Monday, December 29, 2025
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C.A. Reverses Judgment Because Plaintiff Didn’t Contest on Appeal Assertion That It Is Void
Motion Was Made Below to Declare Default and Subsequent Award of Damages to Be Nullities; Appellant’s Brief Was Based on Different Ground
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Court of Appeal for this district has reversed an order denying a motion to set aside a default judgment on the ground that it is void, but did so without determining whether it actually was, as the defendant contended in the trial court, a nullity.
Although the defendant did appeal from the denial of his motion asserting voidness, what he pressed for in the Court of Appeal was a reversal of a subsequent motion seeking relief under a different theory.
Justice Armen Tamzarian of Div. Four authored the opinion, filed Wednesday. It reverses an order by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Michael C. Small denying a motion by defendant Sami Ammari pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §473(d) and declaring that the default judgment cannot stand.
That section says:
“The court… may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.”
Plaintiff Razan Ammari on June 13, 2023, obtained a default judgment in the amount of $337,495 against Sami Ammari, her brother. The dispute relates to ownership of a residence in Malibu.
The defendant purported to appeal from the default and the default judgment but did not do so timely. He did, however, file a timely notice of appeal from Small’s denial of his motion under §473(d), as well as a subsequent motion pursuant to §473(b) based on a default having allegedly resulted from an attorney’s “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.”
Judgment Was Incorrect
Tamzarian said the default judgment on the first amended complaint was erroneous because there was, in fact, no default. The defendant had answered the initial complaint and the denials had covered the allegations in the plaintiff’s subsequent pleading, he explained, noting that an answer to a new pleading is, under that circumstance, optional.
As to whether the judgment was void, and therefore properly attacked under §473(d), the jurist wrote:
“Sami contends his original answer stood to answer the first amended complaint. In her response brief, Razan does not address this argument. She also does not address whether a default judgment erroneously entered after a defendant has filed an answer is void or voidable. We therefore assume without deciding that such a default judgment is void.
“We agree that Sami’s answer to the initial complaint sufficed to controvert the first amended complaint and precluded entering his default.”
Issue Not Addressed
In the respondent’s brief, authored by Helen Grayce Long of the Burbank law firm of Dennis P. Block & Associates, APC, Razan Ammari brushed aside the contention voiced in the trial court that the judgment was void, saying:
“In the case at bar, Appellant submits that there was no abuse of discretion in denying discretionary relief under C.C.P.. Section 473(b), and since the motion for relief did not rely on any affidavit of fault provisions and did not rely on any assertion that the judgment and default void (and also because they were not, in fact void), the order denying the motion must be affirmed on appeal.”
However, in Sami Ammari’s brief on appeal, drafted by Encino attorney Steven M. Tamer—although there is mention of a motion under §473(d) have been made and the filing of a notice of appeal from the denial of it—the merits of that motion are not discussed. The argument put forth is based on the contention that relief should have been granted under §473(b).
Focus of Appeal
Sami Ammari contended:
“The Trial Court erred by denying Defendant Amman’s November 8. 2023 motion for relief from default, based on the mandatory attorney fault provisions under Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b), because it discounted the reasons why Defendant Amman’s counsel, Steven Tamer, caused the entry of the default and default judgment, while not finding that Defendant Ammari, himself caused the default and default judgment.”
Tamzarian’s opinion deals only with the motion under §473(d) and makes no mention of §473(b) though that is the provision relied upon in the appeal.
The case is Ammari v. Ammari, 2025 S.O.S. 3830.
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