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Court of Appeal:
No Special Wording Needed to Overcome Presumption of Bias
Opinion Says Judge May Find That Presumptively Invalid Reason Under Racial Justice Act Is Not Race-Based Without Quoting Language From Statute, Disapproving Last Year’s Contrary Conclusion by Same Division
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Six of this district’s Court of Appeal yesterday held that a trial judge may overrule an objection asserting that the prosecutor has exercised a peremptory challenge based on a presumptively invalid, racially motivated reason without making explicit findings referencing the governing statutory language, disapproving a 2024 opinion by the same division that reached the opposite conclusion.
Yesterday’s opinion, authored by Presiding Justice Arthur Gilbert, acknowledges that the court’s conclusion conflicts with the division’s decision last year in People v. Uriostegui, which held that “a trial court may overrule an objection to the exercise of a peremptory challenge based on presumptively invalid reasons only if it explicitly makes specific findings.” However, Gilbert wrote:
“In [Uriostegui], I dissented from the majority opinion that reversed the trial court on the theory that a juror who had been dismissed required reversal because of a violation of Civil Code of Procedure section 231.7.
“The new majority of this court decides that the rationale expressed in the dissent in Uriostegui applies here. In short, the trial judge need not repeat verbatim a phrase from the statute to satisfy its requirements.”
Justices Kenneth Yegan and Tari L. Cody each penned a concurring opinion.
Sec. 231.7
At issue is Code of Civil Procedure §231.7, which was adopted in 2020. The section provides:
“A party shall not use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.”
Subdivision (g) specifies that a juror’s “demeanor” is to be considered presumptively invalid unless the court “is able to confirm that the asserted behavior occurred, based on the court’s own observations or the observations of counsel for the objecting party” and the party seeking to dismiss the jury “explain[s] why the asserted demeanor…matters to the case to be tried.”
Uriostegui Case
In Uriostegui, a prosecutor indicated that his reason for seeking to dismiss a potential panelist was that party’s “lack of life experience,” citing the individual’s youth, unemployed status, and previous work history at a fast-food restaurant. Under §231.7, a party’s “lack of employment” and previous service “in a field that is disproportionately occupied by” members of a particular race are deemed to be presumptively pretextual.
In an opinion, written by Justice Hernaldo J. Baltodano and joined by Justice Tari L. Cody, Div. Six declared the trial judge’s findings that the prospective juror’s “lack of life experience is unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias” and that the prosecutor’s “reason for peremptory” was not related to “the fact that [the potential panelist] may be Hispanic” were insufficient to withstand the defendant’s §231.7 objection.
Gilbert dissented, writing:
“[T]he majority reverses because the judge did not repeat verbatim the words of the statute.…This is taking literalism into the realm of the absurd.”
Robbery Conviction
The question arose after Richard Quntan Garcia was convicted of, among other crimes, attempted second-degree robbery relating to a hold-up of a Paso Robles convenience store in 2021. San Luis Obispo Superior Court Judge Timothy Covello sentenced him to 118 years to life in prison, based on his prior criminal history and the Three-Strikes statutory scheme.
Garcia appealed, arguing that Covello erred in overruling an objection to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to exclude a prospective juror, identified as “No. 2250429,” who the trial court identified as possibly being “Tongan, Samoan, of mixed race, African-American and something else.”
During voir dire, potential juror No. 2250429 said that she lived with her mother, had no children, worked as a child-care assistant, and had never served on a jury before. While the prospective panelist was answering other questions, Covello had to remind her to keep her voice up so that the judge could hear her responses.
Peremptory Challenge
After the prosecutor excused her in the first round of peremptory challenges, the defendant objected under §231.7, saying that the deputy struck “the sole African-American juror, sole person that appears to be of any substantial ethnicity beyond white.”
When asked to state his reasons for striking the prospective juror, the prosecutor said that she “seemed timid and unconfident” and that “[b]ased on the serious nature of the charges and potential life exposure in this case, the People are looking for jurors who have significant life experience and confidence to sit on this jury and maintain their views during intense deliberations.”
Covello overruled the objection, saying:
“I can certainly make the finding that I think she was not—did not have the life experience and I think…courts have found that to be a justifiable reason….[S]he was clearly very timid. And I think that’s a legitimate reason to not have that and trust that person to deliberate about the issues in this case.”
Reasons Given
Gilbert wrote:
“The prosecutor gave as reasons for his peremptory challenge of the juror, that she lacks life experience and is very timid. The prosecutor explained why his reasons for the challenge matter to the case to be tried….”
He noted that the “lack of life experience is not listed in section 231.7 as a presumptively invalid reason for a peremptory challenge” and reasoned that there was sufficient evidence to support the prosecutor’s characterization, saying:
“Timid young people who live with their mothers seldom have the varied life experiences that would be valuable in a jury sitting on a life-term case.”
The jurist acknowledged that “[t]he other reason for the juror challenge given by the prosecutor—that the juror is very timid—comes within the presumably invalid reason that the prospective juror exhibited a problematic demeanor.” However, he commented:
“But the trial court confirmed that the behavior occurred based on its own observation, and the prosecutor explained why it mattered to the case….Thus, the presumption of invalidity was rebutted.”
As to Uriostegui, he noted that the Office of the Attorney General conceded error based on that decision. Saying that the agency “concedes too easily,” he remarked:
“Garcia’s reliance on Uriostegui…is misplaced. For the reasons stated in the dissent thereto, we disapprove of it….The prosecutor and trial court complied with section 231.7. The prosecutor’s peremptory challenge to the potential juror was proper. And we note, as we did in Uriostegui, that the People, as well as the defendant, are entitled to a fair trial.”
Other Opinions
Yegan said:
“I fully concur in the typically well-written opinion of Presiding Justice Gilbert. I only write separately because amicus curiae, the District Attorney of San Luis Obispo County, contends, inter alia, that any error does not result in a miscarriage of justice. Amicus curiae is correct. In addition, insofar as Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 says that an error pursuant to this section ‘shall be deemed prejudicial,’ it is unconstitutional. Why? The Legislature has neither the right, nor the power, to amend the California Constitution by statute.”
Cody concurred in the judgment but argued that “Uriostegui…is distinguishable and should not be disapproved.” She noted that in the Uriostegui case, the prosecutor cited a presumptively invalid factor in justifying the opinion that the prospective juror lacked life experience—the potential panelist’s employment history.
The justice opined:
“[W]hile appellant’s case and Uriostegui superficially resemble each other, the two fundamentally differ because Uriostegui involved presumptions of invalidity that were never rebutted. In appellant’s case, the sole presumption of invalidity—concerning the juror’s timid, soft-spoken demeanor—was rebutted in compliance with section 231.7.”
The case is People v. Garcia, 2025 S.O.S. 2678.
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