Metropolitan News-Enterprise

 

Tuesday, March 7, 2023

 

Page 3

 

Court of Appeal:

Juvenile Court Order Must Be Vacated in Case of Man, 26

 

By a MetNews Staff Writer

 

The Court of Appeal for this district yesterday granted a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Santa Barbara Superior Court to vacate an order for the deferred entry of judgment declaring a man who is now age 26 to be a juvenile delinquent based on crimes he committed as a minor.

Justice Kenneth Yegan of Div. Six wrote the opinion, saying:

“The courts should not abandon common sense when they are called upon to construe a statutory scheme. They must neither add language nor subtract language from the scheme. We follow these percepts and hold that a 26-year-old adult is not amenable to deferred entry of judgment for a minor. Why? Such a person is no longer a minor in juvenile court. The program is designed as a rehabilitative measure for a minor. A person, such as petitioner, is beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. There is no enforcement mechanism if and when he or she is not compliant with the program. We should not try to force a square peg into a round hole.”

Statutory Scheme

Welfare & Institutions Code §790 provides that where a “minor has not previously been declared to be a ward of the court for the commission of a felony offense” and is “at least 14 years of age at the time of the hearing,” probation may be ordered, with a deferred entry of judgment (“DEJ”). Under §793:

“If the minor has performed satisfactorily during the period in which deferred entry of judgment was granted, at the end of that period the charge or charges in the wardship petition shall be dismissed and the arrest upon which the judgment was deferred shall be deemed never to have occurred and any records in the possession of the juvenile court shall be sealed….”

In January 2022, a juvenile delinquency petition under §602 was filed in Superior Court against “M.E.,” age 25,  alleging, as a minor, he had committed a “lewd act upon a child...under the age of fourteen years.” He admitted the offense, a requisite for a DEJ. In fact, the Office of Attorney General argued, all criteria for eligibility are met. Although M.E. was an adult at the time of the hearing on the petition, it noted, the statute merely says “at least 14 years of age” and does not set an upper limit.

Fourth District Opinion

Yegan acknowledged that, as set forth by Div. Three f the Fourth District Court of Appeal in its 2019 decision in People v. Ramirez, “Because the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is based on age at the time of the violation of a criminal law or ordinance, ‘[i]t is therefore possible that a person might commit a murder at age 17, be apprehended 50 years later, and find himself subject to juvenile court jurisdiction at age 67.’  ”

However, the jurist said, M.E.’s offense was not one warranting retention of jurisdiction until the offender reached the age of 23 or 25, depending on the maximum sentence for the crime if committed by an adult, and “the juvenile court could retain jurisdiction over him only until his 21st birthday.”  Although the Office of Attorney General argued that if the Legislature wanted to set a maximum age for a DEJ, it would have done so, Yegan said there was no need to do so, explaining:

“As a matter of law, a juvenile court’s grant of deferred entry of judgment is void if it does not have jurisdiction over the person because of his age.”

Common Sense

He wrote:

“Common sense compels the conclusion that petitioner is  just too old to be ‘treated’ as a ‘minor’ and the section 602  petition must be dismissed. Any action other than a dismissal  would be void.”

Yegan added:

“We do not lightly so conclude. Lewd act with a child is a very  serious felony offense.”

He pointed out, however, that under §791(a)(3), if the order by Santa Barbara Superior Court Judge Gustavo E. Lavayen were upheld, and M.E. flunked probation, the only recourse would be to hold a dispositional hearing.

“But because of petitioner’s age, the court would be without jurisdiction to declare him a ward and conduct a  dispositional hearing,” Yegan said. “It makes no sense for a juvenile court to  grant deferred entry of judgment if the terms of probation are  unenforceable.”

The case is M.E. v. Superior Court (People), 2023 S.O.S. 830.

 

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