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Court of Appeal:
Death Sentence Is Not Subject to Reduction at Resentencing
Opinion Says Trial Court Has Jurisdiction to Adjust Sentencing as to Noncapital Offenses During Pendency of Automatic Appeal, Defendant May Not Seek to Reduce Penalty to Life Without Possibility of Parole
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
Div. Seven of this district’s Court of Appeal held yesterday that a defendant, who was sentenced to death for the 2001 slaying of a Los Angeles-area college student and to additional time based on allegations of prior periods of incarceration, may immediately seek resentencing under recent amendments to the Penal Code that retroactively invalidate most prior prison term enhancements without waiting for resolution of his automatic appeal.
However, the court said that the resentencing hearing would be limited to reviewing the noncapital portions of the sentence and that the proceedings may not be used to request that the sentence be reduced to life without the possibility of parole, declaring that the filing of a habeas corpus petition remains the exclusive avenue for collaterally attacking a judgment of death.
Justice John L. Segal authored yesterday’s opinion and said:
“Death penalty appeals, which are automatic to the Supreme Court, can take years, even decades, to resolve, and a lot can happen during that time. Voters pass new initiatives, legislatures enact new and sometimes ameliorative legislation, governors institute and modify new policies. One of the things that happened while [the defendant’s] death penalty appeal was (and still is) pending is the Legislature enacted several statutes authorizing the superior court to recall the sentence of defendants serving prison terms that included certain sentence enhancements and to resentence those defendants….The issue here is whether he is entitled to relief in the superior court under that statute, even though his appeal from his conviction and sentence of death is still pending (and not yet fully briefed) in the Supreme Court.”
Under these circumstances, Segal declared:
“[W]e conclude that the superior court had jurisdiction to resentence [the defendant] and that the superior court may resentence him on the noncapital portions of his sentence but not on the death sentence.”
Presiding Justice Gonzalo Martinez and Justice Natalie P. Stone joined in the opinion.
First-Degree Murder
The question arose after a jury found James Dixon guilty of first-degree murder for the killing of Christina Burmeister, who was kidnapped from the California Polytechnic State University at Pomona campus and killed after money was withdrawn from her bank account, as well as two unrelated rapes. The jury also found true two special circumstances, specifically that he committed the crime while engaged in robbery and kidnapping.
Then-Los Angeles Superior Court Judge George Genesta (now retired) sentenced Dixon to death on the murder charge and imposed but stayed the execution of four one-year prior prison term enhancements.
In 2023, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation advised the court that Dixon was eligible for resentencing under Penal Code §1172.75, which was enacted in 2021 and provides that any prior prison enhancements imposed for any crimes other than sexually violent offenses are “legally invalid.”
Without holding a hearing, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Jacqueline Lewis (who is no longer sitting and is using earned vacation time prior to retiring) issued an order stating that Dixon was “not currently serving” a qualifying sentence because the imposition of additional time was stayed. Under those circumstances, Lewis ruled that Dixon was ineligible for relief.
Yesterday’s opinion reverses the denial.
Non-Final Cases
On appeal, attorneys with the Attorney General’s Office contend that §1172.75 confers jurisdiction to conduct resentencing hearings only after a judgment of conviction is final. Rejecting this argument, Segal wrote:
“To determine whether the Legislature intended the superior court to retain jurisdiction under section 1172.75 while an appeal is pending, we begin with the language of the statute….[S]ubdivision (b)…requires the Department to identify persons ‘currently serving a term’ for a judgment that includes a now-invalid enhancement. The statute does not distinguish between judgments that are final and those that are not. If the court verifies the judgment includes an invalid enhancement,…subdivision (c)…requires the court to recall the sentence and resentence the defendant….Under the plain language of section 1172.75, [Dixon] is entitled to have the court recall his sentence and resentence him on the non-death portions of his sentence.”
The jurist also found unpersuasive the prosecutors’ assertion that Dixon can “raise any resentencing claims related to recently enacted or ameliorative statutes” in his pending appeal in the Supreme Court, saying that the fact that the high court may decide to address the issue “does not mean the superior court lacked jurisdiction to strike the enhancements and resentence the defendant while the automatic appeal is pending.”
Segal noted that the Legislature, in 2024, created an exception to resentencing for certain defendants sentenced to death and added §1172.75(f), which provides:
“Commencing on January 1, 2025, an individual who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense…and sentenced to death or a life term without the possibility of parole, who, as of January 1, 2025, has not had their judgment reviewed and verified by the sentencing court [as including an invalid sentencing enhancement], is not eligible for recall and resentencing under this section. This subdivision does not apply retroactively.” He said the section was inapplicable to Dixon because Lewis reviewed and verified the judgment in 2023. However, he opined:
“Nevertheless, the enactment of section 1172.75, subdivision (f), is significant: It shows the Legislature thought it necessary to add the new subdivision because the Legislature recognized in 2024 that section 1172.75, as originally drafted, applied to defendants (like Dixon) sentenced to death.”
As to whether the defendant may challenge his death sentence, Segal pointed out that Penal Code §1509 specifies that the “exclusive procedure for collateral attack on a judgment of death” is a petition for writ of habeas corpus. He reasoned:
“Section 1509 was enacted by a voter initiative, the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016 (Proposition 66). Proposition 66 stated it may be amended by the Legislature only by a statute that passes each house of the Legislature by a three fourths vote. Because Senate Bill No. 483, which enacted section 1172.75, passed the Assembly and the Senate with less than a three-fourths vote, it cannot have amended Proposition 66.”
Statutes Conflict
The jurist commented that “[i]n deciding whether Dixon’s proposed interpretation of section 1172.75 would amend Proposition 66,” the court must consider whether the two statutes conflict and opined:
“Interpreting section 1172.75 to allow resentencing on a death sentence would authorize what Proposition 66 prohibits: a collateral attack on a judgment of death by a procedural vehicle other than a writ of habeas corpus under section 1509. Therefore, when resentencing Dixon under section 1172.75, the superior court may not reduce Dixon’s death sentence to life without the possibility of parole.”
As to the remaining portions of Dixon’s sentence, he said: “[T]he superior court should have stricken Dixon’s four prior prison term enhancements. In addition, the court had discretion to resentence Dixon on the stayed one-year firearm enhancement…and the two stayed consecutive terms of 25 years to life on the rape convictions.”
In an unpublished portion of the opinion, the court found that Lewis erred in ruling that Dixon was ineligible for resentencing because the execution of the sentence applicable to the enhancements had been stayed.
The court noted that the Supreme Court has granted review in the Fourth District decision in People v. Rhodius to resolve a split in authority among the courts of appeal as to whether a stay affects eligibility for resentencing under §1172.75.
The case is People v. Dixon, 2025 S.O.S. 1760.
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