Page 1
Ninth Circuit Panel Is Split on Duty to Return Unlicensed Driver’s Impounded Vehicle
Majority Says That Under Precedent, It Must Be Released
Unconditionally to Licensed Driver Accompanying Owner
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held yesterday, in a 2-1 decision, that three members of the California Highway Patrol were improperly granted qualified immunity in a suit over their refusal to release an impounded automobile to an unlicensed driver except on condition that her attorney agree in writing to make sure the client did not drive until she became licensed.
Qualified immunity is available only where officers have acted in violation of clearly established law and, Circuit Judge Morgan Christen and Senior Circuit Judge Carlos Bea said in a memorandum opinion, the Ninth Circuit’s 2017 opinion in Brewster v. Beck and its 2018 decision in Sandoval v. County of Sonoma “establish that the conditional release agreement was unconstitutional” under the Fourth Amendment.
Dissenting, Circuit Judge Sandra S. Ikuta maintained:
“There is no case clearly establishing that police officers violate constitutional rights if they release an unlicensed driver’s vehicle subject to the condition that the driver not be allowed to drive the car.”
Vehicle Impounded
Plaintiff Angelica Untalan’s 2000 Pontiac was impounded on May 12, 2019, after officers determined, following a traffic stop, that Untalan did not have a driver’s license. Two days later, an unidentified California Highway Patrol officer declined to release the vehiclle to Untalan notwithstanding her offer to pay the storage fee because the car was under a 30-day impoundment, pursuant to California Vehicle Code §14602.6(a).
At a hearing on May 24, conducted by Captain Tariq Johnson and Lieutenants Jonathan Cochran and Joseph Zagorski, Untalan was accompanied by her lawyer, Leah Paula Zeidler-Ordaz, who was a licensed driver. She insisted that under Brewster, release of the vehicle was mandatory given that she, not her client, would drive it.
It was agreed by the officers that there would be a release, but only if the lawyer signed a form stating she would “ensure that the driver indicated below will not be given, rented, or provided this vehicle or any other vehicle to drive, until he/she is properly licensed.”
Zeidler-Ordaz would not sign, insisting that under Brewster, the duty to release the vehicle was absolute. The vehicle was sold at a lien sale on July 1, 2019.
Untalan sued for a civil rights violation.
Decision in Brewster
In Brewster, a motorist loaned her car to her brother-in-law. He was stopped by police and, when it was detewrmined he was unlicensed, the car was impounded.
When the owner, Lamya Brewster, showed up at the Los Angeles Police Department, showing her license, she was denied access to her vehicle on the ground that §14602.6(a) required a 30-day impoundment.
Reversing a determination by District Court Judge Jesus G. Bernal of the Central District of California, the Ninth Circuit said, in an opinion by then-Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski:
“A seizure is justified under the Fourth Amendment only to the extent that the government’s justification holds force. Thereafter, the government must cease the seizure or secure a new justification. Appellees have provided no justification here.”
Majority’s View
In yesterday’s opinion, Christen and Bea said that in Brewster, as well as Sandoval, “we concluded that the government’s community-caretaking justification for impounding a vehicle no longer held force once a licensed driver was available to take possession of the car.” They declared:
“Here, the broad language of the conditional release agreement encroached on Untalan’s possessory interests more than was necessary to prevent unlicensed driving pursuant to the officers’ community-caretaking authority. By requiring that Untalan’s counsel ensure she did not ‘have access to |the car|’ for thirty days, even though a licensed driver was available to take possession, the conditional release agreement prevented Untalan from exercising her valid possessory interests unrelated to driving—for example, she would be barred from accessing the car to store her possessions in it or to perform maintenance on it.
“In light of Brewster and Sandoval, no reasonable officer could have concluded that requiring that Untalan be denied all access to her car for 30 days was a permissible exercise of the police’s community-caretaking function. We therefore reverse the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment for Cochran, Zagorski, and Johnson on Untalan’s § 1983 claim on the basis of qualified immunity.”
(The majority erred in reciting that access would be barred for 30 days; it was to be barred until Untalan gained a driver’s license.)
Ikuta’s Dissent
Ikuta said in her dissent:
“In Brewster v. Beck (on which the majority relies), we held only that officers could not continue to impound a vehicle under the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment once the owner ‘showed up with proof of ownership and a valid driver’s license.’…(emphasis added). This conclusion is inapplicable here, because Untalan did not show up with a valid driver’s license at the time of the storage hearing. Therefore, a reasonable police officer could believe that the state still had a legitimate ‘interest in keeping unlicensed drivers off the road.’ ”
Sandoval was likewise inapposite, she said.
“Because the majority’s ‘clearly established’ rule is neither clear nor established, the officers here are entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct at the May 23 storage hearing,” Ikuta wrote.
She agreed with the majority that no liability attached to the May 14, 2019 refusal by an officer to release the vehicle because his identity was never ascertained.
The case is Untalan v. Stanley, No. 22-55077.
Copyright 2023, Metropolitan News Company