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Court of Appeal:
Defense Verdict Scrapped Based on Denigration of Plaintiff
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Court of Appeal for this district, in a 2-1 decision that was certified for publication yesterday, reversed a judgment in favor of an employer in a constructive termination case, holding that the trial judge improperly admitted evidence of employee complaints about the plaintiff for the purpose of showing that her job was in jeopardy, providing a motive for her to fabricate accounts of sexual harassment.
Presiding Justice Maria E. Stratton of Div. Eight wrote the majority opinion, in which Justice Victor Viramontes joined. Justice Elizabeth A. Grimes dissented. The opinions were initially filed Nov. 8 and were not slated for publication.
The decision grants a new trial to Eunices Argueta who sued her former employer, Worldwide Flight Services, Inc.(“WFS”), for allegedly creating a hostile work environment by tolerating sexual harassment of her by Dzung Nguyen.
Bachner’s Ruling
Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Monica Bachner allowed evidence to be presented to jurors of five written complaints about Argueta’s bullying and nastiness by co-workers, prompting a supervisor to tell her that she would be fired if her behavior did not improve. The judge advised jurors that the complaints were being read to them for a limited purpose, explaining:
“[T]he complaints of other employees about Ms. Argueta are not being received for the truth of those complaints; rather, they are being received for the effect on Ms. Argueta when she was told about those complaints. You are not to consider whether the allegation in the complaints are true or not.”
In her final instructions, she said:
“During the trial, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. You may consider that evidence only for that purpose and for no other.”
The jury found for WFS and Bachner denied a motion for a new trial based on the prejudicial effect of the letters being admitted.
Appellant’s Contention
Argueta argued on appeal:
“Although the trial should have been only about the sexual harassment committed by Nguyen, it was not. Through its erroneous evidentiary rulings, the court allowed Argueta to be put on trial for her bullying of subordinates. WFS was thus permitted to divert the jury’s attention from the conduct that even WFS itself considered to be a violation of its sexual harassment policy.
“Victim-shaming is a tried-but true tactic successfully used to deflect jurors’ attention away from the culprit’s transgressions. The evidence of Argueta’s callous conduct towards her subordinates had little if any relevance to the issues being tried and was so highly biased against Argueta that it should have compelled the court to exclude it under Evidence Code section 352.”
That section provides:
“The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
Stratton’s Opinion
In her opinion reversing the judgment, Stratton acknowledged that the letters “support a reasonable inference that Argueta had a motive to fabricate her claim that Nguyen sexually harassed her, that is, to save her job.” However, she declared:
“We agree with Argueta that the high potential for undue prejudice from admission of the substance of the complaints far outweighed the very minimal probative value of that evidence, and a limiting instruction would not be effective under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we find the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the substance of the complaints. We independently assess the effect of this error and find it prejudicial: it materially affected appellant’s substantial rights and prevented her from having a fair trial.”
She went on to say:
“Here, the employee complaints about appellant fit the quintessential definition of prejudice. The trial court failed to recognize that the evidence had a high potential for undue prejudice. It is, as Argueta contends, character evidence. The complaints show her as mean, rude, lazy, and dishonest. In this context, the accusations of dishonesty are particularly prejudicial.”
Stratton found that the prejudice was intensified by reference to the complaints in closing argument by WFS’s lawyer for a broader purpose than to show a motive for Argueta to fabricate an account of sexual harassment.
“We cannot agree with the trial court that counsel’s closing argument about the substance of the complaints was proper, even under the trial court’s erroneous assessment of the probative value of the substance of the complaints,” Stratton wrote.
Grime’s Dissent
Grimes said in her dissent:
“[A] reading of the entire transcript leads me to conclude the jury could easily decide the harassment was not severe or pervasive, and that any error in the admission of the substance of the employee complaints was not prejudicial. I accordingly conclude the trial court did not err in finding there was substantial, credible evidence on both of the critical points: the harassment was not severe or pervasive, and there was no adverse employment action.”
She commented:
“Appellant’s opening brief says the substance of the complaints took 15 pages of reporter’s transcript, which, in the context of the 18 volumes of reporter’s transcripts of the proceedings of this lengthy jury trial, does not seem likely to have tainted the whole trial.”
The case is Argueta v. Worldwide Flight Services, Inc., B306910.
Matthew J. Matern, Debra J. Tauger, Joshua D. Boxer and Irina A. Kirnosova of the Manhattan Beach firm of Matern Law Group represented Argueta. Robert L. Rosenthal of the Beverly Hills office of Howard & Howard acted for WFS.
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