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Court of Appeal:
Causation Doesn’t Require Showing of What Happened
Summary Judgment for Defendants Reversed Where Man Who Was Sliding Down ‘Super Slide’ Got Foot Caught, Fell Off Equipment, Was Injured, but Could Provide No Account of
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Court of Appeal for this district yesterday reinstated a personal injury action against the Archdiocese of Los Angeles and others brought by a man who slid down a “super slide” at a church carnival, got his foot tangled in a mat—resembling a burlap sack—on which he was positioned, and fell off, incurring injuries.
Div. Eight, in an unpublished opinion by Presiding Justice Maria E. Stratton, reversed a summary judgment granted by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Kerry Bensinger.
In making her ruling on Nov. 16, 2022, Bensinger rejected the defendants’ contention that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk necessarily applies, but declared that plaintiff Oscar Reyes Sanchez failed to show causation because he doesn’t know how the mat got stuck.
He could only recount:
“I just remember that my—the sack got caught, and it got stuck. And my feet were tangled up, and I fell.”
Sanchez was holding a child in his arms at the time.
Judge’s Ruling
Bensinger said:
“[T]he Court finds that Defendant has met its moving burden to show that Plaintiff cannot establish the element of causation. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.
“Plaintiff argues that a reasonable jury could determine that the lack of height restrictions caused his injuries because if there were height restrictions, he would not have been able to ride the slide with his son, and having his son in his lap caused his injuries because he was unable to slow himself down on the slide with his hands….However, this only amounts to speculation because there is no evidence that he would have been able to slow down his descent with his hands. Furthermore, Plaintiff shows no causal connection between the speed of his descent and the mat becoming stuck.”
Sanchez argued on appeal:
“[W]hile the trial court was correct in finding that Defendants failed to sustain their burden in establishing that the primary assumption of risk doctrine applies, the trial court neglected to recognize that the reason the doctrine does not apply is because Defendants are common carriers and as such, owe Plaintiffs a heighted duty. Additionally, there are numerous triable issues of material fact with respect to the element of proximate cause and, specifically, whether Defendants were a substantial factor in Reyes’s injuries. Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor aptly applies to the fact of this case.”
Stratton’s Opinion
In her opinion reversing the judgment, Stratton said:
“Causation may be inferred….Sanchez felt the mat snag. This is a reasonable basis to conclude there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether the condition of the mat and/or the slide itself caused the snag which resulted in Sanchez’s fall. That Sanchez does not remember more about the fall does not mean that he lacked nonspeculative evidence of causation.”
The jurist wrote that Sanchez is not relying on speculation, explaining:
“…Sanchez offered nonspeculative evidence: he testified that he felt the mat snag—a physical sensation—and that testimony is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact about what caused the fall and subsequent injury.”
Stratton noted that Bensinger made no ruling on the applicability of res ipsa loquitor (“the thing speaks for itself:) and said that a discussion of the issue is unnecessary in light of the holding on causation.
Assumption of Risk
Addressing the defense of assumption of risk, Stratton wrote: “We agree with the trial court that for purposes of summary judgment respondents failed to carry their burden of showing there were no reasonable steps available to protect against the risk of entanglement and resulting injury while riding the slide.”
The case is Sanchez v. Candyland Amusements, B330505.
Sanchez was represented by Michael F. Baltaxe, Timothy B. Sottile, and Nicole C. Burgos Romero of the Agoura Hills firm of Sottile Baltaxe and by Westlake Village attorney Janet R. Gusdorff.
Penelope Melissa Deihl of the downtown Los Angeles firm of Clark Hill LLP and Daniel William Bir of the Century City firm of Polsinelli LLP acted for The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, as well as the Resurrection Catholic Church, where the fair took place. Those lawyers, along with David Drew-Lyle Brandon of Clark Hill, also argued on behalf of Candyland Amusements, Inc, which operated the slide. Deihl was the appellate lawyer for intervenor Ace American Insurance Company.
Archbishop Jose Horacio Gomez had been named as a defendant but was later dismissed from the action.
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