Page 4
Court of Appeal:
Judge Erred in ‘Pre-Approving’ Residential Treatment Option
Opinion Says Fact That Defendant Refused to Meet With Probation Officer Before Hearing Did Not Justify Order Requiring Convict to Attend ‘Any Type’ of Program Later Chosen by Department as Condition for Release
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Four of the First District Court of Appeal has held that a trial judge erred in ordering a defendant to attend, as a condition of his release, an inpatient drug treatment program if his probation officer later so recommended, saying that the jurist’s attempt to expressly pre-approve the agency’s subsequent determination does not avoid the problem that the action represents an improper delegation of judicial authority.
In Friday’s unpublished opinion, authored by Justice Jeremy M. Goldman, the court acknowledged that the defendant prevented the department from making any specific recommendations concerning the defendant before the hearing by refusing to meet with his probation officer. However, the court declared that the judge’s attempt to “pre-approve” later determinations by the agency was both “understandable” and “impermissible.”
Goldman wrote:
“[T]he trial court’s order impermissibly delegates to the probation department the authority to decide the kinds of programming or treatment in which [the defendant] is required to participate, including whether he will be required to participate in a residential treatment program….Accordingly, we vacate the conditions and remand so the court can identify with greater specificity the conditions imposed on [the convict].”
Acting Presiding Justice Jon B. Streeter and Alameda Superior Court Judge Jason Clay, sitting by assignment, joined in the opinion.
Drug Crimes
Challenging the order was Tai Tran, who was convicted of the transportation and possession for sale of ketamine, psilocybin, ecstasy, as well as other controlled substances on March 22 of last year. Marin Superior Court Judge Kelly Simmons suspended imposition of sentence on the offenses and placed him on probation.
Simmons conditioned Tran’s probationary status on his participation “in a substance use assessment at the direction of the probation officer” and informed the defendant that “[i]f residential treatment is recommended by the alcohol and drug assessment, it is approved by the Court.”
She added:
“When you are on probation, you must attend any type of self-help meetings or substance abuse treatment or psychological or therapeutic treatment as directed by the Probation Department….So, treatment could include nothing or if it’s determined that you have a substance abuse problem, it could be like AA meetings or…a residential treatment program, whatever they think is necessary. Or, if they think that some treatment, therapy, or psychotherapy is in order, then they can give you directions in that.”
Tran appealed, arguing that the conditions were vague, overbroad, and amounted to an impermissible delegation of judicial authority. Goldman noted the defendant’s failure to object to the terms during sentencing but said that “constitutional challenges are cognizable on appeal because they present pure questions of law.”
California Constitution
The jurist cited Article III, §3 of the California Constitution, which provides:
“The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.”
He pointed to the 2022 decision in People v. Smith, in which Div. Five of the First District Court of Appeal found that a probation condition imposed on a single mother that required her to participate in residential treatment if her probation officer later recommended the program violated the state Constitution. Justice Gordon B. Burns, writing for the court, said:
“Given the significant liberty interests at stake, a court—not a probation officer—must make the decision to require a defendant to attend residential treatment.”
The Office of the Attorney General argued that Simmons did make the decision in Tran’s case by expressly pre-approving the recommendations of the county’s probation department. Unpersuaded by this line of argument, the justice said that the order still allowed “the controlling decision to be made by someone else.”
Goldman acknowledged the defendant’s misdeeds in refusing to meet with his probation officer before the hearing, and reasoned:
“We are mindful of the practical difficulties faced by courts imposing conditions of probation prior to completion of appropriate assessments. Nonetheless, the liberty interests at stake require that the court, not the probation department or even the probation department in consultation with a treatment professional, make the determination that residential treatment is required. On this record, the efficiency intended by preapproving residential care if clinically indicated, while understandable, was impermissible. The court gave itself no opportunity to review the result of any assessment or to hear from the parties about it.”
Under those circumstances, he concluded:
“We agree with Tran that the first two probation conditions, taken together, violate the separation of powers because they delegate to someone other than a judicial officer the decision whether Tran will be required to participate in residential substance use treatment.”
Remaining Conditions
As to the remaining probation conditions requiring Tran to undergo other treatment protocols, Goldman noted that the Smith court found a similar term to be without constitutional infirmity because it found that the order mandated substance abuse programs but left the details up to the discretion of the probation officer.
Applying this principle to Tran’s case, he wrote:
“The question here is…whether there is information in the record that makes clear the court was mandating participation in the identified kinds of programs or treatments—permissibly leaving it to the probation department to oversee the details…—or instead was delegating to the probation department the authority to decide whether Tran would be required to participate in any or some of them.”
Saying that the prosecutors’ assertion that Simmons’ order required Tran to participate in each of the identified types of programs was contradicted by the judge’s comments that “treatment could include nothing,” he remarked:
“In our view, these comments suggest that the court was giving the probation department wide latitude to decide whether Tran would be required to participate in treatment or programming, and if so, what kind(s). At a minimum, there is sufficient uncertainty in the record that clarification is warranted given our conclusion that we must remand in any event for the court to decide whether a residential program is mandated.”
Goldman declared:
“The…challenged probation conditions are vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to identify the type or types of programming or treatment in which Tran is required to participate, including whether he is required to undergo residential treatment.”
The case is People v. Tran, A170390.
Copyright 2025, Metropolitan News Company