in the County’s favor as well.”
The case is County of Nevada v. Superior Court, C101966.
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