Tuesday, December 30, 2025
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California Supreme Court:
Ability-to-Pay Hearing Not Required Before Imposing Fines
Opinion Disapproves Controversial Decision by This District’s Div. Seven in People v. Dueñas
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
The California Supreme Court yesterday held that a criminal defendant is not entitled to an ability-to-pay hearing before a sentencing court imposes statutorily mandated fines, repudiating the 2019 Court of Appeal decision by this district’s Div. Seven in People v. Dueñas, which inspired contentions by numerous appellants based on its holding and which most of the panels examining the contention rejected.
The high court declared that such penalties fall within the discretion afforded to the Legislature over setting the appropriate punishment for a crime, but hat a defendant must be afforded the opportunity to avoid assessments, based on indigency, if the fees were enacted for the purpose of raising state funds.
Justice Carol Corrigan authored the opinion, saying that fines may be imposed without holding an ability-to-pay hearing, unless statutorily required, and that “a challenge to the amount” may be later pursued under “the excessive fines provisions of the United States and California Constitutions.”
However, she added that “the imposition of ancillary payments raises separate equal protection issues” because civil parties may avoid similar payments based on indigency. Accordingly, upon request, a court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment…or a court facilities assessment….”
Yesterday’s decision, joined in by Acting Chief Justice Kelli Evans as well as Justices Goodwin H. Liu, Leondra Kruger, Joshua P. Groban, and retired Justice Martin J. Jenkins, sitting by assignment, resolves a split among the courts of appeal on the issue of whether such a hearing is required at criminal sentencing.
Corrigan declared that “[w]e disapprove the following cases to the extent they are inconsistent with our opinion,” listing Div. Seven’s 2019 opinions by then-Justice Laurie D. Zelon, now a mediator/arbitrator, in Dueñas and that of then-Presiding Justice Dennis Perluss, now a lecturer at the UCLA Law School, in People v. Castellano, as well as the 2020 opinion by Justice Jon Streeter of the First District’s Div. Four in People v. Cowan.
Justice Goodwin H. Liu wrote separately to assert that “it is a distinct inquiry whether the imposition of punitive fines, coupled with any additional court-ordered monetary obligations, violates due process or equal protection principles,” pointing to a “cycle” of unemployment and homelessness that may follow when a defendant is ordered to pay fees and fines without any ability to pay them.
Presiding Justice Frances Rothschild of Div. One of this district’s Court of Appeal, sitting by assignment, agreed with the majority as to the imposition of fines but dissented as to the holding that “equal protection grants indigent criminal defendants the right to a waiver of postconviction assessments….”
Conspiracy for Murder
The question was raised by Jason Hernandez, who was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder in coordination with co-defendant Christi J. Kopp, along with other offenses and enhancements.
In 2017, then-San Diego Superior Court Judge Harry M. Elias (now retired) sentenced Hernandez to 81 years to life in prison and denied the defendant’s request that the court impose the minimum restitution fine and stay any additional payment orders due to an inability to pay. Saying that “[t]here is a possibility that the defendant may be able to earn funds while he is incarcerated,” the judge imposed various fines and ancillary costs.
After Hernandez challenged the monetary orders, Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in 2019, held that an ability-to-pay hearing was required for the court-ordered ancillary costs but not as to the fines imposed. The high court later granted the defendant’s petition for review.
Corrigan, addressing each of the specific fees imposed on Hernandez, wrote:
“Here we clarify that the label employed is not dispositive of whether a particular payment qualifies as a punitive fine, as opposed to some kind of fundraising assessment….The term ‘fine’ is properly understood as a payment imposed as punishment for criminal conduct….[T]he distinction…is important because it impacts whether a given form of required payment is initially challenged under…the constitutional excessive fines clauses, or under the constitutional provision for equal protection.”
No Distinction
She wrote:
“Defendant, making no distinction between fines and ancillary costs, contends principles of due process and equal protection forbid a court from ordering payment of any financial obligation without first finding a defendant has an ability to pay. Although all such obligations are paid to the state, we analyze fines and ancillary costs separately because different justifications support each, and different constitutional protections apply. As we have observed, ‘[i]t is…the prerogative…of the Legislature…to define degrees of culpability and punishment….’….By contrast, requiring payment of ancillary costs…reflects an intent to recoup particular costs or raise funds for specific purposes. In light of these differing justifications, we analyze fines separately from ancillary costs….”
Addressing Dueñas, the jurist said:
“Contrary to [Div. Seven’s] suggestion, we do not find a due process requirement to hold an ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine….Here we clarify that the excessive fines analysis, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines.”
Saying that “[the] defendant did not invoke the excessive fines clauses in the trial court,” the justice remarked that “[w]e remand to give him the opportunity to assert the legal analyses applicable to such a challenge and argue how the particular facts of this case inform such an inquiry.”
As to ancillary costs such as the court operations and facilities assessments imposed on Hernandez, she wrote:
“[The] defendant contends he is treated unequally compared to indigent civil litigants because the statutory scheme regarding civil fees allows waivers of similar ancillary costs by those unable to pay them. He argues no rational basis exists for not granting criminal defendants a similar opportunity to avoid such costs before they are imposed. The Attorney General agrees, and so do we.”
Raise Money
Explaining that Legislative history “confirms [that] the Legislature enacted both civil and criminal operations and facilities assessments to raise money for the courts,” she opined:
“[E]qual protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1).”
Corrigan also acknowledged that some of the assessments imposed on Hernandez, such as a $154 booking fee, have been deemed unenforceable by the Legislature in recent years and that Penal Code §1202.4, governing restitution penalties, demands that an ability-to-pay hearing be held before a court imposes a fine above the statutory minimum of $300.
Noting that Elias imposed a restitution fine of $10,000 in Hernandez’s case, Corrigan said that he may, on remand, seek to contest his inability to pay the amount exceeding the statutory minimum” and that “we vacate the unpaid portions of the booking fee…in light of recently enacted legislation.”
She added: Although our holding resolves the orders in this particular case, we urge the Legislature to revisit issues surrounding court-ordered ancillary payments in criminal cases and address them in a more comprehensive manner.”
Other Opinions
Liu said in his concurring opinion:
“I join the court in urging the Legislature to consider further reforms guided by a basic corollary to the principle of equal justice under law: While a defendant’s poverty does not make him any less subject to punishment for violating the law, our justice system must not punish a defendant more harshly simply because he is poor.”
He added:
“Today’s opinion…recognizes that on remand defendant Jason Hernandez can bring an excessive fines challenge to the imposed restitution fine of $10,000. I would hold that in the event the court determines that amount is excessive, the court must then evaluate whether imposing a lesser amount, including the $300 minimum fine, is also excessive. Specifically, if Hernandez contends that he is unable to pay the minimum restitution fine, the court must consider whether it is excessive before imposing it.”
Dissenting in part, Rothschild took issue with the notion that equal protection principles require that courts hold a hearing before imposing assessments at sentencing. She wrote:
“The majority reasons that because the purpose of both assessments and filing fees is to support court operations, criminal defendants and civil litigants are similarly situated. The majority then concludes that no rational basis exists to deny indigent criminal defendants the right to a waiver of postconviction assessments….In coming to that conclusion, the majority ignores a rational basis for the different treatment of postconviction assessments and civil filing fees. Waiving filing fees for indigent civil litigants is a rational legislative response to the due process requirement to afford them access to the courts….But unlike civil filing fees, postconviction assessments ‘do[ ] not deny a criminal defendant access to the courts.’ ”
The case is People v. Kopp, 2025 S.O.S. 3860.
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