Wednesday, December 31, 2025
Page 3
Court of Appeal:
Remarks After Trial May Be Sufficient to Deny Resentencing
Opinion Says Court Did Not Employ Impermissible Fact-Finding by Relying on Judicial Remarks After Bench Trial Indicating That Defendant ‘Inflicted’ Wounds With Intent to Kill to Find Him Ineligible at Prima Facie Stage
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Six of this district’s Court of Appeal held yesterday that a petition for resentencing, filed under a statutory scheme adopted after the Legislature amended the definition of murder in 2019 to limit implied malice liability, may be denied at the prima facie stage based on judicial remarks made after a bench trial indicating that the defendant personally acted with the intent to kill.
Justice Tari L. Cody wrote yesterday’s opinion, joined in by Acting Presiding Justice Kenneth Yegan and Justice Hernaldo J. Baltodano, rejecting the defendant’s assertion that reliance on the trial judge’s comments amounted to impermissible fact-finding at the initial review of the petition. Cody declared:
“Can a trial court’s remarks at the conclusion of a bench trial support the prima facie denial of a Penal Code section 1172.6 petition? We conclude the answer is yes….”
Penal Code §1172.6, which was adopted in 2019 and expanded in 2022, provides that “[a] person convicted of…murder under [a] theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, [or] attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, may file a petition with the court” for resentencing based on legislative changes limiting the scope of criminal liability.
Under the statutory scheme, a court first determines whether a petitioning defendant has made a prima facie case for relief and, if so, conducts a full evidentiary hearing on the question of whether resentencing is authorized.
The initial inquiry asks whether the convict would be entitled to relief if the allegations in the petition are proven to be true, and case law has established that trial courts may not look beyond the record of conviction to refute any assertions of fact by engaging in fact-finding or weighing of the evidence.
Attempted Murder
Rufino Anaya petitioned for resentencing relating to his conviction for the July 2017 attempted murder of Daniel Martinez, who suffered multiple stab wounds to the chest after trying to intervene when the defendant grabbed his ex-girlfriend at knifepoint and dragged her approximately 35 feet across a gas station parking lot.
A bench trial was held in June 2018 after the defendant waived his right to have a jury determine his guilt.
Following the close of evidence, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Hayden A. Zacky addressed the defense assertion that there was insufficient evidence of an intent to kill based on purported evidence that he acted in self-defense.
Unconvinced, Zacky determined that Anaya “inflicted” stab wounds on Martinez and said that “based on the totality of the facts, I do think that there was an intent to kill.” In August 2018, the judge sentenced him to 25 years in prison based on the attempted murder charge as well as other charges and enhancements; Div. Six affirmed the judgment of conviction the following year.
In 2023, Anaya filed a form petition for resentencing under §1172.6.
The section does not apply to defendants who were convicted of attempted murder as direct perpetrators as the “natural and probable consequences doctrine” is a theory of vicarious liability that establishes that an accomplice may be held liable for certain foreseeable acts committed by others that stem from the original criminal undertaking.
Zacky denied the request at the prima facie stage, saying:
“I know at this stage, the court cannot engage in fact-finding. I did preside over the court trial, however. And in this case, defendant was the only charged defendant in this case. He was found guilty of….attempted murder, along with personal infliction of great bodily injury pursuant to 12022.7.
Based on all of that, the court does not find a prima facie case has been established and the petition is denied.”
Straightforward Case
Cody acknowledged that “[o]rdinarily, we ‘look to the jury’s verdicts, and the factual findings they necessarily reflect, to determine whether the record of conviction refutes the factual allegations’ in a section 1172.6 petition,” but opined that “[t]his case is more straightforward because the court explained its attempted murder finding.”
She continued:
“Appellant contends reliance upon the trial court’s description of its attempted murder finding involves a consideration of credibility and weighing of evidence. We disagree. The trial court evaluated credibility and weighed evidence at appellant’s court trial. Reliance on the trial court’s remarks, which elucidate its underlying factual determinations, does not itself constitute factfinding at the prima facie stage.”
Adding that “[w]e recognize courts have held that ‘in a criminal bench trial, the trial court is not required to provide a statement of decision and that any explanation of his or her decision a trial judge provides is not part of the record on appeal,’ ” she remarked:
“Rather than defining the scope of the record of conviction in a section 1172.6 case, these authorities….[have] no application in the section 1172.6 prima facie context, where the court evaluating the petition is not impeaching the trial court’s determination.”
The jurist addressed Anaya’s argument that Zacky improperly based his denial on insufficient “procedural findings that appellant was the only charged defendant and…was found guilty of the attempted murder and personal infliction of the great bodily injury enhancement,” saying:
“Appellant is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. Thus, regardless of its reasoning, the trial court properly denied the petition at the prima facie stage.”
The case is People v. Anaya, 2025 S.O.S. 3917.
Copyright 2025, Metropolitan News Company