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Bar Is Set Low for Military Service Diversion Relating to Misdemeanor Charges—C.A.
Opinion Says Law Only Requires Veteran to Show ‘Reasonable Possibility’ of Disorder Stemming From Time in Uniform, No Nexus to Crime Is Required
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal has held that the statute authorizing military service diversion—a process allowing for the dismissal of charges upon the completion of a program—only requires defendants facing misdemeanor charges to show a “reasonable possibility” that they are suffering from certain disorders “as result of their…service” and does not require the accused to establish any nexus between the health issue and the crime.
Acknowledging that this “reasonable possibility” threshold diverges from the three most common burdens of proof used in California, the court said that statutory language makes clear that the low bar applies.
At issue is Penal Code §1001.80(b) which provides that a defendant who is charged with a misdemeanor is eligible for diversion if that person “was, or currently is, a member of the United States military” and “ may be suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of [his] military service.”
In Tuesday’s opinion, written by Acting Presiding Justice Eileen C. Moore and joined in by Justices Maurice Sanchez and Martha K. Gooding, the court said:
“Consistent with the statute’s plain language and its legislative history, we hold that by using the word ‘may,’ the Legislature intended to impose a lower ‘reasonable possibility’ burden of proof, thereby making it less burdensome for a veteran, or a member of the military, to establish their eligibility for pretrial military diversion.”
The question arose after Geraldo Segura, a former member of the U.S. Marine Corps, was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol in February 2023. After the Orange County District Attorney’s Office charged him with multiple misdemeanor offenses, he filed a motion under §1001.80(b) requesting pretrial military diversion.
To support his request, he submitted his discharge certificate and 255 pages of confidential medical records from the Veterans Administration to support an assertion that he suffers from an alcohol abuse disorder stemming from his time in the military.
At a hearing on the motion, Orange Superior Court Judge Richard Pacheco found that, based on the submitted records, the defendant’s alcohol use predated his military service. He denied the motion, saying:
“[W]ith everything that the court has there is just no nexus that this incident or his alcohol abuse is related to the military.”
Segura responded by filing a petition for a writ of mandate, arguing that Pacheco abused his discretion in denying the motion. On Tuesday, the court granted that request, commenting:
“While the trial court’s ruling is not entirely clear, it does appear the court was acting under a presumption that Segura needed to show some kind of relationship (a ‘nexus’) between his qualifying condition (‘alcohol abuse’ disorder) and the commission of the…offenses (‘the incident’).
“In short, the trial court appears to have committed a legal error by imposing a requirement for misdemeanor military diversion that is not called for under the statute.”
Moore added:
“We are remanding the matter so the court can apply the correct legal requirements as to misdemeanor diversion, and…apply the correct legal principles as to the burden of proof.”
Nexus Requirement
As to whether a defendant seeking diversion under §1001.80(b) needs to show a nexus between the asserted mental health issue and the crime, the jurist compared the section’s eligibility criteria for defendants accused of misdemeanors with that applicable to those charged with felony offenses.
She noted that, under subdivision (c), a court must find that “the defendant’s condition was a significant factor in the commission of the offense” in order for an individual accused of felonious behavior to be eligible for the diversion program. Based on this additional requirement, she opined:
“[U]nder the plain meaning of section 1001.80 (b), it is…apparent that when a court is determining whether a defendant charged with a misdemeanor is eligible for military diversion, the court does not need to find any sort of relationship between the defendant’s qualifying condition (e.g., alcohol abuse) and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense (e.g., the misdemeanor driving incident).”
Rejecting the prosecutors’ assertion that Pacheco’s order was based on a finding that Segura failed to establish that his alcohol abuse disorder was service-related, Moore remarked:
“The trial court did not unequivocally state that Segura failed to establish a nexus between his qualifying condition (alcohol abuse) and his military service. Rather, the court said that ‘there is just no nexus that this incident or his alcohol abuse is related to the military.’ (Italics added.) The words ‘this incident’ would logically appear to be referring to the driving ‘incident’ leading to Segura’s arrest and [driving under the influence] charges.”
Use of ‘May’
Turning to the burden of proof, she wrote:
“What is at issue here is the significance of the Legislature’s use of the word ‘may,’ and how that affects a defendant’s burden of proof when a court is determining whether that person is eligible for military diversion.”
Pointing out that the “plain and commonsense” meaning of the term expresses a possibility as opposed to a probability, the court declined to find that the Legislature intended to incorporate the default “preponderance of the evidence” standard, saying that “[t]here is simply a gulf of difference between a ‘probability’ and a ‘possibility.’ ”
Attorneys with the district attorney’s office also argued that the phrase “may be” only applies to the existence of the qualifying condition and has no relationship to whether the problem arose as “a result of…military service.” Unpersuaded, Moore said:
“When read in its entirety, the phrase ‘may be’ plainly applies to the entirety of the sentence, and not just the qualifying conditions…Indeed, if we were to adopt the [prosecutors’] interpretation of the statute, we would have to ignore the last seven words of the operative sentence: ‘as a result of their military service.’ ”
She declared:
“We direct the trial court to vacate its order denying Segura’s motion for misdemeanor military diversion. We further direct the court to conduct a new hearing consistent with the holdings in this opinion.”
The case is Segura v. Superior Court (People), 2025 S.O.S. 2340.
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