Return of Children to Mother Doesn’t Moot Her Appeal

Tuesday, December 2, 2025

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California Supreme Court:

Return of Children to Mother Doesn’t Moot Her Appeal

Opinion Says Fact That Agency Must Report Underlying Child Abuse Allegation to Statewide Database Is Sufficient Ongoing Harm to Warrant Appellate Review

By Kimber Cooley, associate editor

The California Supreme Court yesterday held that a mother’s appeal of a judge’s determination that her children are subject to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and must be removed from her care is not moot even though her parental rights were later restored where the underlying allegations require the governing welfare agency to report her to the Department of Justice for inclusion in a statewide database of child abuse incidents.

Appealing the jurisdictional order was a mother, identified only as “S.F.,” who claimed that the child abuse allegations were based on her acting in self-defense when two of her daughters physically threatened her. A Los Angeles Superior Court commissioner ordered the children removed following the incident but returned them to her care six months later.

Certain actors, including the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”), are required by law to forward substantiated reports of child abuse to the California Department of Justice for inclusion in California’s Child Abuse Central Index (“CACI”), which is accessible by law enforcement, some employers, and others. Once listed in the CACI, a party remains in the database until the age of 100.

Justice Goodwin H. Liu authored yesterday’s unanimous decision, saying:

“The issue here is…: Whether a parent’s appeal from a juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding survives a mootness challenge where the parent shows that an agency must report the allegation underlying the court’s finding for inclusion in the CACI. The answer is yes….Reversal of a jurisdictional finding can redress that harm by prompting removal of the parent from the CACI…or by preserving a parent’s right to a grievance hearing to challenge an agency’s failure to reclassify the report as unsubstantiated.”

Retired Justice Martin J. Jenkins, sitting by assignment, joined in the opinion.

Liu also penned a concurring opinion, saying that, although it is “unnecessary” to address S.F.’s self-defense claim, he “explain[ed] [that] a person’s conduct toward a minor that constitutes lawful self-defense cannot provide a basis for including that person in the CACI.”

Dependent of Court

S.F. challenged a January 2023 order by Los Angeles Superior Court Commissioner Lisa Brackelmanns determining that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over her minor children under Welfare and Institutions Code §300, which provides that a child may be adjudged to be a dependent of the court based on findings of neglect or abuse.

DCFS employees filed a dependency petition based on an incident in which two of S.F.’s daughters—who were 22 and 16 years old at the time—were described by witnesses as looking like they were trying to start a physical fight with their mother.

After the 16-year-old allegedly “[came] at” her, S.F. purportedly hit the teenager with the handle of a shovel before brandishing a camping knife and shouting threats. S.F. called the police and a DCFS hotline during the altercation, reporting that she was acting in self-defense.

DCFS removed the middle daughter and her 12-year-old sister from the home. At a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, Brackelmanns found that even if S.F. was defending herself from her daughters, her response was unreasonable, saying:

“I would imagine there was a lot of disrespectful language that was directed at Mother, but the court does not find that her grabbing a shovel and hitting [her middle daughter], leaving a mark on her, and, then grabbing a knife and threatening to kill them was justified….”

She sustained DCFS’ petition and S.F. appealed.

At a six-month review hearing, the juvenile court returned the two girls to their mother’s care and, six months later, terminated jurisdiction. Div. Eight of this district’s Court of Appeal dismissed S.F.’s appeal as moot on May 31 of last year.

Effective Relief

Liu noted that a case becomes moot when events make it impossible to grant any effective relief because there is either no ongoing harm or the injury is not capable of being rectified by the outcome being sought. The jurist pointed out that the rule applies in the dependency context but said that case law has determined that stigma alone is insufficient to sustain an appeal.

He acknowledged that S.F. had not shown that she had been included in the database but said that the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (“CANRA”), found at Penal Code §11164 et seq., obligates the agency to give the notice after an investigation unless the allegations are determined to be false, improbable, or not involving covered conduct.

Parties listed in the CACI are entitled to challenge their inclusion unless a court has determined that the suspected abuse or neglect occurred.

Under those circumstances, the jurist opined:

“In assessing mootness, we first consider whether Mother has shown an ongoing harm. We hold that Mother has met this requirement by demonstrating that the sustained allegation of child abuse has been or will be included in the CACI….The Department…concedes it is proper for courts to presume, absent a contrary showing, that an agency has reported or will report to the DOJ an allegation subject to inclusion in the CACI…Because there is no time limit regarding this duty to report, it is possible that an agency will forward a report following the resolution of juvenile dependency and appellate proceedings. We agree with the parties that it is not speculative to conclude that Mother is or will be listed in the CACI, which carries serious legal consequences for her lifetime.”

Ethical Quandary

The justice pointed out that “placing the burden on parents to ascertain their CACI inclusion status can create…‘an ethical quandary’ for their counsel” as inquiring about a client’s potential listing “may have the effect of prompting” DCFS to report the parent to the Department of Justice.

He opined:

“[I]n light of the dilemma that counsel may encounter in this context, we emphasize that appellate courts have discretion to conduct a merits review of the parent’s claim even if the case is moot.”

DCFS argued that reversal of the jurisdictional finding may not automatically mandate the removal of the parent from the database. Agreeing with the department, he wrote:

“[A]utomatic removal from the CACI is not required to defeat a mootness challenge. It is sufficient that reversal would either result in the agency withdrawing the report from the DOJ such that removal from the CACI would occur or, at the least, preserve a parent’s right to a grievance hearing that would not otherwise be available.”

Liu added:

“We reverse the order dismissing Mother’s appeal and remand to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. On remand, Mother may raise arguments challenging the allegation of child abuse or neglect, including her claim of self-defense.”

Concurring Opinion

In his concurring opinion, Liu noted that CANRA expressly exempts from its definition of “child abuse or neglect” a mutual fight between minors and “an injury caused by reasonable and necessary force used by a peace officer acting within the course and scope of his or her employment” but does not address a parent’s right to defend herself.

Remarking that “[t]hese provisions cannot be read to mean that a parent (or any individual) has committed ‘child abuse or neglect’ when she uses reasonable force to defend herself against an attack by a minor,” he said that “[i]t would make little sense for reasonable resistance to a minor’s use of force to be lawful yet reportable conduct for inclusion in the CACI.”

He continued:

“[L]awfully acting in reasonable self-defense to ward off an attack by a minor does not constitute child abuse under CANRA. Accordingly, the Department may not report such lawful conduct for CACI inclusion, must update the Department of Justice to remove an individual from the CACI when a determination is made that the conduct constituted lawful self-defense, and should otherwise refrain from advancing that argument when an individual shows that lawful self-defense formed the basis of inclusion in the CACI.”

The case is In re S.R., 2025 S.O.S. 3390.