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Supreme Court Upholds Death Verdict for Arsonist Who Set Lethal Esperanza Fire
Majority Affirms Sentence Despite Defendant’s Objections That Juror Was Wrongly Dismissed From Penalty Phase; Evans, Liu Side With Accused
By a MetNews Staff Writer
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RAYMOND OYLER convicted killer |
The California Supreme Court yesterday affirmed the convictions and death sentence for a man accused of starting more than two dozen Banning Pass-area wildfires in the summer and fall of 2006, including the deadly Esperanza Fire that claimed the lives of five firefighters.
There was no disagreement among the jurists as to whether the arsonist, Raymond Oyler, was properly convicted of five counts of first degree murder, 20 arson charges, and 17 other crimes, but the justices divided over whether the death sentence could be upheld in the face of the trial judge disqualifying a juror who had indicated on a questionnaire that she was not opposed to the penalty but said, upon questioning in court, that she would be disinclined to vote to impose it.
Oyler contends that his sentence must be overturned because then-Riverside Superior Court Judge W. Charles Morgan erred in dismissing the prospective juror, identified in the opinion as “E.W.,” for cause based on her voir dire responses, depriving the defendant of his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable death verdict.
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Patricia Guerreo, and joined by Justices Carol A. Corrigan, Leondra R. Kruger, Joshua P. Groban, and Martin J. Jenkins, the majority concluded that the potential panelist’s answers showed an “evolv[ing]” view of her ability to vote for the penalty and found no fault in the dismissal based on her saying that, after further reflection, she “honestly” thought that she would favor imposing a life sentence.
They found Oyler’s challenges to his convictions, including arguments that the evidence was insufficient, to be without merit.
Justice Kelli Evans joined in the majority’s opinion affirming Oyler’s convictions but penned a dissent, joined in by Justice Goodwin H. Liu, saying she would “vacate the judgment of death and permit the People another opportunity to seek the death penalty before a properly selected jury.” Evans took issue with Morgan’s failure to probe the potential juror about whether her preference for a non-lethal sentence could be overcome, writing:
“Nothing in E.W.’s responses established that she ‘would have been unable to follow the law and impose the death penalty if circumstances warranted, which is the only relevant question under high court precedent.’…The reason for that is simple—because she was not asked.”
Juror’s Responses
Several of the inquiries on a jury questionnaire probed the prospective panelists’ views on the death penalty. E.W. explained, in response to a question asking about her general feelings on the topic, that she “feel[s] that it is a necessary penalty to have” but should be “reserved for those who are cruel [and] unusal [sic] with their crimes, especially serial killers, rapists [and] criminals against children.”
She elaborated that she believed the penalty is “a waste of time” in most cases, because “[m]ost people who get it sit for long periods…and don’t actually get executed.”
Question 44 on the form was divided into subparts and one portion asked whether the panelist would “automatically refuse to vote in favor of the penalty of death and automatically vote for a penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, without considering any of the evidence of any of the aggravating and mitigating factors…regarding the facts of the crime and the background and character of the defendant.”
E.W. answered “no” to this query and to one asking if she would “automatically refuse to vote in favor of the penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and automatically vote for a penalty of death, without considering any of the evidence, or any of the aggravating and mitigating factors…regarding the facts of the crime and the background and character of the defendant.”
In response to question 44(f)’s inquiry whether she could “set aside [her] own personal feelings regarding what the law ought to be and follow the law as the court explains it,” E.W. responded by writing “Yes.”
Voir Dire Questioning
Approximately one week later, E.W. was asked in voir dire about her responses. Morgan inquired whether she would only vote to impose death if the special circumstances involved serial killers, rape, or crimes against children, and she responded by saying that she had “been struggling with” and “thinking about” whether she would be locked into a certain position when it came to punishment; ultimately, she answered that she did not know.
He reminded her that the special circumstances involved in the present case involved allegations of multiple murder and killings accomplished through arson, and probed whether she would favor imposing a life sentence regardless of the aggravating or mitigating factors presented, saying:
“[M]y question to you is, are both options open to you, and real particularly, open to you if we were to get there?”
She responded by saying “no.”
Morgan followed up and asked if she would favor one sentence over another, to which she answered that “I honestly do, yes.” The judge then excused her, saying her “honest evaluation” was all he needed to hear.
Majority’s View
Guerrero noted that a prospective juror may be excluded for cause without violating a defendant’s constitutional rights if the panelist’s views on capital punishment interfere with the ability to “conscientiously consider” all of the sentencing alternatives.
Oyler argues that the high court’s 2015 decision in People v. Leon establishes that Morgan erred in excusing E.W. In Leon, three prospective jurors indicated on questionnaires that they would automatically vote to favor a sentence of life without the possibility of parole based on their views of the death penalty.
After further questioning by the court, they said they could set aside personal feelings and weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors before deciding on the penalty. The court found error in their subsequent excusal, saying that “[t]he cursory voir dire of the dismissed jurors here was simply not sufficient to permit an informed determination about their ability to serve.”
The chief justice rejected the argument that Leon was controlling, saying:
“The inquiries in Leon were deemed inadequate because the trial court’s voir dire simply restated questions that appeared on the jury questionnaire and elicited responses similar to those that had already been provided, without further questioning that would draw from related questionnaire responses indicating an ability to serve. In this case, voir dire did not ‘simply reaffirm’ a subset of questionnaire responses…; it revealed instead that E.W.’s views regarding her ability to vote for the death penalty had evolved—evidently due to considerable thought on her part—since she completed the jury questionnaire.”
She remarked “there is no required script that must be followed during voir dire,” and concluded that “[a]lthough questions such as those proposed by the concurring and dissenting opinion may be helpful in certain circumstances, here the trial court undertook an adequate inquiry in light of E.W.’s responses; no further questioning was required.” Guerrero declared:
“Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s excusal of E.W.”
Dissent’s View
Evans said that “[a]criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment” and that “such jurors are qualified to serve” so long as they clearly say that they are willing to set aside their own opinions and apply the rule of law.
Applying this rule to the facts before the court, she commented:
“The record supporting disqualification in the instant case is no more robust—and is, in fact, more deficient—than the record in Leon. As a threshold matter, prospective juror E.W.’s written questionnaire responses provided no basis to excuse her for cause….The general proposition that the death penalty is appropriate for only certain types of offenses comports with the constitutional mandate that capital punishment be narrowly applied….E.W. added that she felt it is often a waste of time because persons sentenced to death sit for a long time on death row and are not executed. Because the sentiment expressed has a basis in fact, it likewise is not disqualifying.”
Turning to the voir dire conducted, she said that the trial court’s questions were “no more probing than those asked and answered in Leon,” saying they amounted to “alternative articulation” of inquiries posed on the written questionnaire. She opined:
“The sentiment that E.W. was not ‘open’ to both penalties and ‘favored’ one over the other is not ‘unequivocal’….True, E.W. did not elaborate when providing answers….Yet the substance of her answers, given the questions posed, did not foreclose consideration of the death penalty.”
The justice added:
“To be sure, even if it is ‘the better practice’ to do so, a court that conducts adequate voir dire need not ask in precise terms whether a juror can set aside their biases and follow the law….But a trial court nonetheless must ask questions and elicit answers probing that ultimate issue.”
Disagreeing with the majority that deference is due to the trial court’s decision, given that the judge had the benefit of witnessing E.W.’s demeanor, she argued:
“This deference is not appropriate…when the trial court fails to make an adequate inquiry….Though the court below conducted limited oral voir dire, it was inadequate because the court did not inquire about E.W.’s ability to set aside her biases and follow the law despite her written responses expressing a willingness to do so.”
The case is People v. Oyler, 2025 S.O.S. 1181.
Daniel Hoover-Najera, Jess McLean, Jason McKay, Mark Loutzenhiser, and Pablo Cerda of the U.S. Forest Service were killed as a result of injuries sustained fighting the Esperanza fire. In 2009, Oyler was convicted of murder relating to their deaths due to having intentionally started the fire.
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