Page 1
Filing Administrative Complaint Devoid of Facts Did Not Exhaust Administrative Remedies—C.A.
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Summary judgment was properly granted to the City of Los Angeles in an action for unlawful discrimination brought by a fired employee, Div. Four of the Court of Appeal for this district has held, declaring that administrative remedies were not exhausted where a complaint was filed with a state agency in purported compliance with a statutory requisite for suing but specific facts were not set forth.
The unpublished opinion by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Nicholas F. Daum, sitting on assignment, was filed Monday. It affirms an Aug. 22, 2023 decision by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Wendy Chang.
Chang found that plaintiff Christian Jaimes did not meet the requirement of Government Code §12960(c) that, prior to bringing an action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), a complaint be filed with what was then known as the state Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) stating “with particularity” the factual bases. (The agency is now called the Civil Rights Department.)
Jaimes did file a complaint—and was given the go-ahead to sue—but failed to supply the underlying facts, Chang said, commenting:
“A reader comes away from review of this DFEH claim not knowing what it is that Defendant did that is alleged to have been discriminatory. Defendant argues this is boilerplate language insufficient to constitute the ‘particulars’ that GOV § 12960 demands. The Court agrees.
“The Court’s ruling on the administrative exhaustion issue is dispositive of the entire matter; thus, the Court does not reach the other bases proffered in support of the motion.”
Wording of Complaint
The complaint to the DFEH says that the City of Los Angeles is an employer subject to the FEHA and that Jaimes “resides in the City of Valley Village.” It continues:
“3. Complainant alleges that on or about March 11, 2021, respondent took the following adverse actions:
“Complainant alleges that on or about March 11, 2021, respondent took the following adverse actions:
“Complainant was harassed because of complainant’s disability (physical or mental).
“Complainant was discriminated against because of complainant’s disability (physical or mental) and as a result of the discrimination was terminated, reprimanded, denied reasonable accommodation for a disability.
“Complainant experienced retaliation because complainant reported or resisted any form of discrimination or harassment, requested or used a disability-related accommodation and as a result was terminated, reprimanded, denied any employment benefit or privilege, denied reasonable accommodation for a disability, denied work opportunities or assignments.”
Daum’s Opinion
Daum wrote:
“Here, Jaimes did not meet the statutory requirements for exhaustion. This is because Jaimes did not allege any facts in his DFEH complaint. Indeed, Jaimes conceded his DFEH complaint was ‘devoid of any facts.’ The administrative complaint did not provide any information about the relevant disability at all—even whether it was physical or mental. It also failed to identify any individual responsible for the alleged discrimination. And, although the administrative complaint provided a date (May 11, 2021), Jaimes does not assert that anything in particular happened on that date, beyond the conclusory statement that some form of disability discrimination occurred.”
The jurist was unpersuaded by Jaimes’s contention that the DFEH found his complaint to be adequate because it issued an immediate right-to-sue letter. Daum said:
“While DFEH may have chosen to issue a right-to-sue notice based on Jaimes’ complaint as a matter of its own policy, we are bound by the statutory, regulatory, and decisional constraints that govern the exhaustion doctrine as a matter of law.”
Jaimes argued in his reply brief that “[m]erely checking a box on the Department of Fair Employment and Housing intake page is sufficient to exhaust administrative remedies.” For that proposition, he cited the 2011 decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s Div. Three in Wills v. Superior Court.
There, Justice Richard M. Aronson, noting that plaintiff/appellant Linda Wills had checked a box on her DFEH complaint for discrimination based on “denial of family/medical leave,” said:
“We may assume Wills exhausted her administrative remedies on her first cause of action for disability discrimination….”
Daum pointed out that the opinion goes on to specify that the court would “assume, without deciding” that there was exhaustion of remedies as to that one cause of action, noting that cases cannot be cited for propositions that aren’t decided.
The plaintiff insisted that, after being injured on-the-job, he was fired right after bring a disability claim, in retaliation. The city said that the injury he incurred was the result of a golf cart he was driving crashing, which it attributed to his using a cell phone while the vehicle was moving, conduct in which he had been admonished against.
There was disagreement over whether he had concealed from the city his pre-employment May 15, 2014 conviction on two counts of forgery. On Sept. 1, 2022—subsequent to the termination of his employment—he was convicted of felony robbery.
The case is Jaimes v. City of Los Angeles, B333667.
Copyright 2025, Metropolitan News Company