Page 1
Ninth Circuit:
Substantiality-of-Evidence Test Applies Where Extreme Hardship From Deportation Claimed
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals determined yesterday that the appropriate standard on appeal for determining whether deportation would create an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is substantiality of the evidence, rather than abuse of discretion.
That holding came in an opinion authored by Circuit Judge Sandra S. Ikuta and joined in by Circuit Judge Morgan B. Christen and District Court Judge Michael T. Liburdi of the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decision last year in Wilkinson v. Garland, the Ninth Circuit had taken the position that in light of statutory language, it lacked jurisdiction to consider whether harm to an alien would incur if returned to the person’s homeland would be so extreme as to justify relief from deportation.
In Wilkinson, the high court held that there is an exception for “constitutional claims or questions of law” applied to “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” determinations because the question involves a mixed question of law and fact.
Noting that the Wilkinson decision did not address what standard of review governs, Ikuta announced that the substantial evidence standard applies, reasoning that the question of exceptional harm is “primarily” factual and so the court should adopt the review level typically applied to findings of fact in the immigration context.
She concluded that substantial evidence does support a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals in finding that an immigrant, Luis Guillermo Gonzalez-Juarez, had failed to show that his deportation would result in the “exceptional” harm to his two teenage sons based upon reported high rates of violent crime in Mexico, the boys’ limited mastery of Spanish, and the separation from their adult sister.
Ikuta wrote:
“[T]he hardship determination requires hardship that deviates, in the extreme, from the hardship that ordinarily occurs in removal cases. Thus, a country conditions report that applies equally to a large proportion of removal cases does not compel the conclusion that the hardship standard is met.”
The case is Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 21-927.
Copyright 2025, Metropolitan News Company