Judge Erred in Vacating Final Death Verdict at Resentencing

Wednesday, December 10, 2025

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Court of Appeal:

Judge Erred in Vacating Final Death Verdict at Resentencing

Opinion Says Fact That Inclusion of Now-Defunct Prison Prior Enhancement Triggers Full Reconsideration of Sentence Does Not Mean Court May Undo Penalty, Habeas Proceedings are Sole Avenue for Relief

By a MetNews Staff Writer

Div. Six of the Court of Appeal for this district has held that a trial judge erred by vacating a final judgment of death against a defendant—accused of brutally killing his neighbors after breaking into their home in search of cash to fund a cocaine party raging next door—during a resentencing hearing triggered by the inclusion of a one-year prison-prior enhancement, saying that habeas proceedings remain the sole avenue for collateral attacks on such verdicts.

Declaring that the so-called “full resentencing rule,” which demands a complete reevaluation of a sentence when a portion of the judgment is stricken on review or revised upon a statutorily-required recall, does not authorize a court to nullify a death sentence, the court pointed to Penal Code §1509, which specifies that “[a] writ of habeas corpus…is the exclusive procedure for collateral attack on a judgment of death.”

Rejecting the defendant’s argument that his resentencing hearing is not “collateral” as the proceeding occurs in the original criminal case and does not qualify as an “attack” because the proceedings are court-initiated after the inmate is identified as one serving a sentence that includes a now-invalid enhancement, the court opined:

“Regardless of who initiated the…proceeding in the present case, it is an attack on the judgment of death.”

Monday’s opinion, authored by Justice Kenneth Yegan and joined in by Presiding Justice Arthur Gilbert and Justice Tari L. Cody, declares:

“We hold that the ‘full resentencing rule’ (allegedly triggered because of a now invalid one-year prior prison term enhancement) does not provide an appropriate vehicle to achieve respondent’s stated goal of nullifying the previously imposed sentence of death. He may now seek modification of the determinate portion of the judgment which is insignificant.”

Prior-Prison Enhancement

The question arose after the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation notified the Ventura Superior Court in 2022 that Tracy Cain was an inmate serving a sentence that included a prior-prison enhancement within the meaning of Penal Code §1172.75, which invalidates any such allegations, other than those relating to sexually violent offenses, and mandates that a court hold a resentencing hearing upon confirmation of the information.

Sec. 1172.75 specifies that courts “shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion” and “[r]esentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed.”

Cain was convicted in 1998 of the murders of William and Modena Galloway, a married couple he beat to death during a 1986 home invasion robbery. A jury found him guilty of the killings, as well as related burglary and robbery charges, and voted to impose the death penalty after finding the special circumstance allegations to be true.

He argued that he was entitled to a full resentencing hearing on all counts and requested that Ventura Superior Court Judge Paul W. Baelly exercise discretion to strike the special circumstance allegations, noting that his offense was committed before the passage of a 1990 initiative that shields such findings from judicial modification and citing alleged childhood trauma and purported cognitive impairments.

Last October, Baelly reasoned that the court may resentence the defendant as requested without conflicting “with the limitations imposed by [§1509] because this is not a collateral attack or even an attack.” He vacated Cain’s sentence in its entirety and declared that he would resentence the convict “at a later time.” Prosecutors with the Ventura County District Attorney’s Office immediately appealed.

Substantial Rights

Addressing the appealability of the vacatur, Yegan wrote that “[w]e hold that an order vacating a judgment of death necessarily affects the substantial rights of the People” and so prosecutors “need not wait to appeal until after respondent has been resentenced.”

Saying that “[t]he trial court’s reasoning exalted form over substance,” Yegan reasoned that, “[r]egardless of how the section 1172.75 proceeding was initiated, it was, and is, a collateral attack on the judgment of death.” He remarked:

“Regardless of who initiated the section 1172.75 proceeding in the present case, it is an attack on the judgment of death. Respondent fully participated in the proceeding and vigorously challenged the death sentence.”

He added:

“The attack on the judgment of death was collateral to the original criminal action against respondent. That action ended after the California Supreme Court had affirmed the judgment of death and respondent had exhausted his federal remedies.”

Mechanical Jurisprudence

Yegan opined that affirming the trial court’s order would involve applying “mechanical jurisprudence” by considering §1175.72 in isolation without considering other evidence of legislative intent. He wrote:

“We…question whether someone sentenced to death with a ‘one-year’ prior can constitutionally escape the death penalty pursuant to section 1172.75, while a person sentenced to death without such a prior has no comparable remedy. If the sentence is death, a one-year prior is meaningless. One would think that, to avoid this inequality of treatment, the Legislature would not have intended to apply section 1172.75 to death sentences.”

However, he acknowledged that subdivision (f), which was added to the statute by way of an amendment adopted last year, “arguably manifests a legislative intent to apply section 1172.75 to death sentences” because it specifically excludes from eligibility persons who suffered the imposition of such a penalty and after being convicted of a sexually violent offense. The jurist remarked:

“Respondent, who has not been convicted of a sexually violent offense, claims that subdivision (f) shows he is eligible for recall and resentencing as to his death sentence. But the Legislature has not explicitly said that a person in his situation is eligible for such relief. We need not determine whether the legislature intended to authorize the recall of a death sentence. Irrespective of its intent, respondent’s theory is a ‘bridge too far’ because it would eviscerate section 1509.”

Voter-Approved Initiative

Citing last year’s decision by Div. Seven of this district in People v. Dixon, Yeagan agreed with that court that “section 1509,” as a statute enacted by way of an initiative which may not be amended without voter approval or a supermajority legislative vote, “prevails over section 1172.75,” which did not meet that criteria.

In October, the California Supreme Court granted review over the Dixon case, which involves other questions regarding resentencing procedures, but Yegan is quick to point out that the high court denied requests for depublication and said the case may continue to be cited for persuasive value until the final decision is rendered.

In a footnote, the jurist said:

“Neither the superior court nor the Court of Appeal should ‘tinker’ with a judgment of death affirmed by the California Supreme Court. Whether couched in stare decisis theory, law of the case theory, or the like, we should be loath to interfere with, alter, or amend such a judgment. The Legislature has not expressly said that a section 1172.75 challenge authorizes a superior court to vacate an affirmed death sentence. And, we doubt that the Legislature, by simple statute, can change the constitutional provisions for the implementation of the death penalty.”

The case is People v. Cain, 2025 S.O.S. 3596.