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Court of Appeal:
Power Exists to Grant Relief Based on Extrinsic Mistake
Attorney Is Entitled to Have Court Weigh Whether Medical Problems Precluded Her From Timely Opposing Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award in Dispute With Former Client in Fee Dispute, Zukin Writes
By a MetNews Staff Writer
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TINA MEHR attorney |
The Court of Appeal for this district has given an attorney a second chance to persuade a judge that a judgment in a fee dispute based on an arbitrator’s award to an ex-client should be vacated, holding that the power to afford equitable relief is not confined to circumstances were a default was entered.
Friday’s unpublished decision will seemingly have no effect on pending State Bar disciplinary proceedings against the attorney, Tina Mehr, in connection with the dispute. Mehr is accused of removing a portion of settlement funds which she claimed as litigation costs, amounting to $178,932.49, from her client trust account (“CTA”), and pocketing the money.
In the civil litigation, Los Angeles Court Judge Lia Martin ruled on Aug. 23, 2023, that she had no authority to exercise equitable powers to correct purported extrinsic mistakes in the Jan. 12, 2022 judgment confirming a arbitration award. That view, Justice Helen Zukin of Div. Four declared Friday, is wrong.
The matter was remanded for a determination as to whether relief should be granted Mehr, a Long Beach employment attorney. She contends she was prevented by circumstances from responding to the petition by the former client, Jordana Korbin, for confirmation of the award by the Los Angeles County Bar Association’s Attorney-Client Mediation and Arbitration Services Program in the amount of $160,679.23 plus 10% interest.
The circumstances were described by Zukin as “an incident of domestic violence and resulting medical issues.”
Martin’s View
In denying relief, Martin said, citing the Feb. 25, 2016 decision by Div. Four of this district’s Court of Appeal in Bae v. T.D. Service Company as authority:
“While the Court has ‘inherent authority’ to provide relief on equitable grounds, such relief due to ‘extrinsic fraud or mistake’ is limited to vacating a default or and default judgment.’ ”
Martin observed:
“[T]here is no indication that a default or default judgment is at issue in this case.”
Zukin’s Opinion
Rejecting that view, Zukin wrote:
“The cited portion of Bae says, ‘courts have the inherent authority to vacate a default and default judgment on equitable grounds such as extrinsic fraud or extrinsic mistake.’…However, the panel in Bae was discussing a default case….Bae held equitable relief applied to the default case then at hand; it did not thereby limit equitable relief to default cases.”
She declared:
“Parties may seek equitable relief from any final judgment.”
Lack of Diligence
Korbin contended on appeal that Mehr failed to satisfy a requisite for equitable relief: diligence, The justice responded:
“But this presents a factual question for the trial court to decide in the first instance….The trial court did not decide this question because it believed its equitable powers were restricted to a default context. That failure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of discretion.”
The case is Mehr v. Korbin, B335052
State Bar Proceedings
The State Bar Office of Chief Trial Counsel has charged Mehr with removing from her CTA the $178,932.49 she claimed as costs in litigation in which she had represented Korbin and “spending the funds on personal expenses,” saying that this constituted “an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.” It explained:
“A violation of section 6106 may result from intentional conduct or grossly negligent conduct. Respondent is charged with committing an intentional misappropriation. However, should the evidence at trial demonstrate that respondent misappropriated funds as a result of grossly negligent conduct, respondent must still be found culpable of violating section 6106 because misappropriation through gross negligence is a lesser included offense of intentional misappropriation.”
Aside from charging Mehr with misappropriation, it has alleged, separately, a failure to maintain funds in a trust account, withdrawal of disputed funds, and failure to distribute funds promptly.
Mehr, through a Georgia lawyer, said in her answer that “[a]ppeal of the arbitration award is ongoing and Ms. Mehr disputes discipline charges set forth” in the notice of charges.
Penalty for Nonpayment
By order of the California Supreme Court on July 1, 2023, Mehr was suspended from law practice based on nonpayment of the arbitration award. On Feb. 4, Mehr petitioned the State Bar Court to “remove or abate” that administrative penalty, arguing that the arbitration decision “enraged Ms. Mehr’s then-boyfriend leading him to physically assault and verbally disparage her,” ejecting her from the home they shared, and leaving her “with little money and nowhere to go,” resulting in severe psychological harm.
Mehr asked for relief based on her inability to pay the award.
On Feb. 26, State Bar Court Judge Yvette D. Roland denied the motion, saying that “this court lacks the independent authority—or equitable power—to modify or override a Supreme Court order suspending an attorney.”
She remarked:
“While the court recognizes Respondent’s disagreement with the civil court’s denial of her motion to vacate the fee award and her ongoing appeal, these circumstances do not exempt her from the statutory consequences of nonpayment. The only statutory avenue for an attorney to avoid or lift such a suspension is payment of the required penalty.”
Unrelated to the disciplinary charges, Mehr is suspended from law practice based on failure to pay State Bar dues and to meet minimum continuing legal education requirements.
Mehr’s medical problems apparently multiplied.
In a June 18, 2024 form complaint, since dismissed, Mehr alleged that on Sept. 1, 2023, defendant Samuel Gomez Miranda “[w]hile driving on the 110-freeway…stepped on the gas instead of the brake; accelerating into Plaintiff, slamming her stopped car into another stopped car in front of her, and then hitting her again, twice because Defendant continued stepping on the gas instead of the brake.”
The pleading continued:
“Defendant drove a large minivan and caused substantial injury to both Plaintiff and her vehicle. As a direct result of the negligence of Defendant, confusing the gas and the brake, and hitting Plaintiff—twice—with his minivan. Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer damages including, but not limited to, wage loss, loss of use of property, hospital and medical expenses, general damage, property damage and loss of earning capacity.”
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