Page 1
Court of Appeal:
Amended Felony-Murder Rule Does Not Require Assisting in Actual Killing
Majority, Dissent Clash as to What Actus Reus Is Required for Aider and Abettor Who Intends to Kill
By a MetNews Staff Writer
An accomplice may be convicted under the felony-murder rule—to the extent it was not abolished by 2018 legislation—under circumstances where the person does not assist in the killing, Div. Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal held on Friday, in a 2-1 opinion.
“A person who, with an intent to kill, directly commits or aids and abets an enumerated felony in which a death occurs commits the actus reus necessary for felony murder under the amended felony-murder statute by acting in furtherance of the common design of the felony,” Justice Thomas A. Delaney said, writing for the majority.
His opinion affirms an order denying a petition for the resentencing of a man convicted of a 1987 murder for robbery and rape where the special circumstances instructions required a finding of a specific intent to kill but did not require a finding that the defendant, James Stockwell, aided and abetted in the actual killing. Under the facts of the case, Stockwell could be convicted of first-degree murder today, precluding resentencing, Delaney wrote, and was joined by Presiding Justice Kathleen O’Leary.
The decision affirms the denial of resentencing by Orange Superior Court Judge Lewis W. Clapp.
Justice Eileen C. Moore dissented, arguing that under Penal Code §189, as amended in 2018 by Senate Bill 1437, an accomplice must have had a role in the killing, not merely an underlying felony, to be convicted of first-degree murder.
Penal Code §189(e)(2)
Although SB 1437 for the most abolished the ages-old felony-murder rule, under which malice of the killer was fictionally imputed to an aider and abettor, even if that person had no murderous intent. However, in Penal Code §189(e)(2), it retained imputed malice to the extend that a person who “was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree” could himself be convicted of first-degree murder.
Interpreting §189(e)(2), Delaney wrote:
“Unlike the actual killer, a person who is not the actual killer must both have a certain mental state (mens rea) and have engaged in a specified act (actus reus) to be convicted of felony murder under the amended statutes….The relevant mens rea in this case, which is indisputably evidenced by the record of conviction, is an intent to kill….The actus reus component requires a closer analysis.”
Drawing support from language in a California Supreme Court opinion and what he discerned to be legislative intent, he reached this conclusion:
“Before the amendments, and now, the person who kills while acting in furtherance of the common design of the underlying felony is the actual killer and is guilty of first degree murder irrespective of his or her mental state regarding the killing.”
Moore’s Dissent
Moore saw no reason no examine legislative intent, insisting that “[t]he language of section 189 (e)(2) is plain and unambiguous.”
She wrote:
“In a felony murder prosecution of a nonkiller participant in the underlying felony who acted with the intent to kill (the mens rea), the People are required to prove that the defendant aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of first degree murder (the actus reus).”
Moore declared that the “actus reus requirement of the current felony-murder rule was understandably never considered, deliberated upon, or found true by the jury” as to Morris, saying she would reverse Clapp’s order and remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
The case is People v. Morris, G061916.
Copyright 2024, Metropolitan News Company