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Ninth Circuit:
No-Contest Plea Does Not Bar Suit Brought by Man Against Whom Charges Were Dismissed
Heck v. Humphrey Only Applies Where There Has Been
A Conviction and Sentence, Opinion Declares
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held yesterday that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1994 holding in Heck v. Humphrey that a civil rights action may not be maintained based on a wrongful conviction unless that conviction has not been invalidated does not preclude an action by a man who pled no contest to resisting arrest but whose plea was held in abeyance and, after he completed 10 hours of community service, the case was dismissed.
District Court Judge Kathleen Cardone of the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation, authored the opinion. She said that District Court Judge Morrison C. England Jr. of the Eastern District of California erred in dismissing Francisco Duarte’s false arrest claim against Stockton police officers and granting judgment in their favor on his false arrest claim, in reliance on Heck.
She also said England erred in dismissing municipal liability claims against the city and its police department on the theory that they are not “persons,” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a civil rights statute, saying that “longstanding precedent establishes that both California municipalities and police departments are “persons” amenable to suit” under that section.
Holding in Heck
Writing for the majority in Heck, Justice Antonin Scalia (since deceased) said:
“We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus….A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.”
Scalia continued:
“Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.”
Cardone’s Opinion
Cardone wrote:
We have never considered whether the Heck bar applies when criminal charges were dismissed after entry of a plea that was held in abeyance pending the defendant’s compliance with certain conditions. We hold that Heck does not apply in this situation.”
She recited that under Heck, the plaintiff must “prove the unlawfulness of his conviction” and declared:
“But because Duarte was never convicted, we find that the Heck bar does not apply.”
The visiting jurist elaborated:
“Although Duarte entered the equivalent of a guilty plea, the state court never entered an order finding him guilty of the charge to which he pleaded. Instead, the court ordered that its acceptance of Duarte’s plea would be ‘held in abeyance,’ pending his completion of ten hours of community service and obedience of all laws. Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘abeyance’ as, ‘Temporary inactivity: suspension.’…Suspension of the plea is not a finding of guilt or a conviction.”
She said “the sine qua non of Heck is a judgment of conviction and a resultant sentence.”
Unusual Circumstance
Cardone came under the unusual circumstance of being a District Court judge in a state that is in the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals rejecting a decision of that circuit. In yesterday’s opinion for the Ninth Circuit, she said, addressing the Fifth Circuit’s 2007 decision in DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi:
“We recognize the Fifth Circuit has…held ‘a deferred adjudication order is a conviction for the purposes of Heck’s favorable termination rule’ because it is ‘a judicial finding that the evidence substantiates the defendant’s guilt’ and ‘a final judicial act.’…[W]e do not adopt that logic. The final judicial act is either the dismissal of the charges or the imposition of a sentence.”
She also noted a factual distinction.
“Challenges that cast doubt on such judgments are the province of direct appeals or habeas—not § 1983,” Cardone wrote, adding:
“But where, as here, the criminal charges were dismissed and there is no conviction to impugn, the tension with which Heck was principally concerned is missing. Also absent are any concerns about finality, consistency, or comity, when there is no order in the state criminal case with which a decision in the federal civil lawsuit could be inconsistent.”
The case is Duarte v. City of Stockton, 21-16929.
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