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State Supreme Court Adopts Strict Reading of Bail Forfeiture After Detention of Fugitive
Opinion Says It Is Error to Read Into Rule a Requirement That Prosecutors Make Extradition Choice Within Given Timeframe
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The California Supreme Court held yesterday that a provision allowing for the vacatur of forfeiture of bail if a bond company detains a fugitive defendant on foreign soil and prosecutors decline to bring him to the U.S. does not authorize a court to read into the law a rule compelling the agency to make an extradition decision by the deadline for such motions, even if the law for the loss of funds due to indecision.
In a unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Kelli Evans, the court said that, even if the statute as written allows for the loss of funds due to the office’s failure to decide on extradition during the timeframe governing vacatur, the law’s plain text and legislative history provide that prosecutors have exclusive control over the timing and choice of whether or not to extradite the defendant.
At issue is Penal Code §1305(g), which provides:
“In all cases of forfeiture where a defendant is not in custody and is beyond the jurisdiction of the state, is temporarily detained, by the bail agent, in the presence of a local law enforcement officer of the jurisdiction in which the defendant is located, and is positively identified by that law enforcement officer as the wanted defendant…, and the prosecuting agency elects not to seek extradition after being informed of the location of the defendant, the court shall vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond on terms that are just and do not exceed the terms imposed in similar situations with respect to other forms of pretrial release.”
Other provisions of the statutory scheme specify that the bail company has a so-called “appearance period” of 180 days from the notice of forfeiture—given after a bonded defendant fails to show up for a court appearance—to either produce the defendant or demonstrate that the order should be set aside, a timeframe that may be extended for an additional six months upon a showing of good cause.
Under subdivision (j), a motion to vacate the forfeiture may be heard within 30 days of the expiration of the appearance period, or more if good cause exists for an extension.
Failure to Appear
The question arose after Geovanni Quijadas Silva failed to appear for a plea hearing after he was charged with committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child in violation of Penal Code §288(b)(1). In February 2018, the trial court declared Silva’s bond forfeited and mailed a notice to The North River Insurance Company and its bail agent, Bad Boys Bail Bonds, providing that the forfeiture would become final on August 30.
North River successfully requested an additional 180 days to secure the defendant’s appearance, and the deadline was extended to March 20, 2019. On that date, the company moved to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond based on §1305(g), declaring that Silva had been located in Veracruz, Mexico on March 15.
North River served the motion on the prosecution via overnight mail on May 19. The prosecutorial office opposed the motion.
Santa Clara Superior Court Judge My-Le Jacqueline Duong denied North River’s motion and the company’s accompanying request to continue the matter to allow the prosecution to make an extradition decision, and judgment was entered against the petitioner in the amount of $100,000.
Div. Eight of this district’s Court of Appeal affirmed the order, in a divided opinion, but later granted rehearing and reversed in August 2023. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice John Shepard Wiley Jr., the court cited fairness concerns and declared:
“The law required the court either to insist that the prosecution make an extradition decision or to grant the continuance so the prosecution had time to decide.”
The court also held that prosecutors have until the hearing date to make any determination, and are not limited to the appearance period.
Yesterday’s decision reverses that judgment.
Justice Leondra Kruger wrote separately to argue that the court should have addressed whether prosecutors must decide on extradition during the appearance period or if they have until the hearing date, which may be more than 30 days later, an issue the majority declined to resolve. Agreeing with Div. Eight on the topic, she wrote:
“This reading has the distinct advantage of avoiding the peculiar result of saddling the bail company with responsibility for the timing of the prosecutors’ decisions, over which the company has no control.”
Implicit Equitable Mechanism
North River argued that the statutory scheme includes an implicit equitable mechanism by which the filing of a motion to vacate the forfeiture serves both to notify the prosecution of the defendant’s location and to compel the prosecution to make an extradition decision. Rejecting this view, Evans wrote:
“We hold that section 1305 neither authorizes the trial court to compel the prosecution to make an extradition decision nor obligates the trial court as a matter of law to continue the hearing until the prosecution makes an extradition decision.”
Looking to the text of the section, she concluded:
“The statutory language…indicates not only that the prosecution is responsible for making the extradition decision, but also that the prosecution’s decision to extradite must be voluntary and not compelled….Had the Legislature intended to authorize a court to extend the appearance period without the prosecution’s consent or to compel the prosecution to make an extradition decision, it would have done so clearly and explicitly.”
The jurist added:
“This conclusion is consistent with the purpose of bail and the bond forfeiture statutes. The bail scheme furthers multiple competing purposes: the state’s compelling interest ‘in assuring the arrestee’s appearance at trial…’ on the one hand…, and the defendant’s ‘fundamental right to pretrial liberty’ on the other….The procedural requirements of the forfeiture statutes, including the requirements that the prosecution elect not to seek extradition and agree to tolling the appearance period, are critical to a proper balancing of the competing interests.”
Pointing to legislative analysis acknowledging that prosecutors may be left with little time to make an extradition decision in the event that the fugitive is located toward the end of the appearance period, she opined:
“Given this concern, the Legislature could have permitted tolling of the appearance period without the prosecution’s agreement, or in circumstances such as those presented in this case—in which the surety filed a motion attesting that it located the defendant just before the appearance period expired and the prosecution did not have an opportunity, or failed, to make an extradition decision. But the Legislature did not.”
Fairness Principles
Addressing fairness considerations, Evans remarked:
“North River urges that once a motion to vacate the forfeiture is filed, fairness requires the prosecuting agency to make an extradition decision one way or the other, and if the prosecution fails to do so, the court is required as a matter of law to continue the hearing pursuant to section 1305, subdivision (j) until an extradition decision is made. Nothing in the text of subdivision (j), however, authorizes a trial court to compel an extradition decision or requires the court to continue the motion if an extradition decision has not been made by the hearing date on the motion to vacate.”
Noting that an extradition decision requires a determination as to whether there is a treaty with the foreign country in which the defendant is found, coordinating with federal agencies, and balancing the financial costs of bringing the fugitive to justice in the U.S. against the seriousness of the offense, she said that “in certain circumstances, an extradition decision simply cannot be made quickly, or at all.”
She continued:
“We do not decide today whether courts may rely on equitable tolling when there is evidence of error, bad faith, unreasonable delay, or other factors in the extradition decision making process. Nor do we decide whether the prosecution’s failure to make an extradition decision can ever constitute a refusal to extradite. But even assuming courts may rely on equitable principles to vacate a forfeiture,…there is no basis for equitable tolling under the circumstances of this case, where it is undisputed that North River served the motion to vacate by overnight mail only one day before the appearance period expired, filed the motion on the last possible day of the appearance period, and no agreement to toll the appearance period exists.”
Saying the remaining public policy arguments are best reserved for the Legislature, she declared:
“Under current law and the circumstances of this case,…North River’s request that we adopt a rule compelling the court to either require the prosecution to make an extradition decision or continue the hearing on the motion to vacate the forfeiture in order for an extradition decision to be made ‘is inconsistent with a surety’s contractual and statutory obligations.’ ”
The case is People v. The North River Insurance Company, 2025 S.O.S. 1944.
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