Officer’s Threats of Making Arrest Were Protected Conduct

Friday, October 31, 2025

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Court of Appeal:

Officer’s Threats of Making Arrest Were Protected Conduct

Majority Says Suit by Disabled Man Based on Order to Exit Building Where He Wanted to Fill Out Complaint of ADA Violation Was a SLAPP; Dissenter Contends CCP §425.16 Has No Applicability to Incident

By a MetNews Staff Writer

The Sixth District Court of Appeal has held that an anti-SLAPP motion was correctly granted in a case in which a man who is confined to a wheelchair was allegedly threatened by a police officer with arrest if he did not leave a post office where he was attempting to file a complaint based on what he contended was disability discrimination by the Postal Service.

Acting Presiding Justice Allison M. Danner authored Wednesday’s unpublished majority opinion, in which Justice Charles Edward Wilson joined. Justice Daniel H. Bromberg dissented, maintaining that the officer was not engaged in protected conduct.

The plaintiff— who goes by the name of “Michael T-Alexander”—was admitted to the State Bar of California in 1973 and resigned, with disciplinary charges pending, in 1989.

Allegations of Complaint

In his June 13, 2023 complaint filed in the Santa Cruz Superior Court, he told of an incident he said occurred at the main post office in the afternoon of May 10, 2022.

Alexander recited that he was waiting for an employee there to provide complaint forms on which to report his perceived violation of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) when Officer Alberto Fletes of the City of Santa Cruz’s police department arrived. He set forth in the pleading that he “was threatened, intimidated, and coerced, by Officer Fletes to abandon this right to file a disability complaint,” fearing “use of physical force by Officer Fletes against” him.

The plaintiff added that “[a]s a direct result of the threats, intimidation, and coercion i.e., what Officer Fletes said, his physical stance, the battlefield combat attire, what Officer Fletes was wearing” and what he termed Fletes’s “personal-visible-threat-appearance,” he left the building “for his physical, mentally & emotionally safety… against his free will in reasonable fear...while in a wheelchair.”

The anti-SLAPP motion, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §425.16, was granted by Santa Cruz Superior Court Judge Timothy Schmal. In his brief on appeal, Alexander protested:

“Officer Fletes’ threats of arrest occurred during what should have been routine law enforcement activity. These threats were neither made in connection with any governmental proceedings nor in a public forum addressing matters of public interest. Instead, they represented direct interference with Appellant’s exercise of federally protected rights.”

Danner’s Opinion

In finding that Schmal did not err in finding that the lawsuit, brought under various theories, was a SLAPP, Danner zeroed in on §425.16(e)(2) which renders protected “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.”

The jurist wrote:

“Broadly construed under section 425.16, Officer Fletes’s conduct comes within this category of protected acts. His statements to Alexander were made in the course of his duties responding to a call for police assistance due to an alleged trespass or public disturbance after the employees were unable to assist Alexander.”

Allegation of Unlawfulness

She went on to say:

“While Alexander argues that Officer Fletes’s oral threats of arrest and statements at the post office do not qualify as protected activity because the officer’s conduct unlawfully interfered with Alexander’s right to file an ADA complaint, Alexander does not offer any authority that would preclude defendants from invoking anti-SLAPP protection here. For example, Alexander does not attempt to show (nor does the evidence support the argument) that the assertedly protected speech was illegal as a matter of law….

“Under these circumstances, the allegation that Officer Fletes’s oral threats of arrest and statements to Alexander constituted unlawful interference with Alexander’s right to file an ADA complaint does not remove those statements from the ambit of section 425.16(e)(2).”

The conclusion that Fletes’s conduct was “protected” under the statute meant that its first prong was satisfied. As to the second prong—whether the plaintiff has shown a “probability” of prevailing on the merits—Danner declared that Alexander failed to show “a possibility of prevailing on the merits of any of his 12 causes of action.”

Bromberg’s Dissent

Bromberg said in his dissenting opinion:

“The Legislature did not enact the anti-SLAPP statute to protect the ability of law enforcement officers to perform their official duties. That ability is protected already by official immunity statutes, which, among other things, grant law enforcement officers absolute or qualified immunity against liability while enforcing the law and initiating prosecution….The anti-SLAPP statute serves a different purpose: ‘to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance’ by a special motion to strike in ‘lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.’…When police officers respond to calls for assistance, they presumably are trying to maintain the peace and perform routine law enforcement duties, not seeking to participate in matters of public significance or to exercise their rights to petition or to free speech. As a consequence, the stated purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is not served by treating statements made by police officers in performing their duties as protected activity under the statute.” The dissenter said he is unaware of any previous case holding “that the anti-SLAPP statute protects a statement made in connection with an issue under consideration by an official proceeding not yet even contemplated,” elaborating:

“The City’s counsel suggested that there was a possibility of future prosecution against Mr. Alexander, but counsel offered no reason why the anti-SLAPP statute should be interpreted to apply because of such a possibility. The majority likewise offers no reason, and I do not see any.”

The case is Alexander v. City of Santa Cruz, H051774.

Alexander has brought other lawsuits on his own behalf after relinquishing his law license. His email address makes reference to his status as a pro per litigant.