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Ninth Circuit:
Term of Failed Plea Deal Not Enforceable Against Ex-Dodger
Opinion Says Provision Purportedly Waiving Objections to Admission of Factual Basis Underlying Charges if Defendant Changes His Mind Does Not Apply Under Agreement Unless Court Finds Knowing Breach
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
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YASIEL PUIG VALDES criminal defendant |
A provision in a plea agreement, that provided that the defendant would waive all evidentiary objections to the admission of the factual basis underlying his charges at any ensuing trial if he is found to be in knowing breach of the terms of the contract, is not enforceable against a former Los Angeles Dodgers player who changed his mind after signing and declined to plead guilty, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held yesterday.
The question arose after former Dodgers’ right fielder Yasiel Puig Valdes agreed with federal prosecutors that he would plead guilty to a single count of lying to federal officers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001(a)(2), relating to statements he purportedly made to employees of the U.S. Attorney’s Office denying having placed bets on certain sporting events with the agent of an illegal gambling organization.
In return, the prosecutors said they would recommend an available sentencing reduction and would decline to file an additional obstruction of justice charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
One provision of the agreement provided that “if defendant, at any time after the effective date of this agreement, knowingly violates or fails to perform any of defendant’s obligations under this agreement (‘a breach’), the [U.S. Attorney’s Office] may declare this agreement breached.”
Knowing Breach
The agreement further specified that “[f]ollowing the Court’s finding of a knowing breach,” the defendant “agrees that…the…factual basis statement in this agreement…shall be admissible…in any such action against defendant, and defendant waives and gives up any claim under the…Constitution, any statute, Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence…or any other federal rule, that the statements…should be suppressed or are inadmissible.”
Federal Rule of Evidence 410 provides that “a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty plea or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea” is not admissible against the defendant.
In an opinion, written by Circuit Judge Daniel P. Collins and joined in by Circuit Judges Holly A. Thomas and Anthony D. Johnstone, the court declared:
“Viewing the language of Puig’s plea agreement against the backdrop of this caselaw, we conclude that Puig’s…waiver was not triggered here. As we have explained, Puig’s waiver…was expressly contingent on the district ‘[c]ourt’s finding’ that there was a ‘breach of this agreement.’ The terms of that waiver are most naturally understood as requiring that there be an ‘agreement’ that, under our caselaw, was enforceable by the ‘[c]ourt[]’ and as to which the court could therefore make the requisite ‘finding’ of a ‘breach.’ ”
Saying that there was no such finding here, the court found the waiver unenforceable.
Withdrawal From Agreement
After the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California (“USAO”) filed, under seal, a single-count information charging Puig with making false statements in violation of §1001(a)(2) in August 2022, the defendant informed the court that he was withdrawing from the plea agreement.
In mid-December, the USAO filed a motion asking Chief District Court Judge Dolly M. Gee to find that Puig had breached the agreement and that the office was relieved of its obligations under its terms.
On Jan. 6, 2023, Gee granted the motion and ordered that the office be “relieved of any obligations it undertook in the plea agreement,” but made no findings as to whether a “knowing” breach had occurred. Two weeks later, Puig was indicted on the violations of §1001(a)(2) and an additional obstruction of justice charge.
Once the case was set for trial, the government moved for an order finding that Puig had “knowingly” breached the agreement and, as such, the factual basis was admissible at trial. Gee denied the motion, finding that, because the plea and accompanying agreement were “never accepted by the Court,” the terms were unenforceable.
Gee also amended the January order so that it was grounded on a ruling that the plea agreement was unenforceable rather than on a finding that a breach had occurred.
The USAO moved for reconsideration and alternatively asked Gee to allow the factual basis to be used solely for impeachment purposes if Puig testified at trial in a manner that contradicted the statements. Gee denied the motions, and the USAO appealed under 18 U.S.C. §3731.
Supreme Court Precedent
Collins acknowledged the 1995 U.S. Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Mezzanatto, in which the court held that earlier, inconsistent statements made by the defendant in a meeting with prosecutors to explore the possibility of cooperating with the government were admissible to impeach him during trial where the parties had so agreed before the interview began, and wrote:
“[B]ecause Evidence Rule 410…[was] ‘enacted against a background presumption that legal rights generally, and evidentiary provisions specifically, are subject to waiver by voluntary agreement of the parties,’ the Supreme Court has held that, ‘absent some affirmative indication that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of [these] Rules is valid and enforceable.’ ”
However, the jurist distinguished the case based on the fact that Puig’s agreement had an unmet condition precedent. He opined:
“[U]nder the terms of Puig’s plea agreement, his express agreement to waive his rights under Evidence Rule 410…becomes effective only ‘[f]ollowing the Court’s finding of a knowing breach of this agreement by [Puig]’….
“By its plain terms, this…phrase requires not merely that Puig perform some specified objective action that triggers the waiver, but that there be a ‘Court’s finding’ that there was a ‘breach of this agreement by’ Puig.”
Types of Agreements
He also pointed out that there are three main types of plea agreements recognized by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and each has specific procedural requirements. The one at issue in the present appeal is a so-called “Type A” agreement, or one that includes a government promise to dismiss or not bring other charges.
Collins noted that “[b]ecause a Type A…agreement includes elements that dictate, at least in part, a binding outcome…such agreements must be approved by the district court” and “generally enforceable only after that approval is given.”
Under these circumstances, he concluded:
“[B]ecause the plea agreement was a Type A agreement requiring the district court’s approval, and because that approval never occurred, the agreement was not enforceable by the court under our precedent. The waiver, by its own terms, therefore did not apply. Consequently, Rule 410 remains applicable with full force here, and the factual basis of Puig’s plea agreement is ‘not admissible against’ Puig.”
Rejecting an assertion by the USAO that the terms should be enforced because the prosecutors detrimentally relied on the agreement, the judge remarked:
“It makes no sense to posit, as this argument necessarily does, that the Government relied on Puig’s not breaching the agreement when the Government drafted the agreement’s language about the consequences of a breach. By definition, such language assumes a breach. Any detriment to the Government’s position here is therefore due, not to any action of Puig on which it relied, but to the Government’s failure to apprehend the significance of the agreement’s waiver language—which the Government itself drafted.”
Illegal Gambling Operation
The USAO contacted Puig after his name came up in an investigation into a former minor league baseball player, Wayne Nix, who pled guilty to conspiring to run an illegal gambling operation in April 2022. Many of Nix’s clients were former and current professional athletes, and prosecutors say he employed three former Major League Baseball players to assist with the business.
According to the factual basis in Puig’s plea agreement, the baseball player began placing bets with Nix through an unnamed contact, identified in the document as “Agent 1,” and eventually accumulated $282,900 in gambling debts.
On Jan. 27, 2022, Puig, who was then playing ball for a team in South Korea, appeared electronically with his attorney for a meeting with representatives of the USAO and federal investigators. Before the interview began, agents warned the ballplayer that “lying to federal law enforcement agents is a crime.”
Despite the warning, the prosecutors say Puig lied about his contact with Agent 1 and indicated that he accumulated the gambling debt through placing bets online, directly accessing a website himself
The case is U.S. v. Puig Valdes, 23-3214.
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