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Court of Appeal:
No Racial Justice Claim Lies for Disparity in Enhancements
Opinion Says Habeas Petitioner Asserting Bias Based on Statistics Purportedly Showing Hispanics Are Disproportionately Subjected to Gang Allegations Failed to Allege Violation of California Statute
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
The Fifth District Court of Appeal has held that a defendant seeking relief from his conviction under an anti-racism statute in a petition for writ of habeas corpus failed to allege a violation under the law where he claimed only that certain sentencing enhancements are more often applied to one ethnic group than another.
Concluding that the defendant’s petition for habeas relief was “facially defective,” the court declared that the statute by its terms only applies to disparities relating to “offenses” and makes no mention of “enhancements.”
At issue is Penal Code §745, enacted in 2020 as part of the Racial Justice Act (“RJA”) to address discrimination in the criminal justice system. The law allows a defendant to seek the vacatur of a conviction and sentence based on a violation of the section by, among other options, filing a petition for habeas relief.
Under subdivisions (a)(3), a violation will be found if the defendant proves that he “was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races…who have engaged in similar conduct…, and the…prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race…in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.”
A petitioner can also prove a violation, under subdivision (a)(4), by showing that “[a] longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race.”
Alleged Violation
The question arose after a jury, in 2010, found Carlos Huerta guilty of three counts of premeditated attempted murder and multiple gang enhancements. He was sentenced to 26 years in prison.
In 2024, Huerta filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on an alleged violation of the RJA, citing statistics purportedly showing that Hispanic convicts are more likely than white perpetrators to be charged with felony sentencing allegations that increase the terms of their incarcerations.
Tulare Superior Court Judge Jennifer Shirk denied the petition without appointing counsel, concluding that Huerta had failed to establish a prima facie claim for relief.
In October, the Fifth District issued an order to show cause to address the legal showing required to trigger the appointment of counsel in a habeas petition asserting a violation of the RJA.
In Tuesday’s opinion, authored by Acting Presiding Justice Herbert I. Levy, the court declared that “the superior court misapplied the statutory sequence by requiring petitioner to make a prima facie showing before assessing whether he met the lower pleading threshold sufficient for the appointment of counsel” but denied the defendant’s request for relief because “the petition fails to allege facts that would establish a violation of the RJA.”
Justices Donald R. Franson Jr. and Kathleen Meehan joined in the opinion.
Statistical Data
Levy noted that Huerta’s petition “has over 140 pages of exhibits, including data, reports and articles” and wrote:
“[Huerta] cites statistical data showing that, while Hispanics comprise 32.6 percent of the state population, they account for 37 percent of felony arrests, 35.9 percent of the prison population, and 66 percent of the ‘felony enhancement prison population.’ In contrast, he alleges that white defendants constitute 47.1 percent of the state population, but only 35.7 percent of felony arrests, 28.7 percent of the prison population, and 58.4 percent of those with felony enhancements.”
The jurist declared that “the petition is deficient” because “the charging and sentencing of gang enhancements…do not fall within the scope of the relevant statutory provisions.”
He pointed out that the statute does not define the term “offense,” and remarked that the court must apply its “plain and commonsense meaning” of an “infraction of law.” Under this interpretation, he opined:
“When the Legislature includes a specific term in a statute, it is presumed to exclude other terms not mentioned…. Subdivisions (a)(3) and (a)(4)(A) of section 745 refer only to an ‘offense’ and omit any mention of enhancements. Had the Legislature intended to include enhancements, it could have done so explicitly. The omission is therefore presumed to be intentional and deliberate, and we decline to rewrite the statute. When the statutory text is clear, courts may not add to it or alter its scope to achieve a presumed purpose not found in the language or legislative history.”
Adding that “California law…consistently distinguishes enhancements from an underlying offense,” he concluded that “[n]othing in the express language of section 745 suggests the Legislature intended to collapse the longstanding distinction between offenses and enhancements.”
Qualifying Offense
Applying those principles, he said:
“[P]etitioner fails to allege facts showing a qualifying ‘offense’…as the basis for his RJA claims. Nowhere in the petition does he allege that he was charged with or convicted of a more serious offense than similarly situated individuals of other races who engaged in similar conduct….Nor does he allege that he received a longer or more severe sentence than similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense.”
Levy continued:
“[P]etitioner only identifies gang enhancements as the source of the alleged disparity, asserting that they constitute a ‘more serious charge’ imposed disproportionately on Hispanic defendants….Consequently, the petition does not show a violation of the RJA, even under the statute’s minimal pleading standard.”
However, he commented:
“In interpreting section 745, we may not adopt a construction that would frustrate that purpose or produce absurd results the Legislature did not intend….Accordingly, we clarify that—while a gang enhancement, standing alone, does not qualify as an ‘offense’ under subdivisions (a)(3) or (a)(4)(A)—enhancements may still be relevant to an RJA claim. When a petition properly alleges facts showing an offense as the basis for relief under these subdivisions, an accompanying enhancement may be part of the factual context the court considers. In that setting, a court may evaluate whether the enhancement contributed to a pattern of racial disparity in the charging or sentencing of the offense. This interpretation respects the RJA’s remedial purpose while remaining faithful to its statutory language.”
The case is In re Huerta, 2025 S.O.S. 2179.
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