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Court of Appeal:
Ban on Teaching Critical Race Theory Must Be Blocked
Justices Say Riverside Superior Court Judge Erred in Denying Issuance of Preliminary Injunction
By a MetNews Staff Writer
A judge erred in declining to issue a preliminary injunction barring a school district in Riverside County from enforcing a resolution by its governing board virtually banning the teaching of a theory that racism is embedded in the U.S. in its laws, as well as in policies of its institutions, Div. Two of the Fourth District Court of Appeal has held, declaring that the measure is void for vagueness.
The resolution proclaims that “racism has no place in American society and especially not in the Temecula Valley Unified School District.” In it, the Board of Trustees condemns the Critical Race Theory (“CRT”) as “a divisive ideology” and prohibits teaching specific elements of it, as well as certain “doctrines derived from Critical Race Theory.”
However, the resolution leaves room for teachers of social science courses to “include instruction about Critical Race Theory, provided that such instruction plays only a subordinate role in the overall course and provided further that such instruction focuses on the flaws in Critical Race Theory.”
A group of students, parents, and teachers, joined by the Temecula Valley Educators Association, sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
The opinion, filed Monday, sets forth that “[i]t is clear from the Resolution’s text and the record evidence that Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to fair warning about what conduct is forbidden has been impinged,” adding that “[t]he language lacks definition and clarity and leaves the reader to guess the meaning of the Resolution’s terms and enumerated prohibitions.”
In particular, teachers are left uncertain as to what instruction they may permissibly provide, Presiding Justice Kathleen O’Leary said in the opinion which countermands a determination by Riverside Superior Court Judge Eric Keen.
Keen’s Ruling
Keen said in his Feb. 23, 2024 ruling denying a preliminary injunction:
“It seems clear to the court that a person of ordinary intelligence would have a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited as what is prohibited is set out specifically in the resolution.”
The judge relied upon the resolution’s specification of five “elements” of CRT that may not be taught—including the notions that “only individuals classified as ‘white’ people can be racist because only ‘white’ people control society” and “[r]acism is ordinary, the usual way society does business”—and eight “doctrines” inherent in the theory. Among those doctrines are that “[i]ndividuals are either a member of the oppressor class or the oppressed class because of race or sex” and that “[a]n individual, by virtue of his or her race or sex, bears responsibility for actions committed in the past or present by other members of the same race or sex.”
O’Leary’s Opinion
Disagreeing with Keen, O’leary wrote:
“Because the Resolution’s language is ambiguous, lacks definitions, is unclear in scope, is seemingly irreconcilable with state-mandated educational requirements, and contains no enforcement guidelines, we find the Resolution unconstitutionally vague.”
She elaborated:
“Because CRT underpins the entire Resolution, a clear and commonly understood definition of CRT is crucial. The Resolution defined CRT as ‘a divisive ideology that assigns moral fault to individuals solely on the basis of an individual’s race and, therefore, is itself a racist ideology.’ The Resolution operates as if this definition is universally accepted, but the text does not indicate where this definition is derived, or whether it is shared with anyone else besides the Board. This definition seems to represent the Board’s subjective perception of CRT.”
The presiding justice continued:
“Making matters worse, the Resolution does not provide any examples of CRT or how CRT intersects with school curriculum. Clear examples could have made the Board’s definition of CRT more nderstandable or, at the very least, could inform teachers about what they can and cannot teach.”
‘Other Similar Frameworks’
O’Leary was troubled over an additional undefined term, saying:
“Another cause for concern is the prohibition of other similar frameworks….[W]e do not know what the Resolution meant when it referenced CRT, let alone frameworks similar to CRT. Other similar frameworks leaves open for interpretation whether a teacher could be unwittingly implicated for teaching a topic wholly separate from racial inequities, but that could be categorized as having a similar framework by whoever is interpreting the Resolution.”
She queried:
“Is instruction on gender inequality also prohibited by the Resolution? Age discrimination? This creates obvious issues of interpretation, which leaves the Resolution enforcement subject to arbitrary practices.”
‘Flaws’ of CRT
O’Leary scoffed at the proviso in the resolution that in social science courses, teachers may touch upon CTR in a manner that is “subordinate” to the main purpose and in such a way that the “flaws” of the theory are exposed.
“What are the flaws?,” she asked, continuing:
“The Resolution never explains. At oral argument, when asked what the flaws of CRT are, Defendants’ appellate counsel replied, ‘At the risk of sounding redundant...the 13 doctrines and elements that are laid out would inherently be the flaws of critical race theory.’ But this is circular—if we adopt counsel’s interpretation, then an educator can teach the prohibited concepts and elements if they focus on the prohibited concepts and elements.”
The jurist went on to say:
“Teachers are torn between providing students with lessons that meet state requirements and complying with the Resolution.”
She pointed to a declaration by one teacher, saying that she “struggles to answer her students’ questions about slavery for fear that she could be reported for inadvertently implying one of the enumerated prohibited elements or doctrines in the Resolution.” That teacher, O’Leary added, “does not know how to comply with the Resolution while also teaching state-mandated topics related to labor exploitation, Native American communities, and the anti-Asian exclusion movements.”
From the evidence presented, she drew the conclusion that “[u]nsure of what conduct is prohibited and fearful of arbitrary enforcement, teachers are erring on the side of caution and self-censoring.”
Reverend King
The plaintiffs argued on appeal:
“[T]teachers can only guess at whether asking students to read Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Letter from a Birmingham Jail— which is mandated by State curriculum standards…and which criticizes the inaction of ‘white moderate[s]’— would result in penalties for teaching that an individual ‘bears responsibility for actions committed in the past or present by other members of the same race[.]’ ”
The defendants responded in their brief: “It is nonsensical to suggest that assigning Letter from a Birmingham Jail would be prohibited under the Resolution. It is a patently unreasonable reading of the Resolution.
“The Resolution does not ban teachers from teaching about Jim Crow, segregation, or otherwise teaching students about civil rights history. Appellants conflate the teaching of doctrines with the teaching of facts to sow confusion. The Resolution by its plain language only prevents teachers from attempting to inculcate racist ideologies. Nothing in the language prohibits teaching that Dr King believed white moderates were failing to support the civil rights movement and have discussion on the topic.”
Rejecting that explanation, O’Leary said:
“We are still left to guess whether a teacher could face repercussions if they suggest in their instruction on this topic that white moderates, in fact, failed to support Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the civil rights movement, or if the Resolution requires they only teach that this was Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s belief.”
The case is Mae M. v Komrosky, 2025 S.O.S. 1333.
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