Thursday, November 20, 2025
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Court of Appeal:
Immunity for Police ‘Pursuits’ Turns on Internal Definition
Opinion Says Judge Erred in Applying Ordinary Meaning to Interpret Whether Liability Shield for Vehicle Chases Applies, Coverage Depends on How Agency Defines Qualifying Event
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
Div. One of the First District Court of Appeal held yesterday that a trial judge erred in finding that the ordinary meaning of “pursuit” applies to a statute providing immunity from liability for collisions caused by suspects fleeing from police if the law enforcement agency has adopted a written policy on safe conduct for vehicular chases, saying that the technical definition provided in the internal plan controls.
At issue is Vehicle Code §17004.7(b)(1), which provides:
“A public agency…that adopts and promulgates a written policy on, and provides regular and periodic training on…, vehicular pursuits complying with [statutory requirements] is immune from liability for civil damages for personal injury…resulting from the collision of a vehicle being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is being, has been, or believes he or she is being or has been, pursued in a motor vehicle by a peace officer….”
Presiding Justice James M. Humes wrote yesterday’s opinion, acknowledging that the case “is unusual” because the city admitted that no official pursuit was initiated but asserted immunity based on the suspect’s purported belief that he was being “pursued” by an officer under the common understanding of the term. Humes opined:
“This case is unusual in that the City seeks statutory immunity based on its vehicular pursuit policy even though it admits that no actual pursuit was initiated—meaning that section 17004.7’s main purpose of freeing peace officers to make decisions about initiating or continuing pursuits without worrying about their employer’s potential liability does not apply here….Under these narrow circumstances, we reach the commonsense holding that ‘pursued’ in section 17004.7(b)(1) has only one meaning. Whether a suspect was actually pursued and whether the suspect had a perception of being pursued both turn on the definition of ‘pursuit’ in the public entity’s vehicular pursuit policy.”
Car Crash
The question arose after Melanie Gilliland was severely injured in August 2017 when Elijah Henry ran a red light and collided with her vehicle at an intersection in Pleasanton. Henry was later convicted of a felony violation of intoxicated driving.
Just before the collision, Pleasanton Police Officer Matthew Harvey had made a U-turn to pull behind Henry after observing him leaving an area known for vehicular burglaries. The officer said that he intended to perform a traffic stop on Henry but was prevented from doing so after the suspect accelerated away from him at a high rate of speed.
In October 2018, Gilliland filed a complaint against Pleasanton and Henry, alleging causes of action for negligence. The city filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting statutory immunity under §17004.7(b)(1).
In a declaration, Henry averred that he did not believe that Harvey was pursuing him because the patrol car’s emergency lights and siren were not activated.
An Alameda Superior Court judge, whose name is not provided in the county’s online records, denied the request in December 2019. Before trial, the parties agreed to have the court resolve the issue of whether a “perceived pursuit” occurred within the meaning of §17004.7(b)(1).
In March 2024, Alameda Superior Court Judge Jenna M. Whitman conducted the bench trial and ruled that the city was immune from liability, finding that a preponderance of the evidence supported the view that Henry believed he was being “pursued” under the ordinary meaning of the word when the collision occurred.
After noting that the section does not define the term, she opined that it was “more reasonable” to apply the common understanding of “pursuit” as including “nonemergency, routine situations, including where a peace officer has no intent to take the actual or suspected violator of the law into custody.”
Yesterday’s opinion, joined in by Justice Monique Langhorne Wilson and Justice Charles A. Smiley, reverses the ensuing judgment in favor of the city.
Same Definition
Pointing out that the municipality did not dispute “that an individual policy’s definition…governs…whether there was an actual pursuit,” Humes said “the City claims the trial court correctly determined that a different definition…applies to whether suspects believed they were being ‘pursued’ under section 17004.7(b)(1).”
Rejecting this assertion, he opined:
“The trial court here gave two reasons for declining to rely on the Policy’s definition of ‘pursuit’ to determine what a suspect must believe. The first reason was that the inquiry is subjective and members of the public are generally unaware of local pursuit policies. The second reason was the court’s view that ‘it would be odd’ if ‘pursued’ under section 17004.7 was defined at a local level, especially since individual pursuit policies could vary. We find neither of these reasons to be persuasive.”
Noting that Pleasanton’s policy defines “pursuit” to require that a police officer be “attempting to apprehend a suspect” and that the party be “attempting to avoid arrest,” as well as generally mandating the use of emergency lights and a siren, Humes found that the trial court’s “misinterpret[ion]” was prejudicial. He remarked:
“Applying the ordinary meaning of pursuit,…the court found it irrelevant that Henry testified he did not believe Officer Harvey was trying to arrest him. Since that testimony, if accepted, would establish Henry did not believe he was being ‘pursued’ under section 17004.7(b)(1), the matter must be remanded for the court to use the appropriate standard to decide whether the City is entitled to immunity.”
The jurist added:
“[W]e emphasize that section 17004.7 immunizes public entities from suit in relatively narrow circumstances if they have adopted and implemented a vehicular pursuit policy. Thus, even if a public entity is not entitled to statutory immunity because an actual or perceived pursuit did not occur, it hardly follows that the entity will be found liable for damages resulting from a collision in which a peace officer might have played a role. Here, the City may ultimately prevail on other grounds, and we hold only that section 17004.7 does not apply merely because Henry believed Officer Harvey was following him for some type of investigative purpose.”
In a footnote, Humes commented:
“Since Gilliland does not raise the issue, we need not decide whether [Whitman] had the authority to overrule the first judge’s conclusion that section 17004.7 did not apply…, given that no new evidence on this point was presented at the bench trial.”
The case is Gilliland v. City of Pleasanton, 2025 S.O.S. 3306.
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