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Monday, February 26, 2024

 

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Denial of Motion to Acquit in Criminal Case Bars Malicious Prosecution Suit—C.A.

Panel Finds Interim Adverse Judgment Rule Applies

 

By a MetNews Staff Writer

 

A man who was put on trial for battery and was acquitted cannot prevail in a malicious prosecution action against his accuser because, at the end of the prosecution’s case, the judge denied a motion for acquittal, Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal has held, invoking the interim adverse judgment rule.

“We are not aware of any published decisions applying the interim adverse judgment rule to a motion for acquittal pursuant to Penal Code section 1118.1,” Justice Julia C. Kelety wrote, but said that “we find it appropriate in this case.”

Although the case was one of first impression, the opinion was not certified for publication.

The case arises from an altercation between Rynold Dwayne Jackson and Mario Lara at Misty’s Lounge, a nightclub located in the Doubletree by Hilton Ontario Airport Hotel. Lara, as director of security for the hotel, supported the bartender’s decision not to serve Jackson more drinks, perceiving that he was intoxicated.

Each insisted that the other started the fight that ensued in the hotel lobby. It was Jackson who was prosecuted.

Following his acquittal by a jury, Jackson sued Lara for malicious prosecution. He also sued DT Management, LLC, which manages the hotel, under the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), maintaining that DT makes a practice of denying equal access to African Americans, such as himself.

Summary judgment in favor of both defendants was granted by San Bernardino Superior Court Judge Janet M. Frangie.

In her opinion affirming the judgment, Kelety said, with respect to the cause of action for malicious prosecution:

“[U]nder the interim adverse judgment rule, the denial of Jackson’s motion for acquittal establishes that Lara had probable cause as matter of law. Because the lack of probable cause is a required element of malicious prosecution, there was no error in granting summary judgment on that cause of action.”

The justice recited that when Jackson moved for acquittal after the prosecution completed its case, the only evidence against him was Jackson’s testimony and surveillance footage that captured the altercation. In denying the motion, Frangie said there was substantial evidence of a battery committed by Jackson.

“This finding necessarily encompasses a determination that the evidence was sufficient to meet the probable cause standard of an objectively reasonable suspicion that Jackson committed a crime,” Kelety wrote.

She said the finding that there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct connotes a belief on Frangie’s part that a reasonable jury might find that the higher standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was met.

“[T]he denial of Jackson’s motion for acquittal establishes that Lara had probable cause as matter of law,: Kelety declared.

In his opening brief on appeal, Jackson said, as to his cause of action under the UCL, contained in Business & Professions Code §17200 et seq.:

“[T]here’s a public policy against consumers being subject to violence and unwarranted contact by employees at a business establishment.”

Kelety responded that Jackson “does not provide any argument or legal authority showing that this claimed public policy exists, nor does he identify the basis for this claimed public policy,” remarking that “therefore, we may disregard this point.”

Jackson also argued:

“DT’s practice of excluding Appellant from its establishment based on race, a false accusation of assault, ensuing arrest without probable cause and sufferance of physical assault by one of its employees clearly indicates a violation of public policy and an unfair business practice in violation of Cal. B&P 17200.”

He proceeded to tie his allegation of racial discrimination to Civil Code §51.5 which bars such discrimination by a business establishment. Kelety said:

“Jackson did not raise this claim in the trial court.  It was not asserted in his written opposition to the motion, and he did not appear at the hearing on the motion.  Jackson may not raise this theory for the first time on appeal; therefore, we will not consider it.”

The case is Jackson v. Lara, D081549.

 

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