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Court of Appeal:
Requiring Intent to Harm for Record-Sharing Breach Is Error
Opinion Says Judge Improperly Ruled That Statutory Treble Damages Do Not Apply for Disclosure of Confidential Mental Health Information if Defendant Meant Well
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
Div. Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal has held that a trial judge erred in granting a motion for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the willful intent element required for an award of treble damages in a case asserting a claim against an Orange County Sheriff’s Department employee who shared the plaintiff’s mental health records relating to a temporary involuntary commitment with the patient’s sister.
Saying that the judge was mistaken in finding that the statutory requirement of willfulness was not met where the defendant testified that he was only trying to help the family look after their relative’s welfare, the court declared that the statute only requires a knowing violation, not a showing of intent to harm, to trigger the increased penalty scheme.
However, the panel found that the non-economic portion of the award was properly reduced based on the jury’s finding that the sister and her attorney—who purportedly used the wrongfully disclosed records to try to pressure the plaintiff to dismiss a lawsuit relating to their father’s estate—were 25% responsible for the ensuing harm, finding that apportionment was available because the defendant was not an intentional tortfeasor.
Civil liability for the disclosure is rooted in Welfare and Institutions Code §5330(a) which provides that “[a]ny person may bring an action against an individual who has willfully and knowingly released confidential information or records” relating to a period of mental health confinement “for the greater of” $10,000 or “[t]hree times to amount of actual damages…sustained by the plaintiff.”
Subdivision (b) specifies that the increased penalties are unavailable if the records were only “negligently” disclosed.
Elevated Penalty Scheme
Acting Presiding Justice Maurice Sanchez wrote Tuesday’s opinion setting forth what is required for the elevated penalty scheme to apply, saying:
“[T]he parties disagree over what it means to ‘willfully and knowingly’ disclose confidential records within the meaning of section 5330. As we explain, it means [that the defendant] intentionally released [the] confidential record to a person [that the defendant] knew was not entitled to the record and the disclosure was otherwise unlawful.”
After learning that the records relating to his 2018 involuntary mental health commitment had been released to his sister, the plaintiff, identified in court records only as “John Doe,” filed a complaint against Robert G. Reyna and the County of Orange in 2022, asserting causes of action based on §5330, invasion of privacy, as well as negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On the §5330 claim, he sought “three times the amount of Plaintiff’s actual damages, in an amount no less than $15 million, subject to proof at trial.”
At trial, Reyna testified that he knew the disclosure was illegal but explained that his “heart got in the way” because he believed that Doe’s sister was “concerned” about her brother.
Willful Release
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the disclosure was willful, but that Doe’s sister and her attorney were responsible for 25% of Doe’s damages. They awarded the plaintiff $29,000 in economic damages and $40,000 for non-economic harm. Retired Kern Superior Court Judge Richard Oberholzer, sitting on the Orange Superior Court by assignment, agreed with the defendants that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that the disclosure was willful under §5330, and declined to triple the damages. He also ruled that the entire $69,000 award was subject to apportionment and ordered that judgment be entered against the defendant for $51,750.
Tuesday’s opinion, joined in by Justices Martha K. Gooding and Nathan Scott, reverses the order granting the defendants’ motion for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict and directed the trial court to “enter an amended judgment in favor of Doe in the amount of $177,000, and against the County and Reyna, jointly and severally,” commenting:
“[A]s to the noneconomic damages, Reyna and the County were responsible for 75 percent of $40,000 which is $30,000. We then [add] the $29,000 in economic damages…for a total of $59,000. Last, section 5330 required the $59,000 to be trebled bringing the total damage award to $177,000.”Sanchez declared that apportionment was not available as to the economic damages under governing law.
Undefined Terms
He noted that the terms “willfully” and “knowingly” are not defined in the code and turned to other provisions for guidance. Borrowing from the Penal Code’s definition, he remarked:
“While section 5330 is not a penal statute, ‘the Penal Code definition is nonetheless persuasive in determining the intent of the Legislature in using that word in other statutes.’…Therefore, ‘knowingly’ as used in section 5330 relates to the defendant’s knowledge of the fact that the person requesting the record is not entitled to it under the Act.”
As to “willfully,” the jurist opined that the term is not so easily defined. He noted that the term has been the subject of conflicting definitions in the criminal context, sometimes found to refer to more than a volitional act.
Saying that “[c]ivil cases contain similar nuances,” he concluded that “[i]t is evident the meaning of ‘willful’ is specific to the statutory scheme at issue, and we must interpret the word in light of the statute’s purpose.”
Noting that the statutory scheme at issue was adopted to “protect the person from the undesired publicity, embarrassment, or more serious consequences which disclosure could bring” and to encourage those suffering a crisis to voluntarily seek help, he reasoned:
“[T]he harm occurs the moment a confidential record is placed in the hands of someone not entitled to it—everyone is presumed to know as much. Willfulness, then, is tied to the act of disclosing the record—it simply refers to the fact someone intentionally released records which are otherwise confidential. Therefore, the protected party does not need to show the act was coupled with bad faith, ill intent, or the knowledge that further harm would flow from the wrongful disclosure.”
Trial Evidence
Turning to the evidence presented at trial, Sanchez concluded:
“Although Reyna may have had good intentions, the Legislature only permits releasing confidential records in certain situations, and Reyna’s actions, albeit well-intended, were nonetheless willful and knowing.”
Addressing Doe’s assertion that his sister and her attorney could not be found to be responsible because they owed him no duty, the justice said:
“It is unlawful for someone to induce fear in another through threat of exposing a secret of that person or imputing to that person a deformity, disgrace, or crime. (Pen. Code, § 519, subds. 3 & 4.) Doe testified he believed his sister and her attorney were blackmailing him with the report and were threatening to disseminate it further….And there was evidence they were using the record to pressure Doe into dismissing the…lawsuit…This constitutes substantial evidence from which the jury could conclude Doe’s sister and her attorney unlawfully instilled fear in Doe by threatening to release the report unless he dropped the lawsuit.”
The case is Doe v. County of Orange, 2025 S.O.S. 2345.
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