Friday, November 14, 2025
Page 1
Appeals Court Says Prosecution for 1994 Murder May Proceed
Majority Rejects Trial Judge’s View That Delay Was Necessarily Unjustified, Prejudicial
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal held yesterday that a trial judge erred in dismissing a murder prosecution based on a 27-year delay in bringing charges.
One man—Steven Thomas—was successfully prosecuted in 1996 for the fatal stabbing two years earlier of Karl Senser during a robbery. But the San Diego District Attorney’s Office did not believe it had sufficient evidence to convict Leon Daniel McInnis who was believed to be Thomas’s accomplice.
In 2018, a fresh look was taken at the “cold case” and, in light of McInnis’s DNA being found on a napkin that had been wrapped around the knife used to stab Senser, as well new evidence that was uncovered, the opinion was formed that McInnis could now be convicted. He was charged with murder on April 26, 2021.
But San Diego Superior Court Judge Jeffrey F. Fraser ruled that the delay in bringing the prosecution was inexcusable and prejudicial.
“Under controlling California Supreme Court authorities, the trial court’s ruling cannot stand,” Acting Presiding Justice Truc T. Do said, writing for the majority. Justice Martin N. Buchanan joined in her opinion.
Supreme Court Decision
Quoting from the California Supreme Court’s 2008 opinion in People v. Nelson, authored by then-Justice Ming Chin, now a private judge, she said:
In determining whether there is a due process violation from precharging delay, courts may not find negligence by ‘second-guessing’ (1) ‘the prosecution’s decision regarding whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant bringing charges,’ (2) ‘how law enforcement agencies could have investigated a given case,’ nor (3) ‘how the state allocates its resources’ during a criminal investigation.”
Fraser did engage in “second-guessing,” she said, substituting his view of the strength of the case against McInnis as of 1994 for the opinion of the prosecutors. DNA testing, she noted, has become far more sophisticated than it was in 1994, remarking that there’s “no categorical prohibition” on prosecutors changing their mind as to bringing charges.
Separation of Powers
The justice wrote:
“Constitutional principles of separation of powers and important public policy considerations underpin these rules. In our justice system, a prosecutor may not ethically charge a defendant with a crime unless completely satisfied the People can promptly establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. And the judicial branch is required by our constitution to give deference to that executive decision of when criminal charges should be filed.”
Do differentiated between purposeful delay, terming it unjustified, and investigative delay—the sort she said in McInnis’s case—which can be found, after a weighing process is conducted, to have been justified. She declared that if the prosecution desires to proceed upon remand, the trial court must undertake to “balance the prejudice to McInnis against the People’s strong justification of investigative delay,” instructing:
“The court shall allow McInnis the opportunity to present evidence that the prejudice to his defense has been compounded by any changed circumstances during the pendency of this appeal. The court shall then reconsider whether pretrial dismissal is appropriate after properly balancing the harm to McInnis against the People’s justification for the delay and considering possible alternative remedies to mitigate the prejudice.”
Kelety’s Dissent
Justice Julia C. Kelety dissented. She expressed the view that Fraser “understood the applicable legal framework and considered the totality of circumstances in evaluating whether McInnis could receive a fair trial despite the lengthy delay.”
She argued:
“To the extent the majority concludes the trial court abused its discretion by improperly second-guessing the prosecutor’s stated view of the evidence or allocation of investigatory resources, the proper remedy is a full remand to the trial court. The majority’s assertion that the trial court must conclude that the delay was investigative only and that the People’s justification was therefore entitled to strong weight as a matter of law is reflective of the rigid nature of the framework the majority applies. The trial court should instead be afforded the opportunity to conduct a complete re-balancing, considering all relevant facts and circumstances, under the appropriate legal framework.”
She went on to say:
“I do not dispute the majority’s assertion that there is good reason for the courts to defer to a prosecutor’s decision as to when to bring charges. However, when the prosecutor does bring charges after a lengthy delay, the courts must also consider the important principles of due process and the ability of the defendant to receive a fair trial. Given these competing interests, I do not believe that deference to the prosecutor should preclude all scrutiny of the assertions regarding the charging decision.”
The case is People v. McInnis, D082909.
In 1995, McInnis pled guilty to an unrelated carjacking and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. He was released in 2006.
Copyright 2025, Metropolitan News Company