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Court of Appeal:
Sheriff’s Department That Sold Services Enjoys Immunity
Decision Comes in Action Brought by Estates, Survivors of 2021 Mass Shooting in San Jose
By a MetNews Staff Writer
A sheriff’s department that sold its services to a public transit authority pursuant to a contract that capped payments at $25 million is entitled, along with the county, to governmental immunity, the Sixth District Court of Appeal held Friday, affirming judgments of dismissal in four cases brought by estates and survivors of nine persons gunned down at their worksite by a fellow employee who then fatally shot himself.
The mass shooting by Samuel James Cassidy took place on May 26, 2021, at the Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority (“VTA”) rail yard in San Jose. The plaintiffs contend that but for negligence, Cassidy would not have been able to gain entrance to the facility toting three semiautomatic handguns.
Justice Daniel H. Bromberg authored the unpublished opinion affirming judgments of dismissal that followed Santa Clara Superior Court Judge Sunil Kulkarni’s orders in the four consolidated cases sustaining demurrers without leave to amend. While jettisoning causes of action for wrongful death and breach of contract against the County of Santa Clara and its sheriff’s department, Kulkarni allowed litigation against VTA and a private security company to proceed.
County’s Argument
Contesting the county’s contention on appeal that only “ordinary law enforcement services” were performed under the “supplemental law enforcement support services” contract, the plaintiffs/appellants argued:
“It that were true, then the Sheriff s Office and its employees would clearly be immune, and the demurrers would have been properly granted.
“It is false. The County’s contract with the VTA required it to provide both ‘law enforcement’ services and separate ‘security support’ services….This is a lawsuit over the latter obligations. In effect, the Sheriffs Office was moonlighting as a private security contractor.”
They further contended:
“When a law-enforcement agency collects tens of millions of dollars to provide workplace security, there must be legal consequences if it fails to deliver what it promised.
“That is necessary, not merely to prevent a miscarriage of justice in this case, but to avoid disrupting the market for security services. Specifically, if law-enforcement agencies can compete with private security contractors—but then escape the normal liability for negligence if they fail to perform—then those agencies will be able to underbid the private contractors. Workplace security will increasingly be provided by entities who have no financial incentive to exercise due care, and who leave victims uncompensated when their negligence leads to tragedies like the massacre in this case.”
‘Harsh Result’
Dismissal of the lawsuits against the county and its sheriff’s department “without considering the merits” of allegedly “deficient conduct” on their part, Blomber wrote, “is a harsh result” in light of “the plaintiffs’ tragic loss.” But, he declared, Kulkarni “correctly applied the law.”
He noted that Government Code §815 provides, in part:
“Except as otherwise provided by statute:
“(a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.”
Blomberg said:
“Plaintiffs have not pointed to any statute imposing direct tort liability on public entities for either wrongful death or common law negligence. Nor are we aware of any. Accordingly, under section 815 the County and the Sheriff’s Office are immune from direct tort liability for plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims, which in turn are based on negligence.”
No Vicarious Liability
The jurist also pointed to Government Code §815.2 which says:
“(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.
“(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.”
The defendants cannot be held vicariously liable because no wrongful act or omission on the part of an employee has been alleged, Blomberg said.
Government Code §814
The plaintiffs maintained that liability exists under Government Code §814 which sets forth:
“Nothing in this part affects liability based on contract or the right to obtain relief other than money or damages against a public entity or public employee.”
A brief on appeal explains:
“Here, Plaintiffs’ wrongful-death claims can proceed under section 814, because they depend on the existence of a contract. Specifically, they depend on a special relationship that arises from the contract between the VTA and the County.”
It adds:
“The wrongful-death liability in this case is based on contract. It therefore falls within section 814.”
Blomberg responded:
“[S]ection 814 does not refer to ‘suit[s] based on a contract.’ It refers to ‘liability based on contract’—that is, contractual liability. (§ 814, italics added.) Thus, section 814 does not permit tort claims against public entities merely because those claims have some factual connection to a contract. It permits only claims that seek to impose liability based on contract law.
“Plaintiffs fail to cite any case holding that section 814 applies to a tort claim merely because the claim has some factual connection to a contract.”
Alleged Contractual Breach
The plaintiffs also sued based on the county’s alleged breach of its contract with VTA. The justice said:
“The trial court denied these contract claims because plaintiffs failed to show that their decedents were third party beneficiaries entitled to enforce the contract. Relying largely on cases from other jurisdictions, plaintiffs challenge this ruling. Conducting an independent review…, we conclude that the ruling was correct.”
The case is Davallou v. County of Santa Clara, H051963.
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