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Evans, Liu Balk at Denial of Review in Racial Justice Case
Justices Argue C.A. Erred in Ruling That Claim Forfeited by Failing to Object to Judge Calling Defendant ‘Young Buck’
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
California Supreme Court Justices Kelli Evans and Goodwin H. Liu have voiced disagreement with the court’s denial of a petition for review in a case in which it was asserted that a Santa Clara Superior Court judge violated the Racial Justice Act of 2020 by calling a criminal defendant “a strong young buck” during a sentencing hearing, arguing that the high court should have taken the case “in light of the importance of” the rights at issue.
A “dissenting statement,” authored by Evans and joined in by Liu, accompanied Wednesday’s order denying a petition for review by Brandon Wagstaff, who was convicted of false imprisonment, criminal threats, and domestic violence in 2022 relating to an August 2019 incident in which he allegedly hit his girlfriend in the face and refused to let her exit the car after the couple argued over money. The Sixth District Court of Appeal’s June 12 decision affirming the conviction was reposted on the Judicial Council’s website yesterday, with the order denying review and the dissenting statement appended to it.
During a sentencing hearing on Nov. 4, 2022, Santa Clara Superior Court Judge Jesus Valencia Jr. addressed Wagstaff, who is Black, saying:
“You know, it’s easy to bust into people’s homes and take property because they’re not there or because you’re a strong young buck and you can do these things at-will. That’s weak. There’s nothing manly, there’s nothing right about that, and your mom will tell you that.”
He then sentenced the defendant to 16 months in prison.
Racial Justice Act Violation
Despite failing to object to the “young buck” statement at the trial court, Wagstaff asserted on appeal that Valencia violated the Racial Justice Act (“RJA”), codified at Penal Code §745, by using the descriptor, which he claims is riddled with racist undertones.
That section provides that “the state shall not…obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race” and specifies that “the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence” upon finding a violation of the act.
On appeal, the Office of the Attorney General conceded that the use of the phrase amounted to a violation and requested that the court remand the matter for resentencing before a different judge.
In a June decision, written by Presiding Justice Mary J. Greenwood and joined in by Justices Adrienne Grover and Allison M. Danner, the Sixth District Court of Appeal declined to accept the concession and found that the RJA claim was forfeited, saying:
“We are aware of racist historical usages and cultural meanings associated with the language challenged here. But under the definition of ‘racially discriminatory language’ set forth in section 745, subdivision (h)(4), the question is not whether we as members of the Court subjectively believe the language to be racist; the question is whether it constitutes ‘language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias….’….Absent a record with sufficient facts and evidence, we have no way to apply that standard while respecting the boundaries of our purview as a court of review.”
Forfeiture Doctrine
In her dissenting statement, Evans wrote:
“Because I do not believe this is an appropriate case to apply the forfeiture doctrine, especially in light of the importance of the RJA, I would grant review.”
She acknowledged the general rule that “a defendant who fails to object to an alleged error at trial forfeits the claim on appeal” but pointed to exceptions that apply to matters involving the public interest or the administration of justice, as well as one excusing parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would be futile.
Noting the important public interest at stake in having criminal proceedings free from racial bias and a concern that litigants might be reluctant to bring an objection that accuses the judge of making racist remarks, she said:
“For all these reasons, I would not find Wagstaff’s RJA claim forfeited.”
The justice continued:
“As the Court of Appeal recognized, the term ‘young buck’ is deeply racialized. With origins in slavery, the phrase evokes negative stereotypes including associations with heightened criminality and violence, and implies that Black men are innately capable of committing crimes. The term and its troubling connotations are well known.”
Comparison to Animal
She noted that subdivision (a)(2) specifies that the conduct covered by the act includes circumstances in which “the judge…used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race” and defines violations by reference to what an “objective observer” would consider biased, including as examples “racially coded” phrases or comparing a “defendant to an animal.”
Based on that section, she reasoned:
“In my view, the trial court’s characterization of Wagstaff as a ‘strong young buck’ in this context is sufficient on the face of the record to find racial discrimination warranting remand for resentencing before a different trial judge as supported by the Attorney General….To the extent the Court of Appeal believed further information was required to ascertain the historical or cultural context of the challenged language, a remand for further factual development would have been the appropriate course of action.”
Evans added:
“Concluding that Wagstaff’s RJA claim is forfeited undermines the RJA’s purpose and intent….The trial court’s use of ‘strong young buck’ may not have been purposeful discrimination, but it was nonetheless racially fraught language comparing Wagstaff to an animal. It appears to reflect at least the very type of implicit bias about which the Legislature was concerned….”
The case is People v. Wagstaff, 2025 S.O.S. 2874.
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