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C.A. Panel Rejects Reasoning in April Opinion
Div. Four Does Not Point to Flaw in Div. Seven’s Contrary Decision, Relies on Concession of Error by Attorney General’s Office
By a MetNews Staff Writer
A person who commits a murder at the age of 15 and is sentenced to 50 years to life in prison is, after 15 years of incarceration, entitled to a resentencing hearing, Div. Four of the Court of Appeal for this district declared on Friday, rejecting contrary reasoning in an April 8 majority opinion by this district’s Div. Seven.
The two cases, with identical facts, lend differing interpretations to Penal Code §1170(d)(1)(A), which provides:
“When a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.”
Demeterius Browner, the appellant in the case decided on Friday in an unpublished opinion by Justice Truc T. Do, will get a resentencing hearing though he was not sentenced to life without possibility of parole (“LWOP”); Ramiro Munoz, under Div. Seven’s published decision, won’t—unless the California Supreme Court grants review (sought on May 12) and reverses the Court of Appeal.
Mori’s Opinion
Justice Audra Mori authored Friday’s unpublished opinion. She said that Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Sean D. Coen “erred by failing to follow People v. Heard,” a 2022 published decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s Div. One.
In Heard, Justice Truc T. Do wrote:
“[W]e conclude denying juvenile offenders, who were sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole, the opportunity to petition for resentencing violates the guarantee of equal protection.”
In Friday’s opinion, Mori said:
“The People agree Browner was eligible for relief under section 1170(d), regardless of his eligibility for parole under section 3051, and concede the trial court erred….We accept the People’s concession based upon Heard. We express no opinion on whether Browner has met section 1170(d)’s other requirements or on what relief the court should grant if it concludes he is eligible for recall and resentencing. On remand, the trial court shall consider those issues for the first time.”
In a footnote, Mori acknowledged that a contrary result was reached by Div. Seven in People v. Munoz, but did not address the reasoning in that opinion. She remarked:
“[T]he People have not rescinded their concession that the trial court erred in this case or sought to raise any issue based upon Munoz.”
The case is People v. Browner, B338704.
Segal’s View
The majority opinion in Munoz was authored by Acting Presiding Justice John L. Segal and joined in by Justice Natalie P. Stone. Segal wrote:
“Section 1170, subdivision (d)(i), applies to juvenile offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole; it does not apply to any other group of defendants….Notwithstanding the clear statutory language, Munoz argues that, under the court’s decision in Heard, he is eligible for relief because his sentence of 50 years to life is the ‘functional equivalent’ of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. It isn’t, and Heard is distinguishable.”
He explained:
“The minimum parole eligibility of Munoz’s sentence (50 years)…is less than half the defendant’s in Heard (103 years).”
Studies, Reports
Segal went on to say:
“Munoz, supporting amicus, and the dissent cite from a range of studies, statistical analyses, law review articles, ‘social science research studies,’ and online publications and reports by private and public entities and authors. Based on the ‘empirical evidence’ in these studies and articles, Munoz claims his sentence of 50 years to life ‘means that [he] will likely die in prison before reaching his normal parole eligibility date.’ Because Munoz did not present these data in the superior court, we cannot evaluate their untested validity and do not consider them….
“In addition, it is typically the function of the Legislature, not the courts, to sift through studies and research and to make policy decisions.”
He added:
“To be sure, line drawing is difficult. A sentence of 50 to life is not the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole, but sentences of 88 to life, 103 to life, 107 to life, and 140 to life are. What about 60 to life for a 15-year-old defendant? Or 53 years eight months to life for a 20-year-old defendant? These are tough questions. But they are questions for the Legislature, which in our current system of government has responsibility for addressing such criminological problems by evaluating potential solutions and drawing lines.”
Feuer’s Dissent
In a dissent, Justice Gail Ruderman Feuer said:
“That sentences of 50 or more years to life are functionally equivalent to LWOP sentences does not, however, resolve the question whether there is a rational basis for the Legislature to distinguish between explicit LWOP sentences and functionally equivalent LWOP sentences. The majority is correct that the Legislature may proceed incrementally in addressing a problem, for example, initially providing relief only to juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP or equivalent terms that with certainty would result in the juvenile offenders never being released from prison. But given the Legislature’s stated intent in enacting section 1170(d)(1) to ensure juvenile offenders have a meaningful opportunity for rehabilitation and reintegration into society in light of their immaturity and relative lack of control over their circumstances at the time of their crimes, there is no rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP and those sentenced to functionally equivalent sentences of 50 or more years to life.”
She continued:
“Further, I do not find plausible that the Legislature intended to limit resentencing relief to juvenile offenders who committed the most heinous crimes, such as special circumstances murder resulting in an LWOP sentence, and to deny juvenile offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent sentences of 50 years to life the same opportunity for resentencing relief that would enable them to become productive members of society.”
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