Judge Erred in Denying Immunity to Officer Accused of Lying

Wednesday, November 5, 2025

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Ninth Circuit:

Judge Erred in Denying Immunity to Officer Accused of Lying

In Case Filed by Plaintiff Who Was Found Factually Innocent After Serving Seven Years in Prison, Opinion Says Allegations Failed to Show That Defendant’s Purported Errors Violated Any Clearly Established Rights

By Kimber Cooley, associate editor

A divided panel of the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a trial judge erred in denying a motion for summary judgment filed by a Los Angeles Police Department officer who asserts that qualified immunity shields her from liability against claims that she violated the Fourteenth Amendment by deliberately fabricating evidence in a case in which the plaintiff was later found to have been wrongly convicted.

In Monday’s memorandum decision, signed by Circuit Judges Sandra S. Ikuta and Kenneth K. Lee, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s characterizations of the defendant’s purported fabrications did not show a violation of any clearly established rights, as required to defeat an assertion of qualified immunity by a police officer.

Those allegations asserted that the officer bolstered her assertion that the plaintiff was in a gang by relying on other officers’ purportedly bogus reports, wrongly indicated that the party had been named in a gang injunction when, in reality, he had only been served with the decree, and failed to provide context to a statement made during his arrest indicating awareness of the nature of the charges against him.

Qualified Immunity Grounds

Ikuta and Lee said:

“Defendant Sharon Kim appeals the district court’s order denying her motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Kim violated the Fourteenth Amendment by deliberately fabricating evidence. We have jurisdiction over ‘whether the defendant would be entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, assuming all factual disputes are resolved, and all reasonable inferences are drawn, in plaintiff’s favor.’…We reverse and remand.”

Senior Circuit Judge Richard R. Clifton dissented, arguing that because District Court Judge Wesley L. Hsu of the Central District of California framed his ruling by saying that the plaintiff had established “a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Kim deliberately fabricated evidence, the court lacked jurisdiction to “re-weigh the determination…not to grant summary judgment.”

Complaint Filed

In October 2021, Derrick Harris filed a complaint against Kim and the City of Los Angeles, among others, asserting constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 based on allegations that Kim and other officers fabricated evidence against him.

In the pleading, he alleged that he was “a 21-year-old father aiming to attend college and play collegiate basketball when the Police Officer Defendants wrongfully prosecuted and convicted him for the armed robbery of Curtis Blackwell” in 2013.

He served seven years in prison before Los Angeles Superior Court Judge William C. Ryan vacated his conviction, dismissed the case, and found him factually innocent of the crime in October 2020.

On Sept. 24, 2024, Hsu denied the defendants’ request for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, noting that Harris denied ever claiming to be involved with the Bounty Hunter Bloods and provided evidence that an internal audit at the LAPD found that some officers had a practice of falsely listing on field identification cards that a contacted party had “admitted” to membership in a gang.

District Court’s View

Hsu said:

“Harris asserts that Officer Kim fabricated evidence that Harris ‘self-admitted’ to her and others, that he was a member of the Bounty Hunter Bloods, when Harris had never done so;…that Harris was named in the gang injunction, when in fact he was only served with the gang injunction via his grandmother; and that Harris made a spontaneous statement about the robbery when Officer Kim arrested him, when in fact Harris’s statement was prompted by the conversations of onlookers.”

The judge acknowledged that “it does appear from the evidence that Officer Kim had a reasonable basis to believe that Harris was a member of the Bounty Hunter Bloods” but declared: “Harris was not required to show that Officer Kim’s opinion regarding Harris’s gang membership was baseless—that is, that Officer Kim ‘continued investigating [Harris] even though [she] knew or should have known [Harris] was innocent’—because Harris provided direct evidence of fabrication….Harris has established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Kim deliberately fabricated evidence that was used against him in her report…and in her testimony at trial.”

By the time of the order, all of the other defendants named in the case had been dismissed by stipulation between the parties.

Ninth Circuit’s View

Ikuta and Lee, in a footnote, said that “the district court erred in considering Kim’s statement at trial that Harris admitted to her that he was in the Bounty Hunter Bloods” because the officer “has absolute immunity for her trial testimony.” Considering the details in her reports, they wrote:

“Assuming all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Harris, Kim stated that Harris admitted to being in the Bounty Hunter Bloods in reliance on other officers’ reports even though Harris never made such an admission. It is not clearly established that Kim’s reliance on other officers’ reports in these circumstances rises to the level of a deliberate fabrication.”

As to the gang injunction, they opined:

“[G]iven that the record of service instructed the serving officer to hand the [decree] to a member of the defendant gang and the gang injunction included those who act in concert with defendant gang members, it is not clearly established that such a technical error rises to the level of a deliberate fabrication.”

Statement During Arrest

Turning to the statement he purportedly made while he was being detained, the jurists acknowledged that Harris had alleged that he asked if he was being arrested on robbery charges because a person nearby during his arrest had inquired if his detention had anything to do with the robbery of Blackwell. However, they concluded:

“Assuming all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Harris, Harris asked Kim if the reason he was being detained had anything to do with a robbery, but Kim failed to report that a bystander mentioned the robbery first. It is not clearly established that such an omission rises to the level of a deliberate fabrication.”

Saying that Harris’ additional claim that Kim violated the rule for disclosure of exculpatory evidence did not provide another basis for denying the officer qualified immunity, they reasoned:

“Because it is not clearly established that Kim deliberately fabricated the evidence referenced above, it is likewise not clearly established that she violated [the 1963 U.S. Supreme Court decision] Brady v. Maryland…by failing to disclose to prosecutors that she fabricated that evidence.”

Clifton’s Dissent

Clifton argued:

“Our court’s binding precedent expressly holds that the ‘district court’s determination that the parties’ evidence presents genuine issues of material fact is categorically unreviewable on interlocutory appeal.’…’[W]e have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity where the appeal focuses on whether the defendants violated a clearly established law given the undisputed facts, while we do not have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal that focuses on whether there is a genuine dispute about the underlying facts.’ ”

He continued:

“The district court explicitly found that ‘Harris has established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Kim deliberately fabricated evidence that was used against him in her report,…and in her testimony at trial.’ Relevant factual questions may remain, such as whether Kim made…false statements deliberately or in error, but we do not have jurisdiction to reassess the sufficiency of the evidence and may not draw inferences in Kim’s favor. Because I do not believe we are permitted to reach the conclusion set forth in the memorandum disposition, I dissent.”

The case is Harris v. Kim, 24-6536.