Thursday, October 23, 2025
Page 4
C.A. Disavows Decision on ‘Functionally Equivalent’ Sentences
Panel Says Legislation Abrogates Need for Rule Set Forth in People v. Heard
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Six of the Court of Appeal for this district yesterday repudiated a 2022 decision that expands upon statutory language by conferring upon certain inmates who were sentenced, as juveniles, to the “equivalent” of a life sentence without possibility of parole the right to petition for resentencing.
Penal Code §1170(d)(1)(A) provides:
“When a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.”
Isaac Daniel Lara, convicted in 2002 of first degree murder and other offenses, was not sentenced to life without possibility of parole (“LWOP”) but, rather, to 79 years to life with the theoretical prospect of a parole. In successfully petitioning in Ventura Superior Court for a resentencing, he invoked the decision of the Fourth District’s Court of Appeal’s Div. One in People v. Heard.
There, Justice Truc T. Do declared that “denying juvenile offenders, who were sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole, the opportunity to petition for resentencing violates the guarantee of equal protection.”
Yegan’s Opinion
Justice Kenneth Yegan authored the opinion reversing the order by Judge Charmaine H. Buehner for a resentencing. Buehner found Lara’s sentence to be tantamount to LWOP.
“A subsequent statute changes the legal landscape,” Yegan wrote, pointing to Penal Code §3051(b)(4), enacted in 2017. It provides:
“A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed before the person had attained 18 years of age and for which the sentence is life without the possibility of parole shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 25th year of incarceration. The youth parole eligible date for a person eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under this paragraph shall be the first day of the person’s 25th year of incarceration.”
Lara was accorded a youth offender parole hearing on Oct. 31, 2024 and was found unsuitable for parole.
Legal Maxim
Yegan cited Civil Code §3510 which says, as it has since the code was adopted in 1872—and harks to Roman law:
“When the reason of a rule ceases, so should the rule itself.”
He remarked:
“This time-honored maxim has application here.”
The jurist explained:
“We acknowledge Heard…and the case law which agrees with its holding and rationale. Court of Appeal opinions, both published and not published have been inconsistent. We agree with the People that the ‘Heard’ rule has been mooted by the Legislature….
“We do not view cases wearing ‘horse blinders.’ Here, appellant has been given a parole hearing and so it is plain to see that he is not presently serving the functional equivalent of LWOP. The issue is moot. As indicated, ‘When the reason of a rule ceases, so should the rule itself.’…Phrased otherwise, the reason for the ‘Heard’ rule has ceased and so should the ‘Heard’ rule itself.”
The case is People v. Lara, B341682.
Copyright 2025, Metropolitan News Company