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Judge Abused His Discretion in Dismissing Case Because Prosecutor Was Late—C.A.
Opinion Says Reinstitution of Proceedings Is Appropriate Where Jurist ‘Appeared’ to Order Measure Solely Because Attorney Was Not Present When Matter Was Called
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Two of the Fourth District Court of Appeal on Friday granted a petition for writ of mandate reinstituting criminal proceedings after a trial judge dismissed the case due to the deputy district attorney not being in court at 8:35 a.m., when the matter was called, saying the jurist abused his discretion by failing to weigh the constitutional rights of the defendant against the interests of society as represented by the prosecutorial office.
In an unpublished opinion, by Justice Carol D. Codrington and joined in by Acting Presiding Justice Art W. McKinister and Justice Douglas P. Miller, the court agreed with the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office that writ relief was warranted in the matter because an appeal would be an inadequate remedy, given the unique procedural rules governing criminal prosecutions, and ordered that the dismissal be vacated.
The challenged ruling occurred on May 9, when a case against Rene Reynoso—who was charged with felony domestic violence and vandalism offenses—was set for trial at 8:30 a.m. Riverside Superior Court Judge Brian McCarville called the matter within five minutes of the scheduled appearance time.
After inquiry from McCarville, the defense attorney with the county’s Public Defender’s Office informed the court that the prosecutor, who is identified on the Superior Court website as Sophia Contreras, had some kind of family emergency the day before and might have been delayed due to unforeseen circumstances. McCarville responded:
“[I]f the prosecutor didn’t arrange to have somebody here today because of some issues, I’m surprised. I will wait until 8:40. If no one shows up, I’m going to dismiss the case, and make such an application for failure to prosecute.”
A few minutes later, he ordered the case “dismissed in the interest of justice” pursuant to Penal Code §1385, which provides:
“The judge…may, either on motion of the court or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed. The reasons for the dismissal shall be stated orally on the record.”
According to the prosecutor, she arrived at the courtroom around 8:43 a.m. and asked the court to reconsider the dismissal and issue sanctions against her instead. McCarville declined to change course.
On June 11, the prosecutorial office filed a petition for writ relief, seeking an order directing the trial court to vacate its decree dismissing the case and to reinstate criminal proceedings.
Codrington noted that Penal Code §1238(a)(8) authorizes an appeal from “[a]n order or judgment dismissing or otherwise terminating all or any portion of the action” and pointed out that, under Code of Civil Procedure §1086, extraordinary writ relief is only appropriate where “there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.”
Case Refiled
The attorneys with the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office conceded that they had already refiled the charges in a new case in accordance with Penal Code §1387, which gives them one more chance to file charges following a preliminary dismissal. However, they said that McCarville’s order unfairly puts the case at risk of a second, final discharge.
They also pointed out that the refiled case was likely to go to trial before an appeal is resolved, which would render the issue moot, and argued that the dismissal places the victim of intimate partner violence at an increased risk of harm.
Reynoso responded that forcing him to defend himself in the writ proceedings as well as on the refiled charges amounted to harassment, and that the victim’s status is irrelevant to the analysis of whether there is an adequate remedy at law.
The justice agreed with the defendant that “cases of a particular kind are not exempt from the demonstration of inadequacy,” but remarked that “we are otherwise unpersuaded.”
She wrote:
“Although we cannot know for certain whether trial would conclude before the pending appeal could be decided, given that the case was on the brink of trial when the issue arose, such an outcome is likely. [Reynoso’s] argument to the contrary suggesting that it could take years to prepare the refiled case for trial would, if true, provide even more justification for providing relief through writ proceedings so such a delay and duplication of resources could be avoided. In addition, addressing the matter through a writ petition would not cause [the defendant] to defend his case on multiple fronts, but would simply allow the matter to be resolved more expeditiously than can be accomplished through an appeal.”
Abuse of Discretion
Saying that rulings “based on the court’s management of its docket” are “reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard,” Codrington commented that case law has established that the judicial power afforded by §1385 is limited by the phrase “in furtherance of justice.” As such, courts are required to balance the rights of the accused against those of the public in having criminal cases prosecuted.
Addressing the dismissal at issue, she opined:
“[I]t appears the case was dismissed for the sole reason that the prosecutor was not present when the case was called. The matter was still within the statutory time limits for trial when it was dismissed, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the defendant’s rights would have been detrimentally affected by placing the matter on second call or setting the matter at some date within the prescribed statutory limit.”
She added: “Even if the court was justified in dismissing the case in the absence of any appearance by the People, when the prosecutor appeared minutes after the dismissal and asked the court to reconsider its order, the court’s refusal to consider other, less onerous sanctions does not reflect the balancing of society’s interest….”
The jurist acknowledged that deciding on an appropriate remedy was complicated by the “duplicate complaint pending in the trial court,” but reasoned:
“Although there is no statutory procedure for dismissing a duplicate complaint without invoking the ‘two dismissal rule’ in section 1387, at least one court has recognized that the desired result could be achieved by consolidating the pleadings…under the newly filed complaint number, then striking the duplicate counts….We find such an approach would be appropriate in this case.”
The case is People v. Superior Court (Reynoso), E086287.
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