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Judge Erred in Denying Franklin Hearing—C.A.
Opinion Rejects Blanchard’s Theory That Mitigating Evidence Could Have Been Preserved by Putting It on the Record at Sentencing
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Court of Appeal for this district has held that a Los Angeles Superior Court judge erred in denying a Franklin motion, which is made to preserve mitigating evidence for use years hence at a youth offender parole hearing, rejecting the rationale that the defendant could have put anything of potential value to him on the record at the time of sentencing,
Justice Gail Ruderman Feuer authored the unpublished opinion, filed Thursday. It reverses an order by Judge Kathleen Blanchard.
A Franklin hearing was sought by Dawuan Javonya Washington who was convicted of attempted murder and robbery. The name of the procedure is derived from the 2016 California Supreme Court case of People v. Franklin which came on the heels of the enactment of Senate Bill 260 which, effective Jan. 1, 2014, created Penal Code §3051.
Subd. (b)(1) of that statute provides:
“A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a determinate sentence shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 15th year of incarceration. The youth parole eligible date for a person eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under this paragraph shall be the first day of the person’s 15th year of incarceration.”
Washington was age 23 when he committed his offenses and was sentenced by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Daviann Mitchell on Nov. 1, 2022 to a determinate sentence of 34 years.
Decision in Franklin
In Franklin, the state Supreme Court acted on the appeal of Tyris Lamar Franklin who committed murder at the age of 16. Justice Goodwin H. Liu wrote:
“[W]e remand the matter to the trial court for a determination of whether Franklin was afforded sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing.
“If the trial court determines that Franklin did not have sufficient opportunity, then the court may receive submissions and, if appropriate, testimony….Franklin may place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.”
In its 2019 decision in In re Cook, the high court said, in an opinion by Justice Carol A. Corrigan, that Anthony Maurice Cook Jr., who committed two murders at age 17 and whose conviction was final, could “seek the remedy of evidence preservation” by making a motion in the Superior Court for a hearing and need not petition for a writ of habeas corpus. She wrote:
“The question here is whether a sentenced prisoner whose conviction is final can seek the remedy of evidence preservation and, if so, by what means. We conclude that offenders with final convictions may file a motion in the trial court for that purpose, under the authority of [Penal Code] section 1203.01. That statute provides that, postjudgment, the trial court may generate, collect, and transmit information about the defendant and the crime to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The statute specifically mentions statements prepared by the court, prosecutor, defense counsel, and investigating law enforcement agency. But the court has inherent authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 187 to authorize additional evidence preservation consistent with our holding in Franklin.”
Blanchard’s View
In addressing Washington’s Franklin motion on Jan. 9, 2024, Blanchard declared that the defendant “was not entitled to a new evidence preservation hearing” because his sentencing came after §3051 was enacted and Franklin and Cook were decided. She reasoned that Washington “was given sufficient opportunity” at the time of sentencing “to make a record of any information relevant to his eventual youthful offender parole hearing.”
Rejecting that approach, Feuer said:
“…Cook specifically provides for the filing of a postjudgment motion under section 1203.01, and nowhere in Cook is there a requirement that a defendant file the motion at the time of sentencing.”
She declared:
“Washington contends, the People concede, and we agree the superior court erred in denying Washington’s motion for a Franklin proceeding. As mandated by Cook…, Washington filed his motion in the superior court under the original caption and case number, citing section 1203.01 and Cook. The People acknowledge that Washington established his entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051, subdivision (b)(1), because he was 23 years old when he committed the crimes and he was sentenced to a determinate term of 34 years in state prison. The record does not reflect that Washington had a prior parole hearing or a Franklin proceeding.”
On remand, Feuer said, the Superior Court must hold a Franklin hearing but “has discretion to set the parameters of the proceeding.”
The case is People v. Washington, B336891.
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