Tuesday, October 28, 2025
Page 1
Fired Lawyers Can’t Seek Fees by Petitioning Under Probate Code §17200, C.A. Declares
By a MetNews Staff Writer
A law firm that was hired by the trustee of a trust, paid some moneys and was then fired, cannot collect additional fees by means of a petition under Probate Code §17200, the Court of Appeal for this district held yesterday.
Sec. 17200(a) specifies that except as provided in another section, “a trustee or beneficiary of a trust may petition the court under this chapter concerning the internal affairs of the trust or to determine the existence of the trust.”
Justice Gregory Weingart of Div. One wrote that “recent opinions have allowed petitions under section 17200 in certain situations from parties who are neither trustees nor beneficiaries” but that “neither the text of section 17200 nor the gloss placed upon it by” recent cases “provides standing for a trustee’s former attorney to petition under section 17200 for payment of a debt allegedly owed by the trust.”
The opinion reverses Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Daniel Juarez’s award of $22,420.04 in fees to the West Los Angeles/Newport Beach firm of Vogt, Resnick & Sherak, LLP (“VRS”) and his additional assessment of 32,354.11 in fees and costs based on defendant Douglas Vogel’s efforts to avoid collection.
Weingart declared:
“We agree with Vogel that VRS lacked standing to file a section 17200 petition for payment of its outstanding fees. In addition, because the subsequent penalties were based on Vogel’s failure to comply with a void order, we reverse the later orders as well, with the exception of one sanctions order made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 that was based on Vogel’s failure to appear in court.”
He commented:
“We are reluctant to relieve Vogel from penalties he could have avoided by filing a timely appeal from the probate court’s original order granting VRS’s petition rather than spending more than a year and a half refusing to comply. On the other hand, the entire situation could have been avoided if VRS had sought to enforce its contract with Vogel by means of an appropriate action rather than an improper petition under section 17200. And Vogel is correct that ‘a void order cannot be the basis for a valid contempt judgment.’ ”
The case is Vogel v. Vogt, Resnick & Sherak, LLP, B341968.
Copyright 2025, Metropolitan News Company