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Court of Appeal:
Bad Faith Not Required for Breach-of-Local-Rule Sanction
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Monetary sanctions may be imposed based on a lawyer’s violation of local rules even where the judge finds that there was a lack of bad faith, Div. Two of the First District Court of Appeal declared yesterday.
It also held that Code of Civil Procedure §575.2, which authorizes such sanctions, is not confined to conduct relating to pre-trial proceedings.
The opinion by Justice Therese M. Stewart affirms a $950 sanction imposed on Sacramento attorney Dennise S. Henderson by San Mateo Superior Court Judge Nancy L. Fineman based on failing to adhere to deadlines imposed under local rules.
Sec. 575.2 provides, in part:
“Local rules promulgated pursuant to Section 575.1 may provide that if any counsel…fails to comply with any of the requirements thereof, the court on motion of a party or on its own motion may…order that…counsel to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses in making the motion, including reasonable attorney fees.”
Sec. 575.1 authorizes promulgation of local rules “designed to expedite and facilitate the business of the court.”
The San Mateo Superior Court has such a local rule.
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HENDERSON |
Nearly $38,000 Sought
Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. sought sanctions against Henderson, lead counsel for the plaintiff, in the amount of $37,587.50 based on conduct that delayed proceedings.
Stewart commented that Fineman “could have imposed a higher amount” than $950 “and was generous in awarding only an amount below that required to be reported by the State Bar,” which is any sanction of $1,000 or more.
In contesting the sanction, Henderson relied upon the finding by Stewart that she had not acted in bad faith, which precluded a sanction under Code of Civil Procedure §995. Stewart responded:
“On its face, nothing in the text of section 575.2 indicates a legislative intention to limit sanctions for local rule violations to bad faith conduct.”
She pointed out that the section “does not employ terms like ‘bad faith’ or ‘frivolous’ or incorporate section 128.5 by reference,” adding:
“Moreover, the statute’s only limitation would implicitly seem to refute a requirement of bad faith. That is, it specifies that sanctions may be imposed only against a party’s lawyer ‘if a failure to comply with these rules is the responsibility of counsel and not of the party.’ (§ 575.2, subd. (b), italics added.) The term ‘responsibility’ would appear to encompass conduct much broader than culpability rising to the level of bad faith.”
Effect of Heading
Henderson also contended that §575.2 does not apply to trial conduct because it and §575.1 are located in a portion of the Code of Civil Procedure labeled “Pretrial Conferences.” Stewart said it is established by case law that such headings are not determinative of the scope of code sections, adding:
“The language of sections 575.1 and 575.2 is not ambiguous, nor does Henderson suggest that it is or point out any ambiguity. In arguing the code heading should control over the unambiguous statutory language, Henderson simply asserts her point in a vacuum with no legal support and ignores California law of statutory construction.
“If that were not enough, there is a case specifically rejecting Henderson’s argument about the significance of the title heading under which sections 575.1 and 575.2 appear in the code.”
Stewart’s reference was to the 1986 opinion by Div. Three of this district’s Court of Appeal in Public Works Board v. Bragg.”
“Henderson did not cite the case in her opening brief, but Chase appropriately called it to our attention,” she said.
The jurist related:
“We publish this opinion to make clear that, in the future, an appellate argument such as this that is so lacking in even potentially persuasive value will indeed carry the possibility of sanctions as a frivolous appeal.”
The case is JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Henderson, A160188.
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