Page 1
Bid for Finding of Factual Innocence Came 10 Years Too Late, Appeals Court Says
Dissenter: Man Showed Good Cause for Delay by Proclaiming
He Didn’t Know of Statute Permitting Petitions for Relief
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Ignorance of the law is an excuse for not filing a petition for a declaration of factual innocence of a crime within the two-year period allotted by statute, a Court of Appeal presiding justice opined on Friday, dissenting from an opinion holding that such a petition, filed more than 12 years after the defendant was charged with murder, was properly denied.
The petitioner, Matthew Timothy O’Day, had been accused of fatally stabbing a man but, following a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found no basis to bind him over for trial.
Friday’s opinion shows that two justices of the First District’s Div. Three found unavailing petitioner Matthew Timothy O’Day’s insistence that he acted timely in bringing his petition in 2020 because he did not learn of the availability of relief until 2018. But to Presiding Justice Alison M. Tucher, that was a good enough excuse for the delay and, she asserted, the issue of factual innocence should have been determined on the merits.
Penal Code §851.8
At issue was an application of Penal Code §851.8(l) which specifies that a person who was charged but not convicted may file a petition for a declaration of factual innocence at a time “up to two years from the date of the arrest or filing of the accusatory pleading, whichever is later,” adding, however:
“Any time restrictions on filing for relief under this section may be waived upon a showing of good cause by the petitioner and in the absence of prejudice.”
Writing for himself and Justice Ioana Petrou, Justice Victor Rodríguez said:
“Here, the two-year limitations period began to run no later than April 2008—when the first amended complaint was filed—and it expired no later than April 2010….The petition, filed more than a decade later, was untimely.”
Further Inquiry
He continued:
“But that does not end our inquiry. We must decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding O’Day failed to satisfy his burden to demonstrate good cause for the late-filed petition. Section 851.8 does not define good cause and O’Day does not proffer a definition.”
The jurist said that People v. Drew—decided by the Fourth District’s Div. One on Oct. 12, 2017—“provides guidance.” There, Justice William Dato noted that that, in a different context, whether there was good cause for delay was considered in light of “(1) the nature and strength of the justification for the delay, (2) the duration of the delay, and (3) the prejudice to either the defendant or the prosecution that is likely to result from the delay.”
Rodríguez wrote:
“We acknowledge the emotional challenges O’Day faced after being held in pretrial custody for charges that were later dismissed, and we commend him on prioritizing employment and education upon his release. But we cannot conclude it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court—after reviewing the length of the delay, the proffered justification for the delay, and the relevant circumstances of the case—to find O’Day did not show good cause.”
Tucher’s Dissent
Tucher commented that, given the determination of the magistrate that there was “not...any credible evidence” that O’Day was the assailant, the petitioner has a “plausible claim of factual innocence.” She expressed this view:
“Here, the People have not argued prejudice and, until today, no published decision has construed “good cause” as used in section 851.8. I would interpret good cause more generously than do my colleagues. Specifically, I would find good cause excuses the decade-long delay attributed to petitioner being unaware that California law allows for such a thing as a petition for factual innocence, or indeed that the law offers any potential remedy for the difficulties his arrest continues to cause.”
She argued:
“As for whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding no good cause here, I see legal error in the trial court’s failure to consider whether O’Day’s inaction was objectively reasonable….Instead, the court found no good cause because nobody counseled O’Day ‘he could not file such a petition,’ there was no ‘legal impediment or barrier’ preventing him from filing one, and no circumstances ‘such as incarceration or medial inability’ rendered filing a petition impossible. All true, but in my view, this set of reasons sets the bar too high. A petitioner should not have to show some impediment made it virtually impossible for him to have filed earlier. He need only establish good—i.e., objectively reasonable—cause for his delay.”
Tucher went on to say:
“A factual innocence petition is, by its nature, filed by someone alleging he or she was the victim of a mistake made in our criminal justice system. The petition does not seek to overturn an existing conviction, but merely to protect the successful petitioner from further consequences for that mistake. In this context, I would not define ‘good cause’ so narrowly as to make timeliness harder to prove in a petition for factual innocence than it is in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.”
The presiding justice added:
“Whether 0’Day*s petition was untimely for other reasons, since it was filed almost two years after he learned of the possibility of a petition for factual innocence, or whether the trial court was correct in denying O’Day’s petition on the merits are issues on which I express no opinion.”
The case is People v. O’Day, 2022 S.O.S. 5704.
Copyright 2022, Metropolitan News Company