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C.A. Reinstates Action Over Council Member’s Disclosures
Opinion Says Judge Erred in Granting Anti-SLAPP Motion as to Claims Alleging Official Improperly Disseminated Information From Closed Session With City’s Attorney, Declaring Case Falls Within Public Interest Exception
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
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LESLIE RULE Ojai City Council member |
Div. Six of this district’s Court of Appeal has reinstated a lawsuit filed against an Ojai councilwoman and her lawyer over the public disclosure of information gleaned from closed sessions with the city attorney relating to a civil action filed against the municipality concerning a real estate development project, saying that a trial judge improperly granted an anti-SLAPP motion after determining that the public interest exception does not apply.
The question arose after Ojai City Council member Leslie Rule disseminated a written statement to members of the public at a regularly scheduled meeting held on Jan. 24, 2023, saying that then-Mayor Betsy Stix made a recommendation during closed meetings that the city hire an outside law firm for the development litigation based on a suggestion by the opposing attorney in that case, Sabrina D. Venskus.
Rule’s attorney, Jonathan Drucker, appeared at the public meeting and handed out a 12-page letter which alleges that Stix has ties to that plaintiff, Simply Ojai, and that principals of the organization served as campaign officials for her mayoral election. The letter was later published on a website titled “Transparent Ojai.”
Brown Act Claims
Following the disclosure, seven residents of the city filed a complaint against Rule and Drucker, asserting that the defendants violated the law by disclosing confidential information. The complaint was filed by Venskus, who is also an attorney for the plaintiffs on appeal.
The plaintiffs assert claims based on the Brown Act, which generally requires that the legislative sessions for local governmental bodies be conducted in public.
However, the Legislature has created an exception to the general rule favoring transparency in Government Code §54956.9, which provides that closed sessions may be held for the purpose of “confer[ring] with, or receiv[ing] advice from,…legal counsel regarding pending litigation when discussion in open…would prejudice the…local agency.”
Sec. 54963 specifies:
“A person may not disclose confidential information that has been acquired by being present in a closed session…to a person not entitled to receive it, unless the legislative body authorizes disclosure of that confidential information.”
Anti-SLAPP Motion
Rule and Drucker responded to the complaint by filing a special motion to strike the pleading under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, found at Code of Civil Procedure §425.16. Ventura Superior Court Judge Benjamin J. Coats granted the motion, ruling that the public interest exception, found at §425.17(b), does not apply.
That provision says that “Section 425.16” does not operate as a bar “to any action brought solely in the public interest.’
Coats noted that “[p]ersonal political agendas and motivations may make the [exception] inapplicable,” and opined that “[g]iven the nature of the case, the special interests of the parties, and the lack of supporting declarations submitted by [appellants],” the plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of establishing that the “narrowly construed exception.” He awarded attorney fees of $78,885 to the defendants.
Justice Tari L. Cody authored the opinion, filed July 23 and certified for publication yesterday, reversing the order and remanding with direction to deny the motion, saying that the exception applies and finding that the plaintiffs’ motivations in pursuing legal action are irrelevant to the analysis.
Presiding Justice Arthur Gilbert and Justice Hernaldo J. Baltodano joined in the opinion, which also reversed the award of attorney fees.
Public Interest Exception
Cody noted that if the public interest exception applies, a court may deny the special motion to strike without further inquiry.
Turning to §425.17, she said that the exception applies if three conditions are met—that the complaint does not seek any relief different from that which would benefit the general public, that the action seeks to enforce an important right affecting the public interest, and private enforcement is necessary and places a disproportionate financial burden on the plaintiff.
As to the first condition, she pointed out that the plaintiffs seek only declaratory and injunctive relief, and concluded:
“They seek no relief or advantage for themselves that is different than that sought for the public at large….The first amended complaint focuses solely and entirely on enforcing the Brown Act’s closed session requirements….The relief appellants seek—not their motivation to seek that relief—is the extent of the court’s inquiry here.”
Policy Tension
Turning to whether the plaintiffs seek to enforce an important matter of public interest, she reasoned that the case presented a tension between transparency in government and the city’s right to obtain confidential legal advice. She remarked:
“The first amended complaint alleges respondents disseminated privileged and confidential information obtained by Rule during closed sessions….If successful, appellants’ action will allow the court to discern whether respondents violated section 54963, and if so, to craft injunctive relief that will guide the parties (and public) at this troublesome intersection of two important policies. ‘Open government is a constructive value in our democratic society….The attorney-client privilege, however, also has a strong basis in public policy and the administration of justice.’ ”
Considering whether private enforcement is necessary, she explained that the Legislature expressly authorized the local district attorney to bring an action for violations of the Brown Act. However, she said:
“While the District Attorney wrote a cease-and-desist letter to the council after this action was filed concerning alleged violations of section 54963, it did not ‘commence an action’ to enforce the statute. Appellant’s private enforcement action is thus consistent with the aims of both section 54960 and the public interest exception.”
Faulting Coats’ analysis, she wrote:
“Appellants bore the burden to establish the exception applied. They did not, however, bear the burden to produce evidence supporting this position….The trial court appears to have conflated appellants’ burden to establish the exception with their burden to prove the likelihood of prevailing on their claims, or, more specifically, to produce evidence rebutting the motion’s declarations and exhibits.”
The case is Byrne v. Rule, B332962.
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